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Menorca was a British possessiorf for more than seventy 
years between 1708 and 1802. 
This thesis traces British influence upon, and involvement 
with Menorca from the seventeenth century until Spain 
recovered the island in 1802. Eighteenth-century Menorcan 
history has been tackled specifically by only two British 
historians, Ella Murdie (1931) and Desmond Gregory (1990), 
but neither has drawn upon primary source material which is 
to be found outside Britain. The following study is based on 
British archives, on primary sources in Spain, Mallorca and 
Menorca, and on some hitherto untapped material in Britain 
and Canada. 
Chapter one is an account of English interest in Menorca 
prior to 1708, and chapter two deals with the capture and 
early years of British de facto rule. The following three 
chapters analyse the Menorcan social structure, and the 
island's administrative, judicial and ecclesiastical 
institutions and organisation. Chapters six and seven examine 
the role of the military garrison and naval base. Chapter 
eight illustrates Menorcals vulnerability to attack; chapter 
nine assesses the impact of British de jure government, and 
chapter ten is an account of the final British occupation. 
The last chapter adds a coda to the British presence, and 
appraises the value of the island to Britain, and of Britain 
to Menorca. 
Britain's determination to retain Menorca sprang more from 
pride than sound judgement. It soured relations with Spain; 
it ignored the island's poor intrinsic commercial potential, 
and that Menorcals defence demanded a priority in naval and 
military resources quite disproportionate to the island's 
political and strategic importance. Britain gained little 
from Menorca and lost much, but the reverse was true of the 
Menorcans. Despite the clash of religion, the generally 
tolerant British government gave scope for the Menorcans who 
so chose to benefit socially, culturally, commercially and 
materially from the British presence. 
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Quotations 
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2 
Introduction. 
My initial interest in Menorca was linguistic, and dates 
from some forty years ago when I first visited the island 
with the intention of recording any remaining legacy of the 
English language in Menorqui, the Menorcan dialect of 
Catalan. Circumstances prevented this study from being 
completed until 1971, by which time my research, which had 
involved not only oral verification but also an examination 
of official records in the Menorcan archives, had led me to 
broaden my horizons with the ultimate aim of producing a 
comprehensive study of all aspects of Britain's relations 
with, and influence upon, Menorca during the seventy-one 
years in which the island was governed by Britain in the 
eighteenth century. The realisation of this objective has 
been delayed because, until recently, I have had no 
opportunity to undertake the essential scrutiny of relevant 
primary source material in this country and abroad which 
forms the basis of this thesis. 
Surprisingly, in view of the number of years of British 
rule in Menorca and of the importance which Britain attached 
to its possession in the eighteenth century, only two English 
historians, Ella Murdie and Desmond Gregory, have 
specifically examined the years of British rule. Murdie's 
study took the form of an unpublished thesis in 1931,1 and 
Gregory's book was published only in 1990,2 when the bulk of 
the research for this thesis had been completed. Murdie's 
original research was based exclusively upon material in the 
3 
Colonial Office files on Menorca in the Public Record Office, 
together with information obtained from some manuscripts in 
the British Library, and her study was restricted to the 
years of British de jure government (1713-1756,1763-1782). 
Gregory made full use of the sources previously consulted by 
Murdie, and he also found additional material in the Public 
Record Office in Admiralty, War Office, Home Office, Foreign 
Office, Privy Council and State papers; in the National Army 
Museum and in private papers housed in some provincial 
archives. However, Gregory's findings were not based upon any 
primary sources in Menorca, Spain o. r Mallorca. He excused 
this lacuna on grounds of lack of time and resources but, 
from his obvious unfamiliarity with the rules of Castilian 
orthography, manuscripts written in Spanish, and especially 
the island's records all written in Menorqui in the 
eighteenth century, would clearly have presented unaccustomed 
problems. 
Moreover, Gregory's research did not uncover all the 
material relevant to Menorca in the Admiralty, War Office and 
Colonial Office files in the Public Record Office, nor did he 
refer to material to be found in the Leake, Mitchell, 
Strange, Wentworth, Robinson, Nelson, Whitefoord, Townshend, 
Pasley and Keene papers in the British Library. He did not 
draw upon sources to be found in London in the National 
Maritime Museum, in the libraries of the Society for the 
Propagation of Christian Knowledge, and in the Masonic United 
Grand Lodge. Elsewhere, manuscripts not consulted by Gregory 
are housed in the Scottish Record Office, the National 
Archives of Canada and in the following British provincial 
Record offices: Bedfordshire, Clwyd, Gloucestershire, 
4 
Northamptonshire, Staffordshire, Suffolk, East Sussex and 
West Sussex. It has to be said that none of this material 
serves to contradict Gregory's overall conclusions, but much 
of it contributes to a fuller picture of British Menorca, 
and the records of the Society for the Propagation of 
Christian Knowledge provide a greater insight into Britain's 
intentions in respect of religious tolerance in Menorca and 
the ecclesiastical government of the island. 
Two French historians, Raoul de Cisternes3 and Edouard 
Guillon, 4 consulted French archives to chronicle the short 
period of French rule, and a third., Irenee Lameire, also 
writing at the turn of this century, drew additionally upon 
archives 'in the island in his account of the foreign 
occupations of Menorca. 5 But no Spanish historian has yet 
published a specific study of the years of British rule. 
Apart from a rather shallow and insubstantial monograph by 
the Menorcan-born novelist Mario Verdaguer, 6 no such complete 
study has been undertaken by any Menorcan historian writing 
in Castilian or Catalan, although the years in question have 
been chronicled by a number of authors in the context of the 
overall history of the island. Most of these accounts reflect 
the findings expressed in the two seminal histories of 
Menorca written towards the end of the nineteenth century by 
the Menorcans Rafael Oleo y Quadrad07 and Pedro Riudavets y 
Tudury. 8 Both Oleo and Riudavets, and also Francisco 
Hernandez Sanz in his influential work on the history and 
geography of Menorca published in the first decade of this 
century, 9 made use of material already researched and 
published by Menorcans - notably the monographs of two 
members of the Ramis family in the years 1787 to 1832.10 They 
5 
also had access to all the island's official archives, and to 
collections of papers in private hands. Regrettably, a 
sizeable proportion of this material is now missing or is no 
longer accessible, and of the notes supplied by these authors 
(following the conventions of the age in which they were 
writing), most were explanatory rather than indicative of the 
source. 
Particular aspects or incidents of British Menorca have 
recently been chronicled by historians writing in Castilian 
or Menorquii. Most have relied upon secondary sources on which 
to base their accounts, but where pr. imary sources have, been 
consulted (except in the numerous articles and monographs by 
Fernando Marti Camps, who has brought a new dimension to bear 
in some of his work, by including material from the diocesan 
archives to which he, as librarian, has ready access), these 
have been found in archives on mainland Spain, Mallorca or 
elsewhere abroad, and it has to be admitted that the 
municipal archives in Menorca are no longer the rich and 
dependable source of material they once must have been. The 
records of the Universitats of Mercadal and Alayor are not 
now open to researchers, although there is an index (1915) of 
what the Alayor archives should contain. It is possible to 
consult the municipal archives in Ciudadela, but here the 
records are largely jumbled and unclassified, with only a 
part-time archivist battling against the odds -to bring some 
order to bear. In Mahon, most of the municipal records are 
readily available, but many of the manuscripts are in poor 
condition and there are gaps in the records, with some 
material (notably all the records of the transactions of the 
vice-admiralty court) having gone missing in recent years. 
6 
Nevertheless, much of the material consulted in these 
archives has served to produce a better perspective of 
contentious issues during the British government of Menorca. 
It is the aim of this thesis to produce a comprehensive 
study of all aspects of the years of British rule in Menorca, 
based principally upon primary sources of material. The 
Menorcan and Spanish archives have helped considerably to 
balance the arguments and, of the British official sources, 
the most rewarding have been the Colonial and War Office 
files. The most disappointing British material, given that 
the prime reason for acquiring Menorca was to provide the 
navy with a naval base in Mah6n, has come from the Admiralty 
records, which are not complete and, while they provide a 
good account of the installations and workings of the base, 
in contrast with the War Office files, they offer little in 
the way of human and social interest. French archives have 
not been consulted, since their relevance falls largely 
outside the scope of this study; nor has reference been made 
to other archives in Spain, partly because of a lack of 
resources, but principally because the material to be found 
there is either duplicated in the various sections of the 
Archivo General in Simancas (which have been thoroughly 
examined), or has been faithfully copied and forms part of a 
collection of duplicates of original documents in other 
Spanish archives now held in the Biblioteca Bartomeu March in 
Palma, Mallorca. The collection was assembled forty years ago 
by Manuel Cencillo y de Pineda, Briones y Sanchez, Conde de 
Pernia, with the unrealised objective of writing a history of 
Menorca in the eighteenth century. 
7 
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Chapter One. 
The island of Menorca and early English interest in it. 
Geography. 
Menorca lies on latitude 40, twenty miles north-east of 
Mallorca, and is the second largest qf the Balearic Islands. 
Within a radius of two hundred miles lie the principal ports 
of eastern Spain, southern Spain and Algiers; the western 
Italian ports, the islands of Corsica, Sardinia, Sicily and 
the ports of Tunisia lie within a four hundred mile radius 
(Fig. 1.1). Menorca is approximately thirty miles long, 
between eight to twelve miles wide and covers an area of two 
hundred and sixty square miles - one fifth of the size of 
Mallorca. In the eighteenth century, it was divided into four 
administrative terminos (Fig. 1.2). 
The island is split geologically into two unequal parts by 
a line running from Ciudadela in the west to Mahon in the 
east. The smaller, northern part is inhospitable, infertile 
and is largely made up of Devonian rock which is not found 
elsewhere in the Balearics, and suggests that Menorca is the 
oldest island in the group. The southern part (roughly two- 
thirds of the total area) has a limestone base and, despite a 
shallow depth of soil, the land is fertile in the centre of 
the island and in the valleys running down to the south 
coast. 1 The northern region contains the only hill of 
9 
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significance (Monte Toro, 1,175ft), while the southern region 
is an undulating plateau never, rising above three hundred and 
fifty feet in height. 
There are numerous freshwater springs which flow freely in 
the winter and dry up in the summer, but there are no rivers 
in Menorca, and the absence of hills leaves the island 
exposed to wind and the influence of the sea. This ensures 
that Menorca has a higher rainfall than the other Balearic 
islands, and helps to produce an average humidity of 70%. 2 
The force of the prevailing northerly wind , the Tramontana, 
which blows over the island for'moiZe than a third of the 
year, can be seen in the stunted forms and shaped incline of 
the trees, mostly pines, holm-oaks and wild olives, which 
lean to the south for protection. Tancas (stone dykes) are 
found throughout the island, and were constructed to give 
cattle and crops shelter from the winds. The climate is 
temperate - an average of 73.5ý F in summer, and 52.80 F in 
winter - but examination of statistics for the late 
twentieth century reveals that temperatures in recent years 
are slightly lower than those recorded by an English army 
surgeon in the middle of the eighteenth century. 3 The weather 
in the autumn and in the spring is often unsettled, and these 
are the seasons of most wind and rain. 
There are four natural harbours - Ciudadela in the west, 
Fornells and Addaya in the north and Mahon in the east. Of 
these, the harbour of Ciudadela is *small, narrow and 
unsuitable for all but fishing boats and small vessels. The 
harbour of Fornells is more capacious (5,500 yards long and 
2,000 yards wide) but, like Addaya (3,800 yards long and 450 
yards wide) it is narrow-necked, shallow and very exposed to 
10 
the prevailing north winds. The harbour of Mahon, although 
only 250 yards wide at its entrance, is deep, 6,000 yards 
long and between 500 and 1,000 yards wide. The sixteenth- 
century Genoese Admiral Andrea Doria is credited with the 
saying: 
Junio, julio, agosto y Mahon 
los mejores puertos del Mediterraneo son. 
(Of all the ports in the Mediterranean. 
the best are June, July, August and Mah6n). 
but he merely made a jingle out of knowledge that had been 
widespread in the Mare Nostrum since time immemorial. 
Early History. 
The island of Menorca has guarded its early secrets well, 
even though traces still abound of the island's earliest 
culture. These take the form of primitive cave dwellings and 
megalithic structures, such as Talayots (tower-shaped 
constructions in stone, of which the solid base only now 
remains visible), Naus (upturned boat-shaped monuments 
believed to have served both as dwellings and as sites for 
secondary burials), and also a structure unique to Menorca, 
the Taula (a large T-shaped construction formed by two stone 
slabs standing in the midst of stone pillars in a walled 
enclosure and surrounded by caves). Nevertheless, despite the 
fact that there are hundreds of such remains on the island, 
and many theories have been advanced, as yet no completely 
authoritative account has been produced of Menorca's earliest 
inhabitants and their culture. 
4 To judge from the sites of 
the megalithic remains in Menorca - usually to be found 
inland and in the southern half of the island -it would 
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appear that the remainder of the island, including the 
natural harbours, held less appeal for the first settlers 
than it did for the Phoenicians, Greeks, Romans, Vandals, 
Byzantines and Moors, all of whom occupied Menorca for 
greater or shorter periods, for commercial or strategic 
reasons, during the 2,500 years which followed the first 
Bronze Age settlement in third millenium B. C. In 1232, 
shortly after the capture of Mallorca from the Moors by James 
I of Aragon, Moorish Menorca became a tributary of the 
Aragonese crown until, in 1287, the island was conquered by 
Alfonso III of Aragon. From 1298 untýl 1343, Menorca formed 
part of the independent kingdom of Mallorca, ýbefore reverting 
to the crown of Aragon. In 1467, with the union of the crowns 
of Aragon and Castile, Menorca became a part of the kingdom 
of Spain, and so it remained until the island was ceded to 
Britain in 1713. 
Post-conquest settlement. 
It is impossible to establish the size of the population 
of Menorca at the time of the Aragonese conquest in 1287 but, 
if the figures (40,000) of a contemporary Catalan chronicler 
are to be believed, it must have been very much greater than 
it was to become for the next six centuries. 5 What is known 
is that very few Menorcan Moors were either willing, able or 
allowed to stay on the island, except as slaves. Those who 
did remain either died out, or became assimilated with the 
Catalan settlers who came to Menorca. By the end of the 
fifteenth century, although Moorish place-names persisted - 
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and are still to be found today - there were no traces of 
inhabitants with names of Moorish origins. 6 
Alfonso III was determined that Menorca should be settled 
with 'bona gent catalanal(good Catalan people) and, to this 
end, he was generous in his distribution and grants of land 
in Menorca to his subjects who had contributed to the 
conquest. 7 However, it is evident from the accounts by 
Menorcan historians of the years which followed the conquest, 
that there were many territorial and financial disputes among 
the 'bona gent', there were poor crops and consequent 
famines, the Barbary Moors frequently attacked and pillaged 
the island, crime and banditry increased and the population 
of Menorca declined for one reason or another. The decline in 
numbers led to a second attempt, this time by Alfonso V of 
Aragon in 1427, to colonise Menorca with Catalans from the 
mainland. The settlement can have done little -to lessen 
strife and unease, since the lure for settlers on this 
occasion was not land grants, but the remission of custodial 
prison sentences. 8 
- In the sixteenth century, Menorca's vulnerability to 
persistent Moorish raids and attacks - the most devastating 
of which were those which destroyed Mahon in 1535 and 
Ciudadela in 1558, and resulted in the captivity and 
enslavement of more than a third of the island's population9 
- caused Philip II of Spain to consider a plan in 1570 to 
evacuate the Menorcans to Mallorca and abandon Menorca. 
10 The 
plan was not, however, implemented, and some new immigrants 
were attracted to Menorca from Naples, Sicily, Mallorca and 
Catalonia in the second half of the sixteenth century by a 
promise of tax exemption for a period of ten years, 
11 and 
13 
numbers gradually built up from a low estimate of 6,000 in 
1588 to 15,000 in 1708.12 Nevertheless, although the island 
suffered fewer and less damaging raids in the seventeenth 
century, an ever-present fear of attack from the sea (the 
last Moorish raid before the British occupation occurred as 
late as 1694), 13 discouraged coastal settlements, and the 
population became concentrated in the 'mitjanial (middle 
strip) of the island, in and around the fortified towns of 
Mahon and Ciudadela, and the inland villages of Alayor, 
Mercadal and Ferrerias. 
The population increase owed littl. e to the immigration of 
non-Catalans. In the first half of the seventeenth century, 
only eight French, *three Neapolitan and two Genoese families 
were recorded as residents in Ciudadela, according to the 
diocesan records. 14 What influx there was to the island came, 
if not from 'bona gent', at least from 'gent catalanal, 
principally from Mallorca, but also from Catalan Spain. But 
there were also some (soldiers sent to garrison duties in 
Menorca who subsequently settled), who came from other 
Spanish provinces. 15 
Before the eighteenth century, there was little to attract 
immigrants to Menorca. The island had no significant natural 
resources, the economy was agriculturally based and geared to 
a level of bare subsistence for the majority. There were few 
trades and no industry. In addition, daily life in Menorca as 
late as the seventeenth century was far from tranquil and not 
lacking in hazard. Banditry was rife, 16 and there were times 
when-the island was infesýed with rats, cicadas and locusts; 
there were years of drought and famine; there were epidemics 
of plague and cholera, and there was even a minor earthquake 
14 
in 1654.17 The seventeenth century in Menorca was, according 
to one modern historian, aI turbulent time of , ungovernable 
tempers, rivalries in government and disputes between civil 
and religious authorities'. 18 
Early English interest in the Mediterranean. 
Good harbour this same upon Minork, 
For shipping very useful Igainst the Turk. 19 
These lines written by an ex-galley slave in 1671 
epitomise what Menorca represented to the English in the 
seventeenth century - an island strategically placed in the 
western Mediterranean providing, in the port of Mahon, a 
large, natural harbour, safe from storm and attack, suitable 
to serve as a base from which a naval force could secure 
English commercial interests in the StraitS20 and the Levant. 
0. On occasions, Mediterranean ports other than Mahon, more 
strategically and conveniently situated, were used to counter 
particular threats to English trade, but Mahon was most 
frequently chosen asý the English naval base in the Straits 
during the seventeenth century. 
Merchants in England began to trade indirectly with the 
Mediterranean in the early fourteenth century, 21 taking 
advantage of the annual voyage of the fleet of Flanders 
galleys which, for two hundred years, called at Southampton 
and London on voyages between Antwerp and Venice. 22 By the 
sixteenth century, Hakluyt recorded some direct trading with 
'diverse tall ships of London, Southampton and Bristow' 
sailing with English cloth and leather to Crete, Cyprus and 
Syria, and returning with silk, spices, oils, wine, carpets 
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and mohair yarn., 23 Later in the sixteenth century, the 
development of the trade route to India by sea (which 
contributed to the eclipse of Venice as the European entrepot 
for eastern merchandise), the decline of Antwerp's influence 
on English markets from the 1560s and the defeat of the 
Turkish fleet by the Spaniards at Lepanto, encouraged a 
substantial increase in the number of English ships sailing 
to trade directly in the Straits and with the Levant. The 
increase was marked by the grant of a royal patent to twelve 
English merchants to form the Turkey Company in 1581 with 
exclusive rights to trade with Turkey, 24 followed by a patent 
granted in 1583 to fifty-three English merchants to form the 
Venice Company with a monopoly of trade with the Republic. 25 
The resulting overlap of interests led to the amalgamation 
of both companies to form the Levant Company in 1592. But, 
while the newly- formed Company was granted an initial 
monopoly of trade with Venice and Turkey, 26 trade within the 
Straits was open to all, and such were the profits to be 
made, that many merchants began to trade with the 
Mediterranean ports of Spain, France and Italy, in particular 
with the Tuscan port of Leghorn, which was declared a free 
port in 1591.27 6 
English trade in the Mediterranean grew substantially in 
volume and value in the course of the seventeenth century. In 
the f irst quarter of the century, it was estimated that the 
Levant Company alone was exporting goods to the value of 
E250,000, and importing merchandise to the same value. 28 By 
the end of the century, despite the growth in American and 
Asian markets, and the steady trade with northern Europe, the 
annual value of English exports to Turkey and southern Europe 
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had risen to E1,708,000, and the value of imports to 
E1,555,000 - both figures representing some 27% of English 
foreign trade. 29 The Mediterranean had become an important 
trading market in which successful voyages brought high 
returns on investment, but it was also a high-risk trade. 30 
English traders faced fierce commercial competition from the 
French and the Dutch, wars closed trading outlets and exposed 
merchant ships to enemy attack, but the greatest recurrent 
threat to all nations trading in the Straits came from the 
'Turk'. 
The Turks (Moors), also known collpctively in contemporary 
accounts as Algerines, were corsairs, nominally subjects of 
the Sultan of Turkey, who preyed indiscriminately on shipping 
and sailed out of ports in the Sultan's north African 
(Barbary coast) regencies of Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli. 
Piracy had been prevalent in the Mediterranean for centuries 
and ,- although the heyday of the Barbary corsairs was the 
sixteenth century when, purportedly in the name of Islam, 
they plundered ships of all Christian nations, they continued 
to be a menace in the seventeenth century. In the early years 
of the century Sale.. in Morocco, was added to the number of 
corsair ports and corsair activity was extended into the 
Atlantic as far north as the 'Narrow Seas', 31 where the 
corsairs marauded the southern coast of England and, in 1625, 
even dared to occupy Lundy Island in the Bristol Channel. 
Within the Straits, English losses to the corsairs were 
considerable - 466 ships were taken between 1609 and 161632 
and, in 1619, the Levant Company pressed parliament to seek 
redress for the capture of a further 150 vessels and the 
release of 1,000 English captives known to be enslaved in 
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Algiers alone. 33 When diplomatic protests produced no result, 
parliament, prompted by a pledge of E8,000 from the Levant 
Company towards the cost, 34 sought to obtain satisfaction by 
force. In 1620 a naval squadron was sent to the Straits under 
the command of Sir Robert Mansell, with orders to 'extirpate 
pirates'. 35 
Mansell's expedition failed to achieve its objectives. No 
pirates were engaged, no damage was inflicted on the Barbary 
ports and only a few captives were ransomed, but the 
expedition had the virtue of introducing the English navy for 
the first time, in April 1621,36 to the harbour of Mahon, and 
Mansell's campaign had some impact abroad and at home. 
Abroad, it signalled to the Barbary States and other 
Mediterranean countries England's intentions to secure her 
interests in the Straits. At home, Mansell's expedition 
prompted thoughts of the advantages to be gained from a more 
regular protective naval presence in the Straits and, in 
1625, Sir Henry Bruce suggested that an attempt be made to 
capture Gibraltar for use as a base for an English naval 
squadron. 37 It was not, however, a proposal which commended 
itself to parliament and, with England's politi. cal 
preoccupations for the next quarter of a century almost 
exclusively domestic, the issue of an English naval presence 
in the Mediterranean did not resurface until the end of the 
Civil War. Decisions were then taken to provide escorts for 
convoys of merchantmen (1649), 38 and to maintain a naval 
squadron of up to twelve ships permanently on station in the 
Straits (1652). 39 These measures reflected the Commonwealth's 
objectives of protecting and encouraging trade, and of 
establishing English naval supremacy in the Mediterranean - 
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aims which were pursued after the Restoration. The extent to 
which these objectives were realised can be measured in the 
increase in volume and value of English trade, and by the 
peace treaty signed with the Algerines in 1683 which, 
unlike its precursors, proved enduring and, importantly, 
included an Algerine pledge to allow unmolested passage to 
English merchantmen upon production of a certificate under 
admiralty seal - the so-called Mediterranean pass - attesting 
to the fact that the ships were English-owned and English- 
manned. 40 
The search for a naval base in the Straits. 
A base where ships could be refitted and revictualled on 
station was essential if the 1652 decision was to be 
implemented. In 1656 a proposal that Gibraltar be captured 
and used for that purpose was again considered, but Cromwell 
rejected it following advice that the harbour, little more 
than an open roadstead, provided inadequate shelter and, 
ironically in the light of subsequent events in the 18th 
century, it was thought to be insecure against an-attack from 
mainland Spain. 41 Nevertheless, in the 1680s, once the threat 
from corsair activity had moved from the Barbary coast to 
Sale, Admiral Arthur Herbert found Gibraltar 'conveniently 
seated, 42 for his operations from 1680 to 1682, and from 1685 
until his squadron was withdrawn to strengthen naval defences 
in home waters in 1688.43 
Hopes had been entertained that Tangier (an English 
possession from 1661 to 1684), would provide the necessary 
base but, although it was used in some campaigns, it failed 
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to match expectations. Despite expenditure in excess of 
E400,000, the mole was inadequate and the anchorage too 
shallow to admit high-rated ships. 44 Tangier itself did not 
develop into an entrepot, consequently provisions and 
materials, all virtually unobtainable in situ had to be sent 
there from England or elsewhere. Like Gibraltar, it was land- 
locked, militarily insecure and, as an Atlantic port, it was 
too far to the west to serve as a convenient base for either 
the protective or punitive roles carried out by the navy in 
the Straits. 45 
Consequently England was forced to rely upon the goodwill 
of other European powers in the Mediterranean to allow her 
access to ports in which her ships could be serviced. In the 
years from 1651 to 1688, English ships used many ports in the 
Straits, the selection of which depended upon two factors: 
the size of the squadron - as f ew as f ive or six ships 
(1685-1688), and as many as thirty-five (1678-1679), 46 - and 
the convenience of the port to the primary expeditionary task 
of the squadron at any particular time. on occasions, ships 
were detached to be serviced in Lisbon or Cadiz, both, like 
Tangier, Atlantic ports, but they were long-establishedf 
well-equipped and dependable naval service stations. However, 
whenever possible, ports within the Straits were used: 
Malaga, Alicante, Marseilles, Ferrajo and Longone on the 
island of Elba, Cagliari (Sardinia), Naples, Spezia, Messina 
(Sicily), Valetta (Malta) and, on one occasion Tetuan on the 
north African coast. The most useful revictualling port 
within the Straits proved to be Leghorn. Provisions and naval 
stores were usually readily available there, and it became 
the principal rendezvous for merchant convoys. However, 
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Leghorn was a free port so that England could not expect 
exclusive privileges. It was also easy to blockade, and too 
distant from the Barbary coast to be ideally suited as an 
operational base for most naval campaigns. 
Mahon, like Tangier and Gibraltar, could provide few or 
none of the provisions, stores and materials which the navy 
needed, but it commended itself as a base because of its 
central position in the western Mediterranean, its capacious 
41 harbour and its safe, deep anchorage. Mahon's pivotal 
position had the additional advantage for the Admiralty of 
enabling naval commanders of the Mediterranean squadron to 
exercise greater control over the independent movement of 
ships' captains, and thereby reduce the temptation for the 
latter to neglect their cruising or escort duties in favour 
of calling at commercial ports to indulge in profitable 
freight carrying on their own account. 47 Mahon was also a 
convenient location from which to police and control the 
activities of Spanish corsairs operating out of Mallorcan 
ports who, at one stage, were guilty of committing 'many 
insolencies' and causing significant disruption of English 
trade in the northern Mediterranean. 48 For these principal 
reasons, Mahon became the - most recurrently used base of the 
English Mediterranean squadron in the seventeenth century. 
Mahon as an English naval base in-the seventeenth century. 
In January . 1663 England's ambassador to Madrid was 
instructed to seek approval for English warships to make use 
of Spain's Mediterranean ports and, specifically, Mahon. 
49 
Permission was granted, and successive Admirals - Sir John 
21 
Fig - 1.3. 
The Approach to Mahon Harbour. 
Grenville Collins, Master Mariner, 1678. 
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Lawson(1664), Sir Thomas Allin(1664-1665,1668-1670) and Sir 
'r Edward Spragge(1670-1672) - took advantage of Mahon's 
availability. In 1669, the Admiralty designated Maho"n 'the 
most convenient port in case of a Warre with Argierl, 50 as 
England's naval base in the Straits, and gave an undertaking 
that 'a plentifull supply of all Stores, Victualls, as well 
Beverage as other Provisions, shall always be in readiness in 
the port'. 51 With this aim in view, the storeship Golden Hand 
and the depot ship Edward reached Mahon in September 1669 
and, a year later, 52 Richard Gibson, a former junior clerk in 
the Navy Office under Pepys, arriveý in Menorca to act as 
Commissary of Stores and Agent/Victualler to the fleet. 53 
Allin welcomed the safe, sheltered anchorage, but he*found 
that the narrow harbour mouth and the prevailing northerly 
winds made entry and exit difficult (Fig. 1.3)54. Ships could 
leave harbour only one at a time, thereby running the risk of 
exposing themselves disadvantageously to any enemy blockading 
squadron and, in calm or contrary wind conditions, ships 
leaving or entering harbour frequently had to resort to 
warping, kedging or towing. 55 Despite these shortcomings, and 
the f act that the harbour lacked a wharf or other dock 
facilities, there was a supply of brushwood to hand and the 
harbour was used for careening and repairing the fleet. 56 
Gibson reported that between October 1670 and May 1671, 
thirty-six ships had been careened, repaired and provisioned, 
with a stay in port varying between fourteen and one hundred 
and forty days. 57 
The fleet commanded by Allin and, from July 1670, by 
Spragge, 58 was the largest England had sent to the 
Mediterranean. Comprising eighteen ships of the line, three 
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fireships and two ketches, 59 its total complement could 
have amounted to 3,800 seamen, though it was more likely to 
have been in the region of 2,500-3,000 men. 60 As 
Agent/Victualler, Gibson's task of catering for the needs of 
the men and the fleet was unenviable. 61 
Shortly before Gibson's arrival in Menorca, Spragge had 
instructed one of his captains, William Poole, to survey 
Mahon harbour and select a site near the town where ships 
could careen, and where huts could be built for provisions 
and materials 'now sent from England'. 62 Poole's survey and 
map of the port (Fig. 1.4) revealed how capacious the inner 
harbour was, and that it would be possible to create a wharf, 
600 feet by 30 feet, on the southern shore below the town of 
Mahon, large enough to provide storage facilities and working 
space to careen as many as twenty third-and fourth- rated 
ships moored alongside in three and a half to five fathoms of 
water. 63 
Gibson's first report to the Admiralty indicated that he 
had leased the wharf space which Poole had recommended, 
together with 'four rooms at the waterside', and one house in 
Mahon in which he proposed to place some of the four hundred 
tons of stores he had brought with him. 64 But he complained 
that the house was 'as high as Westminster Abbey roofel above 
the landing place and that all provisions had to be carried 
there 'by strength of armel. He had not succeeded in leasing 
any additional storage space in or near Mah6n, and he had 
been forced to make use of caves in the cliff by the wharf 
not only for storage, but also to provide lodging for his 
workmen and an infirmary for the sick. He also reported that, 
while the authorities in Menorca were regulating prices for 
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the islanders, costs to the English for some commodities had 
as much as quadrupled and, for fear of a shortage in the 
island, the Jurats had banned the sale of fresh meat to the 
fleet at any price. 65 
ý Problems of supply of raw materials were one of Gibson's 
bugbears. In March 1671, he wrote to the Admiralty listing 
the stores he required. He requested that hard wood be sent 
out to construct two sheds in which to preserve provisions 
and secure stores *f rom 'embezlment'. Because of the 
inadequate and unsatisfactory existing storage facilities, he 
urged that only the best quality provisions be sent -to 
Menorca and that shipments should be evenly spaced to avoid 
rot and wastage. 66 The storehouse sheds were built in April 
1671, but their construction was resented. Permission to 
build them had been given by the Governor of Menorca, Juan de 
Bayarte, but the sheds had been represented as fortifications 
to the court of Madrid by the Governor of St. Philip's, a 
francophile according to Gibson, and no friend to Bayarte or 
to the English. Following instructons from Madrid, a demand 
was made for the buildings to be demolished, but Spragge 
refused, interpreting the demand as an act of hostility or a 
'ruse to make us weary of the port'. 67 Gibson, left in charge 
when Spragge sailed from Menorca, refused to . comply with a 
repeated demand, and was outraged that a 'Coopers' yard full 
of rotten stakes' was being deemed a fortification. 68 The 
bluff was successfully called but, although no further 
protest was made in respect of the storehouses, the Spanish 
authorities on the island subsequently made repeated attempts 
to monitor, control and even impede the movement of ships and 
the landing of supplies for the fleet. 69 
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Two other issues caused Gibson and the English admirals 
do some frustration. When Mahon had been chosen as his base, 
Allin had been apprehensive that the Governor of Menorca 
would be 'severe in point of pratique, 70 (permission to dock 
and land personnel and cargo upon production of a clean bill 
of health). In fact, the Governor proved capricious in this 
respect. At times pratique was granted without delay, at 
other times, despite a clean bill of health, an arbitrary 
period of quarantine was imposed. 71 Also, periodic attempts 
were made by the Governor to limit the number of English 
ships at anchor at any one time in the harbour, 72 but such 
restrictions were usually of short duration and were 
withdrawn as a result of English protests or inducements. 
73 
Allin had been content with the choice of Mahon as a base, 
finding the harbour 'as safe and convenient for careening as 
can bel. 74 Initially Spragge, too, had high hopes of 
Menorca. Within a month of his arrival, however, Gibson was 
much less sanguine: 'He [Spraggel expects this island to find 
everything, which it will never do'. 75 By May 1671, a 
disillusioned Spragge acknowledged Mahon's logistical 
shortcomings - supplies from England were irregular; methods 
of preservation of perishables were primitive and the 
duration of the voyage from home waters (at best some eight 
to ten weeks, and often much longer), led to a high incidence 
of wastage; storage facilities on land were inadequate and 
unsatisfactory, and the surplus stores had to be lodged in 
the hulk in the harbour which was worm-eaten, leaky and 
vermin-infested. 76 Accordingly, he supported Gibson's 
proposal to seek to obtain victualling supplies from 
elsewhere in the Mediterranean. since 'this island neither 
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affords Bread, Beverage, Wine, Oyle nor Rice', Spragge 
suggested that it would be profitable to obtain such supplies 
nearby - wine and bacon from Naples, rusks, beef, flour, 
fruit and figs from Leghorn and rice from Genoa - all readily 
obtainable from Levant Company ships which would have to 
deviate only ten leagues from their normal return route to 
call at Mahon. 77 There were additional difficulties: the men 
were poorly clothed (shoes and slops were in very short 
supply), 78 and many of the shore-based workers were 
succumbing to illness - 'agues', fever and smallpox - which 
he ascribed to the damp, unhealthy cpnditions of their cave 
dwellings. 
When Spragge's fleet was recalled to home waters late in 
1671 to strengthen the Channel fleet for the looming conflict 
with the Dutch, the navy's Agent in Mahon was also 
recalled. 79 In the light of the difficulties under which he 
had been required to operate, it is not surprising to read 
that Richard Gibson left Menorca 'with as much satisfaction 
as any man., 80 
A squadron of fifteen ships8l. returned to the 
Mediterranean in 1674 under the command of Sir John 
Narborough, with the task of conducting a campaign against 
Tripoli. A base at Mahon was too far to the west to be 
convenient, consequently Narborough used Leghorn as his 
revictualling port82 and proposed Malta as his refitting base 
'providing all things necessary be lodged there as 
[previously] at Mahon., 83 In the event, supplies were even 
more wanting in Malta than they had been in Menorca, but 
Narborough's two-year campaign was successful, 84 and he 
returned to command a fleet of thirty-five ships for a 
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campaign against Algiers in July 1677.85 It was intended that 
Tangier should serve as his base, but the inadequacy of the 
harbour there and the acute shortage of all manner of 
supplies and provisions, prompted Narborough to-request that 
Cadiz and Mahon be made available to him. 86 The Admiral's 
ships subsequently visited both ports, and Mahon was used 
both to refit and revictual. 87 Narborough expected provisions 
to be forthcoming from England as in the past, but, on this 
occasion, ships at Mahon were serviced from supplies sent to 
Menorca from Leghorn by* Sir Thomas Clutterbuck, naval Agent 
in the Tuscan port. 88 This local arrangement proved less 
advantageous than anticipated and, although Narborough 
continued to use Mahon (fourteen of his ships were refitting 
there in January 1679), 89 he complained that essential 
materials and craftsmen were still lacking. 90 Moreover, 
provisions from Leghorn were so deficient that Clutterbuck 
was censured by the Navy Board in April 1679 for his failure 
to fulfil satisfactorily his supply contract. 91 
After Narborough relinquished his command in May 1679 his 
successors made no use of Mahon for the remainder of the 
century. During those years the bases used by English ships 
were: Tangier (until it was abandoned by England in 1684), 
Gibraltar (1680-1682,1685-1688) for a much reduced squadron 
of six ships, 92 and Cadiz (1694-1696) where the navy 
established a dockyard administered and largely manned by 
English personnel and equipped to service Admiral Edward 
Russell's large Anglo-Dutch fleet-93 However, if admirals 
commanding in the Mediterranean had sound tactical reasons 
for not using Mahon, the Admiralty apparently remained 
convinced of the harbour's usefulness. In 1689, Maho"'n was 
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designated one of two ports in the Straits where 'victuals 
and naval stores may be lodged"94 and in 1693, Admiral Sir 
Francis Wheeler was urged to use Mahon for 'supplying ships 
with necessaries'. 95 Moreover, in 1694, the Spanish 
government, allied to England and apprehensive of the threat 
to Spain posed by France's Toulon fleet, attempted to 
persuade Russell to make Mahon, and not Cadiz, his base, 
going as far as to offer to supply an experienced dockyard 
labour force in Menorca. 96 While conceding that Mahon's 
harbour was sufficiently capacious and better situated 
*strategically to monitor activity (? ut of Toulon, Russell 
firmly maintained that the formidable logistics of servicing 
af leet of seventy-two ships (with a total complement in 
excess of 20,000 men) with supplies to be sent from England, 
demanded a base more readily accessible from home waters than 
Mahon. 97 
The year-round presence of a naval squadron in most years 
in the second half of the seventeenth century served 
primarily to protect English trade from the depredations of 
the Barbary corsairs, and Mahon was not always the most 
conveniently located base for the campaigns which were 
mounted against the corsairs. Menorcals geo-political 
importance emerged only in the early years of the eighteenth 
century when Britain's ambition to become a European power of 
the first rank emerged. Sailors remained aware that, apart 
from the capacious, secure harbour of Mahdn, Menorca had few 
intrinsic virtues as a base and, among its known 
shortcomings, were Mahon's lack of any established dockyard 
facilities and the island's incapacity to provide the 
materials and supplies necessary to service a fleet. 
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Politicians, however, became 'convinced that Menorca's 
extrinsic values outweighed its intrinsic deficiencies. 
Strategically, Menorcals location made Mahon a convenient 
base from which activity in the ports of eastern Spain and 
southern France could be monitored in times of peace and 
blockaded in wartime: politically, possession of Menorca 
would enable Britain, for the first time, to influence events 
in Italy and, commercially, it was anticipated that Menorca 
would become an entrepot whereby Britain would substantially 
increase her share of Mediterranean trade. For these reasons 
Menorca became Britain's preferred base in the Mediterranean'. 
and possesion of the island became 
an essential element of British foreign policy for much of 
the eighteenth century. 
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Chapter Two. 
The context of Britain's acquisition of Menorca. 
The War of the Spanish Succession (1702 - 1713). 
The more probable it became that the sickly Charles II of 
Spain would die childless, the more predictable it was that 
there would be a dispute between the two principal claimants 
for his throne, the French Bourbons and the Austrian 
Hapsburgs. By the end of the seventeenth century it was 
equally certain that the principal maritime powers, England 
and the Dutch, looking to preserve their commercial 
interests, would seek compensation from any outcome of the 
dispute which significantly shifted the balance of world 
power. Attempts by all the interested parties to reach a 
peaceful agreement on the partition of the Spanish Empire 
remained unresolved at the time of Charles' death in 1700. 
Charles' will nominated Philip, Duke of Anjou, Louis XIVIs 
grandson, as his sole heir to an undivided empire, thereby 
pointing the way to a Bourbon hegemony unaccceptable to the 
other European powers. War became inevitable when, in 
February 1701, Louis XIV, in a pre-emptive strike to seize 
the initiative to support his grandson (already proclaimed 
Philip V of Spain), expelled the Dutch from the barrier-towns 
in the Spanish Netherlands and installed French garrison 
troops in their stead. England's participation in the war was 
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guaranteed when, on the death of the exiled James II, Louis 
provocatively recognised his son James as the rightful King 
of Great Britain in September 1701. In the circumstances, 
England had no option but to support the Hapsburg pretender 
and a treaty of alliance was signed by Austria, England and 
Holland in September 1701, joined, in 1703, by Savoy and 
Portugal, both anxious to preserve their boundaries and 
identities as inaependent kingdoms. The outcome of the war 
left the Bourbon claimant on the throne of Spain but Britain, 
anticipating her allies by signing a preliminary peace treaty 
with France in 17114 obtained impprtant territorial and 
commercial concessions (duly confirmed in the subsequent 
peace treaty of Utrecht in 1713) including the acquisition of 
Gibraltar and Menorca, possessions which made Britain the 
dominant Mediterranean power for much of the eighteenth 
century. 
The principal theatre of war was in northern Europe, but 
there was also a major campaign fought in the Iberian 
peninsula, l where Portugal's entry into the war provided the 
Allies with a base (Lisbon) from which to attack Bourbon 
forces in Spain. In 1705 the Allied campaign spread to 
Catalonia when an army commanded by the Earl of Peterborough 
landed at Barcelona to support the Catalan uprising in favour 
of the Hapsburg pretender, Archduke Charles, now styled 
Charles III of Spain. 
The opening of a second war front in Spain by the Allies 
had the predictable effect of forcing Louis XIV to divert 
French troops sorely needed for his northern campaigns, but 
it also had the unforeseen result of consolidating popular 
support for Philip V in most of the mainland provinces of 
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Spain. Government ministers in Madrid had welcomed the 
prospect of a Bourbon succession, believing that it would 
preserve intact the Spanish kingdoms and empire but, until 
fighting broke out in the peninsula, the people of Spain had 
been largely apathetic about the tussle for the throne. The 
participation of Portugal (from 1580 until 1640 a vassal 
state of Spain), the capture by the Allies of Gibraltar in 
1704, the Catal&n Carlist revolt in 1705, and the knowledge 
that Charles III's campaigns in Spain were being sustained by 
troops of a heretic nation, all combined to rally popular 
support in all the provinces of Spain. except Catalonia to the 
Bourbon cause. 
There was no surprise in the hostility of the Catalan 
provinces to the French, since they had suffered grievously 
when they had been a battlefield in the previous war between 
France and Spain (1690-1697). There was also, in Catalonia, 
and in other provinces of the former kingdom of Aragon, a 
fear that the establishment of a Bourbon on the Spanish 
throne would produce a more centralist administration and 
lead to the revocation of their fueros. But the Catalan 
parliament prudently waited to declare its support for 
Charles III, not only until it was assured of a sizeable 
allied army to support the revolt, but also until an 
undertaking was given to respect the Catalan fueros. The 
Catalans were reassured by Peterborough who, in the name of 
Queen Anne, 2(subsequently endorsed by Charles 111), 3 promised 
to secure them: 
a confirmation of their rights and liberties .... that they may be settled on a lasting foundation to them and 
their posterities. 
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A supply base for the Allied troops in Catalonia. 
The Allied army in Catalonia could not be supplied by land 
and had to rely on the navy to bring it provisions and 
reinforcements. To maintain the necessary year-round support, 
the navy needed a base in a secure harbour close to the 
Catalan coast and near enough to Toulon to inhibit French 
naval activity. Of the harbours available to the Allies, 
Lisbon was too distant, and Gibraltar could not accommodate 
the fleet. Gunboat diplomacy by Admiral Sir John Leake 
induced Mallorca and Ibiza to dqclare for Charles in 
September 1706 but, although both islands were close to 
Catalonia and Toulon, neither possessed a harbour to suit the 
navy's needs. For a time (until 1707), the Spanish 
Mediterranean ports were open to the Allies, but their tenure 
was so insecure that they were never seriously considered as 
bases. In an attempt to solve at one stroke the dual problems 
of supply and enemy threat, an expedition was mounted to 
capture Toulon itself in August/September 1707, but it 
failed. It was not until June 1708 that the Admiralty, for 
all the preference it had shown for the port in the previous 
century, tardily came to the conclusion: 'We do not know of 
any port in the Mediterranean ... where twenty ships of war 
4 may safely winter unless Port Mahon'. 
No contemporary commentator, nor any subsequent historian, 
has offered an explanation of why no attempt was made by the 
Allies before 1708 to capture the harbour of Mahon, the 
strategic value of which had long been appreciated. In 1698, 
before war broke out, William III had recognised Menorcals 
geo-political potential, and had attempted to secure 
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possession of Mahon - 'a very good port'5 - in his 
negotiations with Louis XIV for a peaceful partition of the 
territories belonging to the Spanish crown. William's 
negotiator, the Earl of Portland, had disingenuously (albeit 
somewhat prophetically) claimed that England's possession of 
Mahon and the island of Menorca would serve only to secure 
her Mediterranean trade but, in, other respects, it would be 
6 #a burden of no advantage'. But Louis refused to countenance 
the proposal, stating: 'He who had Port Mahon, being powerful 
at sea, would be master of the commerce of the 
Mediterranean, 7, and that English possession of the port 
would 'absolutely exclude other nations from the commerce'. 8 
In 1704, two years after hostilities had broken out, the 
Allied fleet was empowered to mount an attack and attempt to 
secure either Cadiz or Menorca. 9 No such attack was mounted 
but, after an ill-considered attempt to take Barcelona, 10 
Admiral Sir George Rooke captured Gibraltar in August 1704-11 
The capture was easily achieved but, at that time, the 
smaller and more inexperienced garrison of Menorca would have 
offered even less resistance and an attack on the island 
would surely have given the Allies a more advantageous 
possession. 12 
A project to capture Menorca did not lack advocates. Major 
General James Stanhope, on leave in London in 1705, had urged 
the Godolphin ministry to order an attack, 13 and a pamphlet 
circulated in London some months later censured the ministry 
for not having made the acquisition of Mahon an early and 
primary military objective. 14 In June 1706, Charles III urged 
Leake to capture the Balearic Islands 'particularly Port 
Mahon ... the most important for my interest and for the 
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common causel. 15 Charles was convinced, such was the degree 
of support for him in the islands, that a mere show of force 
would suf f ice to win them over. He was proved right in 
respect of Ibiza and Mallorca which, upon sight of the Allied 
fleet, declared for the Carlist cause on 18 and 26 September 
1706 respectively. But Charles had been misinformed about the 
strength of the garrison in Menorca. He had told Leake to 
expect no more than 'one hundred French soldiers', 16 whereas 
the garrison numbers had, by this time, been considerably 
augmented. Louis XIV, aware of England's interest, had 
anticipated an attack upon the island. In 1702, at the start 
of the war, he sent artillery, ammunition and stores to 
Menorca; 17 in 1703, he sent more provisions and engineers to 
make a 1draught' of Mahon harbour to plan greater protection 
at a time when it was thought the 'the English would come and 
take it,. 18 He was instrumental in augmenting the garrison 
with 300 troops from Mallorca in 1704 and, in October 1705, 
he ordered 500 French marines to the island. 19 In the 
circumstances Leake, whose request for additional troops to 
accompany the fleet in case he encountered unexpectedly 
strong oppostion had been denied, held to his earlier belief 
that 'Port Mahon is not to be got with our Marines alone'. 20 
He did not, therefore, proceed from Mallorca to Menorca, but 
sailed for Lisbon and England on 3 October. 
Leake's decision to sail out of the Mediterranean 
immediately after the surrender of Mallorca was 
precipitate. It is true that it must have been prompted by the 
intelligence he had gained of the increased strength of 
Menorca's garrison, but to have left the Balearics before 
attempting at least a reconnaissance off Menorca (the primary 
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target of his mission) was a tactical misjudgement. In 
Menorca the surrender of Ibiza and Mallorca had increased 
expectation of an Allied attack, and the authorities on the 
island loyal to Philip V (known in Menorca as Felipets) were 
equally apprehensive of a popular Carlist uprising on the 
island itself. In early October 1706 the Governor of Menorca, 
Diego Davila, reported to Madrid that such were the close 
ties between Mallorca and Menorca: 'I can't foresee that 
Ciudadela and the other towns will stand firm [for Philip V] 
and not follow in Mallorca's footsteps'. 21 His fears were 
justified when an uprising occurred gn 18 October 1706, and 
Carlist support in Menorca would surely have been declared 
earlier if Leake had delayed his departure long enough to 
appear off the island with the fleet. 
Carlist support in Menorca 
The revolt of the Menorcans was unique in that it was a 
protest against authority unparalleled in their history. 
They had, of course, rallied to the defence of the island 
when it was attacked by marauding Turks, but they had never 
taken up arms in any other cause. Mallorca's defection to 
Charles III was undoubtedly a major spark to the Menorcan 
revolt, but there were other contributory factors. Among 
these was a long-standing resentment of the neglect of the 
island and its affairs by the government in Madrid, and the 
often high-handed and unsympathetic treatment of the 
inhabitants by the island's Governors, not one of whom had 
been a native of Menorca. Also the recent imposition of 
Mallorcan, French and some Italian troops as part of the 
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garrison had proved economically draining and socially 
irksome, 22 but the main thrust of the Menorcan protest 
stemmed, as in other Catalan territories, from a dread of 
being deprived of the island's fueros. 
The instigator of the revolt was Juan Miguel Saura Morell, 
a member of a long-established noble family in Ciudadela, who 
had been promised the Governorship of Menorca by Charles III 
in the event of a successful Carlist uprising. 23 Saurals 
fervour and dynamism induced all the island's Universitats to 
declare for Charles within three days, with the result that, 
by 21 October 1706, the Felipets remained in control only of 
Fort St. Philip, and Fort St. Anthony at the mouth of 
Fornells harbour, and the latter surrendered to the Carlists 
on 27 October. There can be little doubt (particularly in 
the light of Davila's subsequent pusillanimous reaction to 
Stanhope's assault in 1708), that the appearance of the 
Allied fleet in Menorcan waters at this juncture, offering 
the prospect of support for the popular uprising, would have 
led to a bloodless outcome analogous to what had happened in 
Ibiza and Mallorca. The probability of such an outcome was 
increased by the unreliability of some of the garrison 
troops. 
Of the 1,200 soldiers Davila withdrew into Fort St. Philip 
at the start of the uprising, 24 he could depend reliably only 
on the loyalty and discipline of the 500 experienced French 
marines. He could not rely on the conduct of the small 
detachment (64 soldiers) of the Milan regiment, and the 
loyalty of the 300 Mallorcans was in doubt as a result of 
Mallorca's defection to Charles. The remaining 350 soldiers 
were the core garrison, and they were a motley and amateur 
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collection. of mainly Spanish, non-Catalan origin, most had 
come to consider themselves Menorcan since they were the 
descendants of the soldiers sent to garrison Fort St. Philip 
when it was built in the second half of the sixteenth 
century. The soldiers of the original garrison had never been 
relieved; officers and men had married and settled in 
Menorca, and their male descendants through the generations 
had assumed the role (and often the rank) of their forbears 
in the garrison. They were more versed in managing their 
smallholdings, working as day labourers or practising a trade 
- occupations they had been forced to turn to to supplement 
their meagre, irregular and often non-existent army pay - 
than they were in military duties. 25 Not all possessed 
weapons, and few had uniforms. 26 To these there had been 
added, over the years, criminals and Spanish soldiers who had 
been judged 'disaffected' on the mainland, and had been 
banished to the Menorca garrison. 27 
Estimates of the numbers of Menorcans who rallied to Saura 
and the Carlist cause vary. The Spanish historian, Micaela 
Mata quotes the French commander's (de la Jonquile're) estimate 
of 1,800,28 while she, herself, gives a more realistic total 
of 1,500,29 but in his account the Menorcan historian, Jose' 
Luis Terro**n Ponce, cites an officer in the garrison who put 
the number as improbably high as 2,800.30 Whatever the total, 
and Mata 's estimate of 1,500 appears the most reliable, 
Saurals supporters were superior to Davila's troops in number 
only. The Carlists had no military training, no artillery and 
possessed only the most primitive of weapons. Nevertheless, 
Saura -attempted to press home his initial advantages of 
surprise and popular support and, placing his followers in a 
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cordon cutting off St. Philip's from Mahon, he called upon 
J# 31 Davila to surrender. 
J- Davila rejected Saura's demands and, for the next two 
months, there was an impasse. There were skirmishes between 
the two camps, but Davila did not launch a serious attack 
upon the Carlists and they, sensibly, did not attempt to 
storm the fortress. Both sides were waiting for 
reinforcements but, despite urgent pleas to the authorities 
in Mallorca and Barcelona, Saura was sent only 150 soldiers. 
Davila, on the other hand, on 1 January 1707, welcomed the 
arrival of a French naval squadron under the command of the 
Comte de Villars, which brought him not only much needed 
supplies, but also another battalion of 400 seasoned 
soldiers. The reinforcements made the outcome inevitable. 
Saura and his men did not lack courage, and they confronted 
the Felipet troops but, on 5 January, after a battle lasting 
four hours, the Felipets routed their opposition who 
sustained some 200 casualties (dead and wounded); the 
Felipets lost 12 dead and suffered 60 wounded. 32 Mahon was 
occupied by the Felipets the following day and, on 12 
January, de la Jonquiere accepted, on Davila's behalf, the 
terms of capitulation agreed by the Universitat 6eneral of 
Menorca. 33 Saura, and those of his followers who could, fled 
to Mallorca. 
Davila initially exacted moderate retribution from the 
insurgents. He confiscated goods, rents and lands of known 
Carlists, imposed fines on some and exiled others. 34 But, in 
March 1707, when he was informed of another Carlist 
conspiracy, Davila's reaction was harsh. All the supposed 
conspirators were judged guilty without trial, and Davila 
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spent a month crossing the island torturing and hanging all 
those who had been implicated, demolishing their houses and 
confiscating their possessions. 35 In all, thirty-three men 
were hanged, six sentenced to the galleys and a further 
fourteen were exiled. 36 The Menorcans' bitter resentment of 
such rough justice, together with their anger when Davila 
repudiated the clauses of the capitulation which guaranteed 
the island's fueros, were made manifest in the welcome and 
help given by most Menorcans when Stanhope's troops-landed on 
the island in September 1708. 
In the eighteen months which followed the ruthless 
suppression of the conspiracy, DAvila, with a reduced 
garrison - the French battalion which Villars had brought to 
Menorca, the Mallorcan and Italian troops were all withdrawn 
in February 170737 - faced the uneasy task of maintaining the 
military dictatorship which he had imposed on a largely 
disaffected populace, knowing that he had barely sufficient 
resources to contain internal troubles, and not enough to 
withstand a determined attack from without Menorca. He 
repeatedly, but unsuccessfully sought reinforcements from 
France and Spain, 38 and in Menorca he succeeded in 
recruiting only a militia of 250 men which he used to 
garrison Ciudadela. 39 
The Defences of Menorca. 
In 1708 Menorca's defences were adequate to repulse hit- 
and-run piratical raids, but they were orientated to cope 
with attacks from the sea on predictably vulnerable locations 
and, - Fort St. Philip apart - they were not sufficiently 
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strong in design, firepower or manpower to be able to resist 
investment or a determined attack by land. Of the fortified 
locations, Ciudadela (Fig. 2.1), still contained within its 
walls, was superficially protected from attack from all 
quarters, but its garrison numbers were minimal; 40 Fort St. 
Anthony (Fig. 2.2) guarded the strategically important 
northern harbour of Fornells, but it was isolated and had 
only twelve light cannons and a minimal garrison of thirty- 
five. 41 Mahon's defences had been neglected in favour of the 
fortifications at the mouth of the harbour and, by the late 
seventeenth century, its population had spilled beyond its 
walls. The only fortification which posed a serious challenge 
to an attacker was Fort St. Philip, (Fig. 2.2) but, even here, 
one military commentator of the day considered that the fort 
was too small, and that its all-round defensive capabilities 
were so limited that it did not merit the high reputation 
which it enjoyed in Europe. 42 
The renown of St. Philip's sprang not from any proven 
defensive record, but from the impression it made on the 
approach and entry to Mahon harbour. It was, however, less 
impressive when viewed from the land. The fort was dominated 
by a ridge running west to south f rom the harbour to St. 
Stephen's Cove, and also by the high ground of La Mola, the 
promontory opposite the fort on the north side of the 
harbour. The fort had been built on solid rock, but this, in 
itself, had restricted the provision of bomb-proof 
subterranean accommodation, and the bulk of its firepower was 
immutably directed to the sea approach and the harbour mouth. 
A smaller fort, St. Charles, had been constructed nearer the 
sea to the east of St. Philip's, and a battery of guns had 
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been placed in a redoubt - rather grandly called Fort Felipet 
- on the tongue of land jutting out from the north side of 
the harbour facing St. Philip's, but the guns of these forts 
could not be brought to bear on any land attack launched upon 
the principal fortress. Moreover, St. Philip's own field of 
fire inland was severely restricted by its own arrabal 
(suburb), a shanty-town of some sixty dwellings which housed 
the families of the men in the garrison. Nevertheless, in the 
years immediately preceding the Allied expedition to Menorca, 
measures had been taken to improve the defences and self- 
sufficiency of St. Philip's. Ravelinq had been added to all 
but the eastern outworks, the subterraneans had been 
expanded, the covered way widened and a new foodstore and 
hospital had been built within the fort; but the magazines 
were not damp-proof and the living quarters for the troops 
were dismal and unhealthy. The final improvement had been 
undertaken by Davila in 1707 when, increasingly apprehensive 
of a land attack, he had ordered a dry-stone wall to be 
built, twelve feet high and fifteen inches thick, ' containing 
four towers each mounted with three light cannons., to enclose 
not only the fort, but also the arrabal in a line from the 
harbourside to St. Stephen's Cove. 43 It was to prove a 
rudimentary and ineffectual first line of defence. 
Accounts vary about the state of repair, of St. Philip's 
defences immediately prior to Stanhope's siege. Two French 
sailors visiting Mahon in 1704 were favourably impressed by 
the solid structure of the fort; 
44 in 1705, de la Jonquiere 
(the commander of the French marines) considered the fort to 
be 'admirably conserved"45 but an assessment in 1707 by the 
Captain of the grenadiers in St. Philip's was less sanguine. 
45 
Blas Gimenez de Mendoza y Lillo reported that the defences 
were not in a good state of repair. The ditch was too narrow, 
the covered ways were open to enfilade fire and lacked 
adequate cover from the bastions and curtains, the firing 
platforms could accommodate too few men, the garrison 
quarters were leaky, unhealthy and morale-sapping, and he 
concluded that the fort would not be able to withstand a land 
attack. 46 
The Capture of Menorca. 47 
In May 1708, a naval Council of War in Barcelona 
recommended that Mahon must be taken for the Allies if the 
military campaign in Catalonia was to be sustained. 
48 Admiral 
Leake in a letter to the Viceroy of Mallorca claimed that 
'nothing would be more agreeable to me .... than 
the 
reduction of Port Mahon, 49 but, he maintained that he could 
not proceed with that objective without specific instructions 
from London. In June, the Admiralty endorsed the 
recommendation from Barcelona50s, and Marlborough -wrote to 
Stanhope: 'I am so entirely convinced that nothing can be 
done effectively [in Spain] without the Fleet, that I conjure 
51 
you ... to take Port Mahon'. Marlborough's 
letter reached 
Stanhope with orders from Godolphin which made the ministry's 
intentions clear. Stanhope was to capture Mahon without delay 
so that 'measures can be taken for the wintering of sixteen 
to twenty ships there., 52 When Stanhope received his orders 
in mid-August, Leake and the fleet were engaged in a 
successful attempt to capture Sardinia for the allies. on 24 
August, Stanhope, anticipating Leake's co-operation, sent the 
46 
Admiral a despatch, giving, details of his plans, and 
requesting a rendezvous off Menorca where he hoped the 
Admiral would spare him the marines and the additional guns 
and ammunition he badly needed. 53 In the meantime, and not 
without some difficulty, Stanhope persuaded the captains of 
the four English warships remaining in Barcelona roadstead to 
escort his expedition at least as far as Mallorca. 
54 On 2 
September Stanhope set sail with 700 Spanish and Neapolitan 
troops, 750 Portuguese and 600 English soldiers (Harrison's 
regiment, later 6th Foot, and two companies of Lord Raby's 
regiment of dragoons), together with. as much siege equipment 
as he could gather in Catalonia. 55 Mallorca was reached on 6 
September where 300 additional Spanish troops (soldiers and 
dragoons) were embarked together with more cannons, 
ammunition and some mules. Two days later Stanhope set sail 
and joined Leake off Menorca on 13 September. 
Leake had arrived off the south-east coast of the island 
on 5 September, and had spent the next few days, until 
Stanhope kept his rendezvous, gathering intelligence and 
searching for a suitable landing place for Stanhope's force. 
At a Council of War on the day of Stanhope's arrival Leake 
made it clear that, while he would stay until the troops were 
landed, and would give Stanhope 700 marines and all the 
ammunition and supplies he could spare, he then intended to 
comply with Admiralty orders (issued the previous January), 
and return to England with fifteen ships of the line. 
56 
Leake's second in command, Rear-Admiral Sir Edward Whitaker, 
was to remain with a squadron of twenty-six ships (including 
fourteen ships of the line) to give 'all possible assistance' 
to Stanhope but, 'when that service is performed, or when the 
47 
Lieutenant-General is in a condition to carry on the siege 
without the assistance of the squadron', Whitaker's ships 
were to sail to Leghorn and Naples (on missions for Charles 
III), and then proceed to winter at Lisbon, leaving only four 
or five frigates to cruise off the coast of Catalonia. 57 In 
the event of Stanhope's expedition being successful, Leake 
clearly had no immediate plans to use Mahon harbour. He wrote 
to Charles III on 17 September: 'As to what your Majesty is 
pleased to desire, that a squadron may winter at Port Mahon, 
I cannot possibly comply therewith without orders. 
58 He 
further justified his decision by adding that Mahon could not 
serve as a base until it was equipped to service the f leet, 
and that such arrangements 'will take up some time'. 
59 Leake 
sailed for England the following day. 
Despite, or perhaps because of,, Leake 's decision to leave 
the Mediterranean as soon as possible, Stanhope wasted no 
time in setting about his task. On 14 September, he landed 
unopposed with an advance party of troops in the RecO del 
Llexiu, a small cove between Cala Alcaufar and Punta Prima, 
60 
five miles to the south-east of Fort St. Philip, and then 
marched inland towards the fort to establish his first camp. 
In the course of the next three days, his force of 3,000 
soldiers, marines and dragoons, the artillery train and the 
provisions were also landed unopposed at Cala Alcaufar. 
61 
Stanhope had not been best pleased with Leake's departure, 
but he was well served by Whitaker who detached sailors from 
the fleet to help to manhandle the artillery from the coast 
to Stanhope's camps. Whitaker also sent two ships of the line 
to reduce Fort St. Anthony at Fornells which, after suffering 
a four-hour bombardment, surrendered on 21 September, and 
48 
Whitaker was able to send the transports and bomb vessels to 
the shelter of Fornells harbour. 62 
On 15 September, the Jurats of Maho"n had approached 
Stanhope to 'say their obedience', and deliver up the keys of 
the town. 63 Stanhope took possession of Mahon, garrisoned it 
with 100 men, and sent detachments across the island to the 
other towns. Within a week Alayor, Mercadal and Ciudadela 
declared for Charles III so that, by 22 September, Davila 
retained control only of forts St. Charles and St. Philip, 
into which he had withdrawn all his remaining troops. 64 
Stanhope's early reconnaissance, together with the 
intelligence he had gathered from the Menorcans, convinced 
him that an attack on St. Philip's, unsupported by artillery, 
would be foolhardy. Accordingly, he made his first priority 
the construction of a road from Cala Alcaufar over which his 
siege guns, mortars and cannons could be hauled to a position 
commanding the outer wall, the arrabal and the fort itself 
from the west. The terrain through which the road had to be 
made was rough and rocky; there were few draught animals 
available, so the guns had to be manhandled by soldiers and 
sailors, helped by a volunteer force of 500 Menorcans whom 
Stanhope found 'very zealous in their assistance, 65 and who 
were armed by him and put under the command of Juan Saura, 
the leader of the 1706 uprising, who had joined Stanhope's 
expedition in Mallorca. 66 By 23 September, after nine days of 
road-making and haulage, Stanhope had established his second, 
main camp (Fig. 2.3). A further five days were spent digging 
gun emplacements under sporadic, but largely harmless fire 
from the garrison. During this time Stanhope, according to 
his aide-de-camp, Cornet Cope, was indefatigable in the 
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example he set, encouraging the work, making personal 
reconnaissances and staying with the batteries until 
midnight. 67 on the morning of 28 September, Stanhope's guns 
opened fire on the outer defences of the fort. Their fire was 
steady and accurate and, after an hour and a half, one of the 
towers in the line wall was silenced. Three hours later, 
another tower was so badly damaged that it was abandoned, and 
two sizeable breaches had been made in the wall. It had been 
Stanhope's intention to delay his ground assault until the 
next day, but the breaches proved irresistible to Brigadier 
Wade's68 grenadiers who advanced and. penetrated them without 
waiting for orders. Stanhope was quick to react, and he 
launched an attack from the centre, supported by Lt-Colonel 
Lee and the marines to his left. Their combined efforts were 
successful in driving all the enemy forces ahead of them into 
Fort St. Philip. By the evening, Wade and his men were firmly 
lodged at the foot of the fortress glacis, and forward gun 
emplacements had been sited from which the fort itself was to 
be bombarded the next day. 69 
However, on the morning of 29 September, Davila beat a 
parley and, by 5p. m., he and de la Jonquiere accepted terms 
of capitulation, thereby abandoning to Stanhope af ter only 
token resistance (according to Cornet Cope) a 'prodigious 
strong fortress, 70 and the Mediterranean harbour essential 
for the Allied. campaign in Catalonia. The readiness of the 
garrison to negotiate a surrender so soon after the first 
attack had been launched, and before the fortress itself had 
been bombarded, was unexpected by Stanhope, and explicable on 
only one jingoistic count to his aide de camp: 'Everybody may 
judge the Governeur was a Spaniard and an intolerable fellow 
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to deliver up such a place without one cannon shot against 
it., 71 Stanhope had lost fewer than fifty men, the garrison 
losses had been minimal, and the surrender had not been 
prompted by any lack of provisions or ammunition. 72 Davila's 
decision to surrender, taken after a Council of War, was 
based on the belief of the senior garrison officers that no 
relief could be expected from Spain or France; the garrison 
numbers were too small, and too many troops were too 
inexperienced to be able to offer stern resistance; morale 
was low (there had been a number of desertions), and all 
feared the havoc that would be created by the bombardment of 
the fort - particularly the inevitable casualties among the 
families of the arrabal who had taken refuge in St. Philip's, 
and were as numerous as the garrison itself. 
73 
Stanhope's capitulation terms were generous. They provided 
for the repatriation of the garrison, their families and 
their belongings, and transport out of Menorca for any 
civilians unwilling to become subjects of Charles III. There 
was to be no victimisation of any Felipet who chose to stay 
on the island having changed his allegiance, and most of the 
'Spanish' garrison availed themselves of this opportunity and 
opted to remain. Moreover, clergy who had shown Felipet 
sympathies were not to be prevented from returning to their 
livings or monasteries. 74 
The reactions of the authorities in Spain and France to 
the loss of Menorca was predictably severe in the light of 
the barely token resistance offered to Stanhope's attack. 
00 Davila was arrested and imprisoned but, such was the public 
outcry against him, he committed suicide before he could be 
brought to trial. 75 De la ionquiýre was tried by court 
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martial, sentenced to a term of imprisonment and to be 
cashiered and dismissed the service. 76 It was not to be the 
last occasion in the eighteenth century when, for largely 
political reasons, a commander with responsibility for 
Menorca was to be held culpably negligent for the loss of the 
island and suffer as a consequence. 
Stanhope's conquest of Menorca was a major success for the 
Allies in the War of Spanish Succession, but he was, to an 
extent, favoured by fortune. If Davila had held out for 
another forty-eight hours, the elements would have played a 
very significant role in his defencq of St. Philip's. On 1 
October, Menorca was hit by one of the worst storms ever 
experienced in the island. The Tramontana winds reached 
hurricane force and, for twenty-four hours, were accompanied 
by lightning, thunder and torrential rain. Stanhope's troops 
saw their makeshift tents disappear, their rations and 
provisions spoiled and their powder drenched. Soldiers were 
drowned in the flooding, sailors were washed overboard and 
lost, and ships were dispersed, and damaged in the storm. 77 In 
the circumstances, Stanhope would have found it impossible to 
launch an immediate attack and, with Leake's departure, it is 
improbable that the remainder of the fleet could have given 
him the, fresh support and supplies he would have needed to 
succeed. Given the season of the year and Whitaker's orders 
to sail to winter at Lisbon, it is not inconceivable that 
Stanhope would have been forced to abandon his expedition. 
Stanhope was grateful for the support and assistance he 
had received from Whitaker and his squadron, but his comment 
to the Earl of Sunderland after the capture of Menorca that, 
in the enterprise, he had encountered 'ten times more 
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difficulty with the sea than with the enemyl, 78 was not 
unjustified. The Admiralty had shown no enthusiasm when he 
had first proposed an expedition to Mahon in 1705; Leake, 
having secured the bloodless submission of Ibiza and Mallorca 
in 1706, had not attempted to show the flag off Menorca; only 
the persuasive arguments of Philip Stanhope had ensured naval 
escorts for the troop transports from Barcelona; Leake's 
precipitate departure from. Menorca before Fort St. Philip had 
been invested, and his instructions to Whitaker to leave 
Menorca, if necessary before the success of the expedition 
had been assured - all these fac. tors combined to give 
Stanhope a sense of grievance. 
The navy's lukewarm attitude to the capture of Menorca is 
nowhere explained in official records, and the reasons for it 
can only be a matter of conjecture. The memory may still have 
been fresh in the Admiralty of the supply difficulties and 
frustrations encountered a generation earlier when an attempt 
had been made to establish a naval base at Mahon; the 
attitude of Leake may have been tempered by his earlier 
experiences of sailing in the Mediterranean, and his 
awareness of the risks his ships would run if they were kept 
on station throughout the stormy winter months, and by a 
knowledge of the difficulties of manoeuvring a fleet in and 
out of Maho*n harbour in adverse weather conditions. Whatever 
the reasons for the navy's lacklustre support, it is 
indisputable that, while monarchs, statesmen and soldiers 
were readily convinced of Menorca's and Mahon's geo-political 
and strategic importance, sailors remained sceptical. 
The British garrison in Menorca 1708-1713. 
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Stanhope had conquered menorca in the name of Charles III, 
but, from the outset, he was determined that the island 
'which will give the law to the Mediterranean both in time of 
war and peace, 79 should remain British. 'Let who will be King 
of Spain', he wrote 'we should not temporise in the matter, 
but have it [Menorcal absolutely yielded to us', 80 and all 
Stanhope's actions in respect of Menorca were carried out 
with this aim in view. Charles III's right to appoint a Civil 
Governor was not disputed, but Stanhope appointed one of his 
own officers, Lewis Petit, an Engineer (a Colonel in the 
British army, but who held a Brigadier's commission from 
Charles), to -be Military Governor with instructions to brook 
no interference from any of the civil powers in Menorca. In 
October 1708, Stanhope sent back to the front in Catalonia 
the bulk of his expeditionary force, retaining only 
Harrison's regiment and some marines to form the garrison. 
The ministry in London supported Stanhope 's plans for , the 
future of Menorca - Sunderland wrote in October of the 
advantages to be gained from British possession of the island 
'both in War and Peace'81 - and, in December, instructions 
were sent to Stanhope confirming Petit's appointment and 
stipulating that the Menorcan garrison should consist of 'our 
own Troops only and none else', adding that it was 'highly 
just and reasonable' that Britain should retain at least Port 
Mahon as 'security for all our expenses in the Peninsula'. 82 
Moreover, Stanhope was given plenary powers to negotiate with 
the court in Barcelona for the cession of Menorca to 
Britain. 83 
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Stanhope's hopes that Charles III would agree to cede 
Menorca were based on his awareness of the desperate need 
Charles had of British support for his campaign in Spain, and 
the naive expectation that Menorca was a price Charles would 
be prepared to pay to reward Britain f or the men and money 
which had been committed to his cause. Stanhope's 
negotiations had to be kept secret. Not only had , Charles 
sworn a coronation oath never to part with any portion of 
Spanish territory, but any hint of the cession of Menorca to 
Britain in advance of a general peace settlement would have 
contravened the terms of the allianciý, and would have caused 
an outcry among Britain's allies, particularly the Dutch, 
whose Ambassador in London, Vryberg, was later to declare 
that Menorca in British hands would be as hazardous to the 
Dutch Republic as Ostend. 84 Nevertheless, Stanhope attempted 
to force the issue and, in May 1709, delivered an ultimatum 
to Charles - either repay in full British loans and costs 
incurred in the Spanish campaign, or cede the sovereignty of 
Menorca until the debts were paid. 85 In reply Charles 
fulsomely expressed his gratitude to Britain for the support 
he was receiving, but reminded Stanhope that the terms of the 
alliance excluded any re-allocation of terrritories in 
advance of a general armistice. 
86 However, he put forward a 
counter-proposal to the effect that he was prepared to use 
Menorca as temporary collateral for his debts to Britain 
(grossly underestimated at 200,000 pistoles - E160,000), and 
allow Britain to garrison the island. But this proposal, the 
first clause in a suggested Treaty of Port Mah6n, was 
contingent upon Britain accepting sixteen further clauses. 
87 
In so far as the Treaty concerned Menorca, Britain was 
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required to give assurances that the island would be closed 
to ships from Barbary, it would not be ceded to another power 
and that the Menorcans' religion and fueros would be 
respected - all conditions to which Britain subsequently 
subscribed in the Treaty of Utrecht. But there were other 
clauses deliberately designed to be unacceptable to Britain - 
a pact of mutual defence in the Mediterranean which required 
Britain to maintain a permanent squadron of twelve ships 
based at Mahon; a policy of non-aggression to Catholic 
powers; an undertaking not to support non-Catholic powers and 
a promise to support the integratiorý into Catalonia of the 
French provinces of Roussillon and Cerdagne. 88 
These clauses alone would have made it impossible for 
Britain to sign the treaty as proposed, but any prospect of 
further negotiations disappeared when, in mid-summer 1709, 
the Dutch learned of Stanhope's initiatives. 89 On I August 
1709 the British ministry was reminded in the strongest 
diplomatic terms of its undertaking not to make any pact with 
Charles III without the prior approval of the States 
General, 90 and with Godolphin subsequently under instructions 
from Queen Anne to do 'nothing that shall be uneasy or 
displease the States', 91 the issue of the Treaty of Mahon was 
sidelined to such effect that, by the middle of September, 
the Earl of Portland wrote that it was accepted in London 
that the Treaty would come to nothing. 
Portland's forecast was correct, but Stanhope's 'crusade 
had found powerful support in London, and Menorca became a 
key element in Britain's expectations in the eventual 
peace negotiations. Indeed, such was Britain's impatience 
to exercise sovereignty in Menorca, that Queen Anne 
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signed the Duke of Argyll's commission as Governor in June 
1712,92 at a time when only preliminary armistice terms had 
been agreed between Britain and her allies and the French. 
Philip V of Spain did not accept the preliminary peace terms 
until 1 November, 93 only one week before Argyll arrived in 
Menorca and raised the British flag there. 94 Eventually, the 
definitive peace terms to end the War of Spanish Succession 
were agreed at Utrecht in April 1713, but it was not until 13 
July that Spain signed the Treaty, clause eleven of which 
gave Britain de jure sovereignty over Menorca, thereby 
legalising the de facto rule it had. exercised in the island 
for the previous eight months. 95 
The secrecy and subterfuge which Stanhope used in his 
diplomatic negotiations with Charles III's court in Barcelona 
to secure Menorca for Britain were nowhere in evidence on the 
island itself, where the uniquely British garrison, and the 
obvious expenditure to strengthen the defences and create a 
naval base were unconcealed indications that Britain did not 
intend to share the island or to part with it. 
Queen Anne's instructions to include no foreign troops in 
the garrison were strictly enforced. 96 All the non-British 
troops who took part in the expedition to capture Menorca 
left the island immediately after it surrendered and, of the 
initial British garrison, the 192 marines were relieved in 
May 1709 by six companies of Col. Charles Dubourgay's 
regiment, and Harrison's men by Sir Charles Hotham's regiment 
in July 1709. These were, in turn, relieved by 573 men of 
Brigadier Thomas Whetham's regiment (later 27th Foot) in 
November 1709,97 together with 400 fusiliers (7th Foot) who 
were added to the garrison in April 1710.98 For the first 
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four years of the British presence in the island, the 
garrison, including an HQ staff of sixteen, 99 mustered 1,000 
until, with the withdrawal from Catalonia to Menorca of nine 
British regiments, 100 numbers swelled to 3,800 in November 
1712,101 and then to more than 6,000 in the first half of 
1713.102 
The costs involved were significant. Estimates for 1712 
gave the outlay for the HQ staff (originally set at 
E1,645.10s. in October 1708) 103 as E4,884.18s. 4d, and the 
pay for each regiment amounted to E16,266.8s. 6d. 104 In 
November 1712, there were five regimepts (each of 760 men) in 
Menorca, making the total cost of the garrison (excluding the 
artillery train) in excess of E86,000 in pay alone, and this 
sum. does not take into account the cost of the regiments 
which were drafted to Menorca from Catalonia from December 
1712 until August 1713. 
Expenditure on Ordnance was considerable. The proportion 
of the Ordnance budget destined for Menorca out of the amount 
allocated for the campaign in Catalonia cannot be quantified 
but, at the end of that campaign in July 1712, there is a 
record of materials 'Powder, Shott, Carriages etc. ' costing 
E29,877.15s. 4d. being sent from England to Menorca-105 There 
was, of course, the annual cost of the artillery train (at 
least E3,000 p. a. )106, but the financial outlay on repairs 
and improvements to the defences again cannot be reliably 
quantified. Essential repair work was instigated immediately 
after the capture of Menorca, and it is known that nearly 
E20,000 was earmarked for work on the fortifications in 
1709,107 and that 1,200 workmen were brought to Menorca from 
Mallorca and Catalonia to assist in the work. 108 In August 
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1709 Stanhope, having received an enthusiastic independent 
report on the work that had already been 
undertaken, 109instructed Petit and Col. Peter Durand 
(appointed Chief Engineer in Menorca) to start- work on new 
defences -a battery to the north of St. Philip's, another 
bastion, additional curtains, ravelins, a barracks to house 
twelve companies of soldiers and five 'pavilions' for the 
officers. The estimated cost of this work was put at 336,514 
dollars (E72,911), 110 an amount which, in the context of 
Britain's total war commitment, must be considered 
disproportionately high for an island which was not certain 
to remain British and which, with the Allies in command of 
the sea, was under no threat of attack. When Britain's 
sovereignty in Menorca was all but assured, further 
expenditure of E68,295 was authorised by Argyll in 1712, of 
which E42,000 was to be spent on finishing work already 
started, and the remainder to go towards new works. 
111 Argyll 
also approved, in principle, a plan submitted by Durand to 
build a new fort (to be called St. Anne) on La Mola on the 
north side of the harbour, opposite St. Philip's. An undated, 
unsigned, but very detailed estimate of the cost of the 
proposed new fortification (including the provision of a 
barracks for 4,000 men), put the cost at P-175,364.14s, 
112 
Not surprisingly, the cost was considered to be prohibitively 
high, and although Durand's plan was never implemented, Staff 
officers were appointed and paid to carry out duties in the 
non-existent fort for at least the following forty years. 
113 
At Fort St. Philip, it is difficult to establish what work 
was undertaken from 1708 until 1713, and what it cost. An 
'Accompt of the Expenses at Mahon for years 1708,1709 and 
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1710,114 suggests that a maximum of E27,000 was allocated to 
improve the fortifications between October 1708 and July 
1710, and, in February 1713, Petit submitted an account of 
the expense incurred by work on the fortifications which 
totalled E62,765.115 However this account is inadequately 
itemised, mathematically inaccurate and, as will be shown 
subsequently, unreliable. 
Once the news of the capture of Menorca had reached 
London, the Admiralty reacted swiftly and positively. Admiral 
Sir George Byng was appointed to succeed Leake in command in 
the Mediterranean, and orders were sent to him at Lisbon in 
October 1708 to sail to Mahon and to use the port as a base 
from which to protect Allied trade and 'annoy the enemy'. 
116 
Byng's squadron of sixteen ships, together with a hospital 
ship, a storeship and a hulk carrying the first naval stores 
for the dockyard he was to establish, reached Mah6n on 12 
January 1709, and Byng remained there until the end of 
March. 117 The Victualling Board appointed Joseph Gascoigne as 
its Agent in Mahon, 118 and the Board for the Sick and Hurt 
sent Pierce Griffyth to the island to establish a naval 
hospital 'as soon as may be, in some convenient position near 
the harbour mouth. 1119 Both Agents had reached Menorca by the 
Spring of 1709; in May, Admiral Sir John Jennings arrived 
with more dockyard supplies and equipmentl2O and, by July, 
essential facilities and staff had been established and the 
dockyard was operational, albeit in an initially limited 
capacity. 
on his arrival Byng found that the harbour facilities were 
no greater or better than when the navy had last used Mahon 
as a base a generation earlier, and he set out to improve 
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them. 'Soldiers of the garrison, seamen of the fleet, Spanish 
masons and 186 French prisoners'121 were set to work to clear 
the ground previously used by the navy as a wharf, to reface 
it at the water-side and to widen it by cutting back into the 
cliff on the land-side. But, while the site was suitable for 
a careening and landing quay, Byng was reluctant to build 
permanent storehouses and workshops on it, considering the 
site not sufficiently secure from 'surprise or insult from 
the enemy', or from 'the people of this island seizing or 
setting [the buildings] on fire upon any revolt'. 122 His 
intentions were to erect all the main storehouses within the 
new fortifications under construction at St. Philip's, and 
build only 'little necessary stores' and a 'lodgement for the 
petty officers [shipwrights, carpenters and caulkers) that 
may attend duty there' on the wharf itself, 123 and he 
subsequently sent the Admiralty plans of what he had in mind, 
estimating building costs on the wharf to amount to 
E920.11s. 8d. 124 The plans made no mention of, the naval 
storehouses to be built within the precincts of St. Philip's 
(for which Byng had requested materials to be sent out from 
England125), but there is a later reference to a powder 
magazine for the navy being enclosed within Fort Felipet. 
126 
Byng's development plans were sound only on the grounds of 
security, and the impracticality of -having 
the naval stores 
dispersed and of manhandling the greater part up and down the 
slope from the town to the wharf, and then along a rough 
track to St. Philip's (which, in itself, had no adequate site 
for a landing stage), concerned the victualling Agent, 
Gascoigne, and the storekeeper, John Corfield. As a result of 
representations they made to him, Byng had changed his mind 
61 
CN 
r- 
%0 
44 
0 
ý4 
=1 
0 
ýQ 
ý4 
ro 
L"L - 
111f 
r. - 
ev 
.. /'/, -_, 
.7 
A 
Y1l' 
Fig. 2.4. 
44 
ý4 
(d 
a) 4J (13 
$4 U 
(0 . 14 
u> 
-i r4 (1) 
by June 1709,127 and the naval and victualling stores and 
workshops were subsequently built on, or in the vicinity of, 
the wharf (Fig. 2.4). 
On the wharf itself, the stores which Byng had originally 
envisaged as 'little' must have been expanded considerably if 
only to judge from two returns by the naval storekeepers in 
1709128 and 1712.129 The first, submitted by Corfield, listed 
the considerable amount of careening and repair equipment 
which had reached Maho"n in the first six months of the 
dockyard's existence, and bemoaned the limited working and 
storage space available. The second account, submitted by 
George Atkins, Corfield's successor, indicated that little 
progress had been made in the provision of storage space for 
the bulkier items of naval stores. With his report Atkins put 
forward plans for improved and more permanent storehouses at 
an estimated cost of 7,600 pieces of eight (El, 520), but 
these were considered too expensive and no improvements were 
authorised until a more cost-effective plan was implemented 
four years later. 
The victualling stores and the 'cooperidgel yard were 
established near the wharf, part way up the slope to the town 
and close to the Carmelite monastery in which the victualling 
clerks and coopers had their lodgings. 130 Storeships in the 
harbour housed some provisions, but storage space on land 
must have been considerable, if only to judge by the 
provisions which Gascoigne reported that he had in store in 
July 1712.131 It is clear from the same report that the 
bakers whom Gascoigne had asked to be sent to Menorca from 
England had arrived, 132 but, while new bakehouses were built, 
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the bulk of the remaining buildings used by the navy were 
leased from Menorcans. 
Pierce Griffyth, the Agent sent to Menorca by the 
Commissioners of the Admiralty Sick and Hurt Board to 
establish a naval hospital in the island, set about his task 
immediately on arrival in Menorca in the Spring of 1709. At 
the outset, he hired accommodation for the sick seamen in the 
Franciscan monastery situated on the high ground on the then 
western outskirts of Maho'n. 133 A few months later Griffyth, 
through Byng, submitted a design of a hospital (since lost) 
to his Commissioners, together with an estimate of the 
building costs which, at E9,000, was clearly too grandiose 
and expensive to meet with their approval. 
134 Consequently no 
work was started and no progress was made until Byng's 
successor, Admiral Jennings, impatient with the delay, took 
it upon himself to authorise the construction of a revised 
design in 1711. The building now proposed was a more modest 
undertaking -a fact reflected in the projected cost of 
E3,600 - but it was to be built on the site originally 
selected by Griffyth, 'the great island in the harbourl, 
135 
the Illa des Rei (King's Island, but to be known by the 
British, no doubt with some justification, as Bloody Island), 
situated in mid-channel towards the mouth of the harbour. The 
island, open to the sea breezes, was considered a healthy 
site; it was accessible to ships, so that no seaman with a 
contagious illness would have to be landed on the mainland; 
it was removed from dissolute temptations readily accessible 
in Mahon, and it was a difficult place from which to desert. 
Work on the hospital was started without Admiralty 
approval and, therefore, without Griffyth having the funds to 
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meet the bills. Jennings was obliged to fund some of the 
expense himself, and to borrow the outstanding amount from 
the officers of his fleet. 136 When Jennings applied to be 
reimbursed, he justified his initiative by claiming that if 
he had not acted, he would have missed the opportunity of 
employing the skilled labour force imported to work on the 
fortifications at St. Philip's, who were about to be 
repatriated. 137 The Admiralty were not impressed and, far 
from commending Jennings on his initiative and welcoming the 
greatly reduced cost of the building, the Navy Board refused 
to sanction any repayment, and Jenniqgs was obliged to plead 
his case with the Lord Treasurer and petition the Queen 
before he and the others involved were reimbursed. 138 
The hospital built in 1711 (Fig. 2.5) was a single storey 
building with projecting wings, catering for 336 patients in 
fourteen wards with twenty-four beds in each. 139 Two storeyed 
houses with storerooms for the Agent, Surgeon and his Mates 
were built on the end of the wings, a chapel formed the 
central feature, and a bakery and a kitchen were situated at 
either end of the eight wards which ran north to south, four 
on either side of the chapel. Access to the wards was from a 
covered way which ran round three sides of the central 
'piazza!. No provision was made for nurses or for a communal 
dining-room. 
The hospital which Jennings authorised has a place in 
naval history. Not only was it the first hospital to be built 
in an overseas base, it was the navy's first purpose-built 
hospital, pre-dating Haslar in Portsmouth by some fifty 
years. Unfortunately, while Haslar hospital still stands, a 
price was paid for the haste and shoddy workmanship with 
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which Maho"n hospital was built. Within three years of its 
construction, Admiral Baker reported 'very great defectstl40 
in the structure, and the Admiralty was forced to authorise a 
major reconstruction of the building. 
The land-based naval element in the garrison of Menorca 
was insignificant in comparison with the number of soldiers. 
In the years in question, the permanent staff of the dockyard 
can have numbered no more than fifty (shipwrights, 
carpenters, sawyers, caulkers and blacksmiths), with the 
semi-skilled and unskilled labour being supplied from the 
fleet or recruited from the local ilihabitants, but that is 
not to imply that the creation of a dockyard did not have an 
effect on the island. Although all the equipment, stores and 
the bulk of the provisions had to be sent to Menorca from 
England and Ireland, or obtained elsewhere in the 
Mediterranean, and although the fleet was seldom in port in 
numbers, 141 the needs of the navy, added to those of the 
rest of the garrison, helped to stimulate the Menorcan 
economy to provide a labour force and local supplies in the 
form of vegetables, fruit, wine, fresh meat and poultry. , 
The welcome extended to Stanhope and his forces when they 
captured Menorca was genuine, but it was given only in as far 
as the British were allies of Charles III and were acting in 
his name. For as long as the expectations of the Menorcans 
were that they would remain subjects of Charles III, they 
resigned themselves to the presence of a British garrison 
sanctioned by Charles, although their tolerance did not 
preclude protests at actions of the military commanders, nor 
did it prevent complaints being registered about excesses by 
the troops. But the Menorcans became increasingly alarmed by 
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political developments outside the island, and by military 
activity in Menorca itself. In 1711, the death of the Emperor 
in April, the coronation of Charles III as his successor in 
December and persistent rumours of a peace settlement 
favourable to Philip V and detrimental to Menorca, were 
matters of very real concern in the island -a concern that 
was increased by an awareness of the money being invested by 
the British in the military and naval installations in 
Menorca. 
By March 1712, the concern of the Jurats had become so 
great that they wrote to Queen Isabel Cristina (whom Charles 
had empowered to act as his Regent in Catalonia) to pledge 
their - continued loyalty to the monarch who had sworn to 
uphold their fueros,, to express their alarm that the garrison 
officers were 'boasting' that Menorca would become British 
and to register their strong opposition to a peace agreement 
which would make them 'subjects of another prince who 
professes a contrary religion. ol42 The reply from Barcelona 
was not encouraging. It advised the Menorcans to 'tolerate 
the present unhappy circumstances with prudent resignation, 
and, although it stated that it was quite 'irrational' that 
Menorca would become British, it offered no concrete 
reassurance about the island's fate. 143 In September 1712, 
the Jurats made -a last-ditch attempt to state their 
opposition to British rule and their determination to remain 
subjects of a Catholic monarch. 144 They sent a cleric, Dr 
Cristobal Rubf del Vilar to argue their case in Barcelona 
but, by then, Menorca's fate had been virtually sealed. 
The Menorcans had been relieved when Stanhope renewed his 
Queen's promise to respect their religion and fueros, 145 and 
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were additionally reassured when Charles appointed a Spanish 
Civil Governor, 146but they became increasingly disillusioned 
and resentful as it became clear that the authority of the 
Civil Governor was subservient to the British military 
commander, and that the latter was prepared often to pay only 
lip-service to their fueros and way of life. Undoubtedly, 
some Menorcans benefited from the increased business and 
labour opportunities created by the British presence, but, 
inevitably, there were numerous clashes between the civilians 
and the military, leading to protests about the behaviour and 
demands of the garrison. The protests took the form of 
accusations, often repeated, that soldiers deliberately 
provoked disturbances, 147 showed disrespect to civilian 
authority, 148 assaulted innocent civilians, 149 and were 
guilty of theft. 150 other recurrent complaints related to the 
insensitive demands of the garrison in respect of 
requisitioning civilian houses for use as military quarters, 
and the excessive demands made upon the universitats to 
provide the troops with wood and oil. Petit paid scant heed 
to the protests and complaints, but his successor as Lt. - 
Governor of St. Philip's in 1711, Col. John Fermor, 151 took 
action to curb some of the soldiers' worst excesses. 
Recognising that the conduct of the garrison had become 'so 
disorderly', he applied for, and was granted, permission to 
hold general courts martial in Menorca. 152 
Ostensibly, Stanhope's choice of Lewis Petit des Etans as 
Governor of St. Philip's was astute. Petit was an Engineer, 
and Stanhope's priority after the capture of Menorca was to 
repair and reinforce the island's defences, a task in which 
Petit's expertise would be useful. Petit was also politically 
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acceptable to Charles III, having been given a Brigadier's 
commission by him as a reward for signal services in the 
sieges of Barcelona. But, whatever his professional military 
skills, Petit lacked tact, and his venal nature was not to 
endear him to the Menorcans nor, ultimately, to his 
superiors. 
The Jurats resented Petit's high-handed attitude, 153 his 
disregard for their fueros, 154 his abrogation of their 
responsibilities to fix market prices, 155 his unreasonable 
demands for the amount of wood, straw and oil to be supplied 
to the garrison, 156 and his involvement with trade on his own 
account and for his own profit. 157 
The Duke of Argyll, appointed in 1711 to succeed Stanhope 
as Ambassador to the court of Charles III and to be Commander- 
in- Chief of the British troops in Spain, 158 did not, 
apparently, find fault with Petit's treatment of the 
Menorcans, but he did question Petit's loyalty, professional 
ability and honesty. In December 1711, Argyll wrote to the 
Earl of Dartmouth expressing disapproval of Petit's use of 
his Spanish rank of Brigadier, the flying of a Spanish and 
not British flag in Fort St. Philip, and complaining that 
Petit was, inexcusably, in direct correspondence with the 
court of Charles 111.159 After a brief, secret visit to 
Menorca in January 1712 (a visit so brief and secret that it 
is nowhere recorded in the island's archives), Argyll again 
wrote to Dartmouth expressing the view that under Petit's 
command 'conditions on Minorca were contrary to Her Majesty's 
interests, ' and he criticised Petit's professional judgement 
'too much is begun and so little finished that the place is 
not in a much better posture of Def ence than when it was 
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taken., 160 Argyll ordered Petit to give an account of the 
money which had been spent on the fortifications. Petit's 
account -was investigated in 1712 by Andrew Archer who 
concluded that Petit (abetted by Col. Durand and Capt. 
Latham) had been guilty of malpractice, and had claimed more 
money than had been spent. 161 Archer's findings were that of 
the 204,892 dollars (E44,393) claimed by Petit, the actual 
cost of the work done should have been no more than 108,888 
dollars (E23,592), and he recommended that the difference 
should be recovered from the former Governor of the fort. 162 
Petit subsequently submitted an amended account of his 
expenses which was largely accepted by the Treasury in 
1717,163 but, even then, there was an unjustified shortfall, 
and a final amount of EI, 049.12s. 6d. was recovered by the 
Treasury from Petit's widow after his death in 1720.164 - 
The Treaty of Utrecht. 
Throughout the War of Spanish Succession, the policy of 
Queen Anne's ministries, in accordance with the terms of the 
alliance, had been to deny France control of the Spanish 
Netherlands, Spain's possessions in Italy and the Spanish 
Indies, and to respect the agreement that 'no peace shall be 
made unless jointly'. 165 The rise to power of the Tories in 
the autumn of 1710, the death of the Emperor Joseph in April 
1711 and the election in his place of Archduke Charles (until 
then the British- supported claimant to the throne of Spain 
as Charles III), brought about a change in policy but, even 
as early as the summer of 1710, British ministers had 
unilaterally opened negotiations with France to conclude the 
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war on the most favourable terms for Britain. 
166 In respect 
of Menorca, these terms were initially limited to the cession 
of the port of Maho**nl67 but, by the time Britain came to 
negotiate peace with Spain in addition to France in the 
autumn of 1712, Britain's expectations had expanded to 
include the entire island of Menorca. 
Direct negotiations between Spain and Britain opened when 
Lord Lexington, the British envoy, arrived in Madrid in 
October 1712,168 and his Spanish counterpart, the Marques de 
Monteleon, joined the Spanish Ambassador, the Marques de 
Bedmar, in London at about the same, time. on 19 . October, 
Lexington presented a list of eleven pre-conditions on which 
Britain required satisfaction before agreeing to peace-169 At 
the head of the territorial demands on this list was that the 
island of Menorca be ceded to Britain. Philip V had expected 
' 170 and agreed only reluctantly to the to surrender Mahon, 
greater concession on the understanding that the Menorcans 
fueros and their Catholic religion would be safeguarded, and 
Bedmar was instructed to achieve the maximum possible 
concessions in this respect. 
171 
In London Bedmar made the requisite representations, but 
it was made clear to him that, the island of Menorca having 
been conquered by force of arms, any concessions in the 
sphere of religious tolerance would be discretionary on 
Britain's part, and would not be acceptable to her as a 
binding pre-condition to the cession of the island. 
172 
Britain was prepared to go so far as to undertake to allow 
'free exercise of the Catholic religion', and to 'safeguard 
people, goods and privileges' on the island, but she would 
not be bound beyond that, 
173 since any greater concession 
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would have limited the Queen's 'absolute and independent 
sovereignty' over Menorca. 174 Although these undertakings 
fell short of Spain's objectives, Monteleon advised the 
Spanish court to accept them and not to press for greater 
clarification, for he had little doubt that, if pressed for 
more specific and binding undertakings, Britain would 
withdraw what she had already conceded, and still insist on 
the cession of Menorca. Monteleon's advice was accepted and 
the final draft of Britain's obligations to the Menorcans 
read as follows: 
Moreover the Queen of Great Britain promises that all 
the inhabitants of the said island, both ecclesiastic 
and secular, will safely enjoy all their goods, rights 
and privileges, even the freedom to worship in the 
Roman Catholic faith: and, for the protection of the 
said religion in that island, measures will be taken 
which will not be at variance with the civil 
government and laws of Great Britain. 175 
On 13 July 1713, two months after the general terms of 
peace had been agreed in Utrecht, Philip V signed a separate 
Treaty of Peace and Friendship with Britain whereby he ceded 
to the crown of Great Britain 'the whole island of Menorca, 
transferring forever all rights and full dominion over the 
said island., 176 
No-one had worked more assiduously than Stanhope to secure 
Menorca as a British possession and, as the only 
soldier/statesman of his age with first-hand knowledge of 
Britain's newly acquired Mediterranean bases, his marked 
preference for Menorca over Gibraltarl. 77 was to have a 
lasting effect on British Mediterranean foreign policy for 
much of the 18th century. - It was not until 1783, by which 
time Menorca's geo-political importance had waned, that 
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Britain was constrained to cede the island to Spain. Until 
then, Britain had never contemplated giving up Menorca 
whereas, in return for a variety of concessions from Spain, 
an offer to return Gibraltar to Spain had been made on no 
fewer than five occasions. 178 
Of Stanhope's claims for Menorca, only his assessment of 
the island's geopolitical and strategic importance stood the 
test of time. 'Only a day's sail from Africa, Spain, France 
and Sardinia, almost contiguous to Mallorca and only two days 
sail from Italy', 179 meant that British possession of Menorca 
ensured that no Mediterranean power w9uld undertake any major 
military or diplomatic initiative in the area without 
considering Britain's likely reaction. But his belief that 
Mahon would rival Genoa and Leghorn as a Mediterranean 
entrepot was fanciful and unrealistic. 180 Stanhope's other 
claims that Menorca could be made impregnable (at a cost of 
only E60,000), 181 and that the annual maintenance cost of the 
island to Britain would be no more than E30,000, were both 
disproved - the latter claim almost at the same time as 
Stanhope made it, the former (after an expenditure greatly in 
excess of the amount Stanhope had in mind) on the only two 
occasions the defences of Menorca were tested in 1756 and 
1781/2. How different the fate of Menorca might have been if 
the more cautionary advice of Brigadier Francis Palmes had 
prevailed over Stanhope's romantic vision. Palmes, the 
British Envoy in Vienna at the time of the Barrier Treaty 
negotiations, wrote prophetically to Marlborough in 1710 
advising him, and the ministry, to be: 
mindful of the exorbitant costs of fortifying a place 
[Menorcal which, when all is done, upon the breaking 
out of another war, the French, with good reason 
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will take it from us before we in England can have 
news of its being besiegedJ82 
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Chapter Three. 
Menorcan Society in the Eighteenth Century. 
At the time of the British acquisition of Menorca, the 
island's society was structured, settled and firmly rooted in 
the form and offices of local government, the fueros and the 
social classifications which had operýLted since the Aragonese 
conquest in the late thirteenth century. When Menorca was 
ceded to Britain, the Menorcans feared that the island's 
traditional way of life would be threatened, and it is ironic 
that the laissez-faire policy markedly adopted by the British 
authorities to the island's internal affairs, served 
. 
to 
preserve many of Menorcals traditions into the nineteenth 
century, and was in sharp contrast to the interventionist and 
centralist policies of the Spanish government which, after 
the War of Spanish Succession, suppressed similar traditions 
and fueros in all the Catalan provinces. Britain did not set 
out deliberately to bring about changes, but her liberal 
attitude, and more than seventy years of a British presence 
in Menorca inevitably had a profoufid effect on Menorcan 
society. Nowhere was this more marked than in the prosperity 
resulting from the British presence which contributed to a 
population explosion (the number of inhabitants increased by 
nearly 92% in the course of the eighteenth century), the 
emergence of a bourgeoisie, and an opportunity for new money 
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to facilitate upward mobility at all levels in the 
tradionally static social strata. 1 (Fig. 3.1. ). 
Menorcan Social Strata. 
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In common with other former Aragonese territories. in the 
kingdom of Spain, the inhabitants of Menorca were classified 
socially in one of four estates (bracos) - nobility 
(militar), major (major), middle (mitja) and minor (menor)2 
-a classification by birth in the first group, and by the 
occupation of the head of the family in the remaining three 
divisions. The nobility comprised the island's aristocracy, 
but contained only one representative of the. titled nobility 
(nobleza titulada), the head of the Cardona family, who had 
been created Baron of Lluriach in 1683.3 Although untitled, 
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other families enjoyed noble status. Some, like the Gomila, 
Olivar, Martorell and Sintes families were descended from the 
old nobility (nobleza vieja), who had settled in Menorca on 
estates granted to them by the King at the time of the 
island's conquest from the Moors; 4 others, the new nobility 
(nobleza nueva), enjoyed noble status, having acquired it as 
a result of being granted noble blood (castizo) status by 
royal decree, or through marriage (noble status was inherited 
if either parent was noble by birth). In the seventeenth 
century, six Menorcan families were granted castizo status, 5 
0, and in his, Llinatges dels Menorquin. 7, Fernando Marti cites 
examples of families improving social status and eventually 
6 acquiring noble status through marriage. Of these, the rise 
of the Portella family is typical. 7 Descendants of a private 
soldier in the garrison of St. Philip's in the sixteenth 
century, the family had become weavers and tailors in the 
seventeenth century. In the early years of the eighteenth 
century, Josep Portella Andreu became an apothecary; his son 
became a doctor, and his grandson, Josep Portella Seguf, also 
a doctor, married into the noble Sancho family in 1768. 
Ranking below those of noble blood, were the knights 
(cabal leros/hidalgos) , who had received a patent of nobility 
(hidalgufa) from the King. They, too, were entitled to the 
noble prefix of 'don', but their status could be passed on 
only in the male line. In the seventeenth century, the heads 
of thirty-five Menorcan families were honoured in this 
manner, 8 and in 1711, Charles III conferred an hidalgul'a on 
Vicente Alberti Mercadal as a reward for his services. 
During the periods of British rule in Menorca no additions 
were made to the ranks of the island's aristocracy, other 
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than those which were achieved through marriage, although 
attempts were made by Governors to persuade the British 
government tangibly to recognise services rendered to the 
British crown by some Menorcans. In 1718, Kane urged that 
nobles, and in particular Juan Miguel Saura Morell, who had 
shown themselves well affected to Britain should be 
encouraged in their attitude and rewarded with a gold medal 
and chain, 9 and in 1775/76, Murray recommended knighthoods 
for Dr. Mateo Mercadal and Diego Vidal Segul, but none of 
these proposals was entertained in London. It was not until 
Spain regained control of Menorca (1782-1798), that a further 
three Menorcan families were ennobled (ironically including 
Diego Vidal), and the marquisate of Albranca was conferred 
upon the head of the Martorell family. 10 
The noble estate was the least numerous of the four 
groupings in Menorcan society but, like the aristocracy 
elsewhere in Europe at the time, it was disproportionately 
influential, and it was not inclined to be pro-British in its 
outlook, for at least two reasons. The first sprang from its 
resentment of the preference shown by the British for Maho"n 
over Ciudadela as Menorcals seat of government. Most noble 
families had their town houses in Ciudadela and resided 
there, and they deplored the diminished role in, the island's 
affairs to which Ciudadela, its officials and its tribunals 
were relegated by the British. Secondly the British 
represented change, and the aristocracy (like the clergy) 
felt their authority and standing threatened by Britain's 
generally liberal regime of government in the island, and the 
change in the old order brought about by the commercial 
opportunities open to the Menorcans, which resulted in a 
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burgeoning middle class and, for many, a swing away from the 
traditional way of life in the island. 
The remaining three' social groupings had no intrinsic 
reasons for resenting British rule. The major estate 
contained some armigerous families, but lacking a patent of 
nobility they could not be classed as nobles. Also in this 
estate were prosperous farmers (payeses acomodados) with 
substantial leasehold properties, lawyers, notaries and 
doctors. 11 The middle estate contained small farmers, tenant 
farmers and those professional people excludep from the major 
estate - surgeons, apothecaries. 
12 The minor estate 
constituted the largest grouping, and was made up of 
artisans, tradesmen, journeymen, mariners and farm 
labourers. 13 Not only were the social groupings clearly 
divided, but for -categories within the upper two estates in 
particular, appropriate titles and forms of address were 
punctilliously observed. Nobles and their children were 
addressed as 'don' or Idonzell'; the island's principal law 
officers14 were referred to as 'muy magnfficos', a form of 
address also used for the councillors - of Ciudadela. 
Provincial lay magistrates, and the Jurats of Mahon, Alayor 
and Mercadal were known as Imagnifficos', as were the district 
Amostacenes (officials controlling goods and prices in the 
markets). The Syndichs sent from Menorca to foreign courts 
were addressed as 'honorable'; notaries and lawyers were 
addressed as Idiscret', and the remainder of the major estate 
were referred to as Imoss'e'n'. Minor land-owners were known as 
lamol(master), followed by the name of their property. 15 
It is impossible to quantify the numbers respresented in 
each of the groupings but, from census returns in the course 
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of the 18th century, the most socially informative of which 
16 are the figures available for Mahon in 1763, and for 
Menorca as a whole in 178217 and 178718, it is reasonable to 
conjecture that, calculated as percentages of the population, 
numbers of the aristocracy never exceeded 1%, and that 
numbers in the other estates were approximately: main 10%, 
middle 24% and minor 63%. The regular and secular clergy made 
up the remaining 2% in the census returns. 
Wealth. 
What wealth there was in Menorca at the start of the 
eighteenth century, came from the land and its produce. All 
land in the island belonged theoretically to the King by 
right of conquest from the Moors in 1287 but, in -practice, 
large tracts of land were in the hands of a few families, 
notably Olives, Cardona, Marti, Saura, Gomila, Huguet, 
Guevara and Quart. 19 Some estates had been acquired as 
01 Icavalleriasl(a royal grant, usually of some 100 acres), of 
which the recipients enjoyed the freehold. There were 
seventeen such fiefs. 20 other prominent families had been 
allocated estates with what amounted to a perpetual lease, 
which entitled them to the usufruct of the estate, although 
rent was payable on the land, and tithes on the produce to 
the royal patrimony. All such land grants were invariably 
entailed, and could be alienated only at great cost and after 
lengthy legal proceedings. Also the loss of the island's land 
registers in the sack of Ciudadela in the middle of the 
sixteenth century, had allowed some of these families,, and 
others, to acquire apparently unclaimed land, the ownership 
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of which they justified subsequently under the heading of 
'uninterrupted possession by the family over many years'. 21 
By the start of the eighteenth century, most major landowners 
lived in Ciudadela and not on their estates, which were 
leased (and even sub-leased) from year to year to tenant 
farmers who lived on the estates and farmed the land on a 
consequently insecure sharecropping basis. 
In 1713, Henry Neal, Her Majesty's Surveyor in Menorca, 
drew up, by terminos, 'an Account of all the Estates in the 
Island and the value at which they are rented in money and 
corn'. 22 Neal listed 389 estates/farms (120 in Mahon, 94 in 
Ciudadela, 77 in Alayor and 98 in Mercadal), of which the 
total rent returns were given as E(M)45,32723 (E6,799) in 
money, and 7,177 quarteras (17,942 bushels) of cereals, worth 
an additional E2,142. The annual rentable value of most farms 
(290) was between E(M)50 and E(M)150, but there were thirty 
farms which produced less than E(M)30 (E4.10s. ), and only 
two, Torre de Vall (E(M)470) on the south coast and Son 
Morell (E(M)480) on the north-west coast which were rented at 
more than E(M)450 (E67.10s. ). Most farms (300) produced 10-30 
quarteras of wheat as part of their rent, but only one, Son 
Morell, produced as much as 50 quarteras, which was worth an 
additional E(M)100 (E15). Seventy years later, in 1784, Juan 
Ramis estimated that the number of farms in Menorca had 
increased to 520 (147 in Mah(5n, 131 in Ciudadela, 112 in 
Alayor and 130 in Mercadal), but Ramis listed no rental 
values. 24 
The substantial increase recorded in the number of farms 
between 1713 and 1784 should not be taken necessarily as 
evidence of extensive land reclamation (although some was 
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undertaken) but, as a glance at a map of rural Menorca will 
show, rather that many estates had been fragmented - revealed 
by the suffixes upper(dalt), lower(baix), or old(vell) and 
new(nou) to previously existing farms. Even if Ramis had 
listed the rental values of the farms in 1784, a comparison 
with Neal's 1713 findings would be of doubtful benefit, 
because of the inconsistency (usually unchallenged by the 
universitats) of the proprietors' declarations in the 
capbrevacion or catastro on which the land tax was 
. le calculated. The capbrevacion (survey of royal property) and 
the catastro (survey of all property). required returns to be 
made periodically, by landowners to the universitats of each 
termino, in order that an assessment could be made of the 
talla (land tax), and diezmos (tithes) to be paid. But the 
figures so produced cannot be relied upon as an accurate 
record of the value or yield of any property since, as Jose 
Luis Terron has shown in his comprehensive study of property 
in Menorca, the amounts submitted by landowners were 
invariably an underestimate - often of iceberg proportions 
with as much as seven-eighths of income undisclosed. 
25 
Land continued to be an indication of superior social 
status as well as a source of wealth in the 18th century 
when, in particular, demand for agricultural produce of all 
kinds increased substantially because of the needs of the 
garrison. But ownership of land in itself was not a reliable 
indicator of individual wealth. Returns for a catastro listed 
properties, but not their size or land value. Nor have the 
wills and testaments consulted proved a reliable barometer of 
financial standing. 26 Affluence can be gauged comparatively 
from the amount of money left to cover funeral expenses and 
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masses to be said for the deceased, the size of dowries, the 
allowances made for other surviving relations, and by the 
quality of the personal bequests of jewellery, furnishings 
and clothes, but it is not possible to calculate the net 
value of an estate. 
In 1764 Menorcals Advocate Fiscal, in a memorial to the 
British government about the state of the island, claimed 
that 'the richest man [in Menorca] has an annual income of 
E4001 but only two are possessed of this fortune'. 27 This 
estimate may have been justified, based on the catastro 
returns available to the Advocate Fisca, 28 but, while they 
are neither comprehensive, complete nor always dependably 
accurate, there are other sources which give some indication 
of the extent and spread of wealth in Menorca in the 
eighteenth century. These are: a list of the 'Principal 
Inhabitants of Minorca and what they were esteem'd to be 
worth in 17561 drawn up by Captain the Hon Augustus Hervey, 
the senior naval officer at Port Mah6n immediately prior to 
the loss of the island to the French in 1756 (Fig. 3.2); 29 
statistics gleaned from an examination of Menorcan corsair 
activity 1778-1781, and inventories of the assets of two 
brothers submitted to the court of Madrid in 1782 in support 
of their application to be considered for promotion to the 
ranks of the aristocracy. 
Hervey's estimate of individual wealth of some leading 
Menorcans in 1756 gives an indication of the increased 
prosperity in the island under British rule, a prosperity 
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which was particularly enjoyed by the inhabitants of Mahon. 
His list contains names that are badly misspelt, sometimes 
incomplete (which makes identification difficult and suggests 
that it was drawn up without Menorcan assistance), but it is 
worthy of close examination (Fig. 3.2. ). Fifty-eight potential 
lenders were named in Hervey's list, of whom fifty-three were 
Menorcans. Ten of the eleven names from Ciudadela were nobles 
and great landowners. There were twenty-four individuals 
listed from Mahon, all, apart from one nobleman, from the 
main estate, professional men, merchants and prosperous 
farmers. In Alayor eight potential lenders were listed, 
lawyers, farmers and one 'very rich' butcher. In Mercadal it 
was thought that four farmers 'with much money' could make a 
contribution, and Hervey considered that a further loan might 
be forthcoming from six merchants and tradesmen in St. 
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Philip's. In addition, four Jews were listed as 'rich' 
potential lenders and one Greek merchant was expected to be 
able to make a substantial contribution. In all, Hervey 
expected loans, calculated 'at a Moderate Computation', to be 
forthcoming to the amount of 89,600 dollars(E19,533). In the 
event, only 11,627 dollars(E2,519) - 2,493 dollars from 
Ciudadela, 4,451 from Mahon, 283 from Alayor and 4,000 from 
the Jews - was pledged. No money was promised from Mercadal 
or St. Philip's, but there was a surprising pledge of 400 
dollars(E87) from the clergy of Menorca. 
The estimates of financial worth apd loan capability which 
Hervey produced were in round numbers, and were clearly no 
more than rough estimates, but the list is interesting for 
its omission of foreigners (other than a handful of Jews) 
resident in the island. For example, the Greek community, 
which had reason to be greatly indebted to British support in 
Menorca, was represented by only one name, and yet forty 
members of the community had, between 1749 and 1754, found it 
possible to contribute 10,640p 
% (E2,128) towards the 
construction of a Greek Orthodox church in mahon. 
30 In 
addition, one of the community, Manuel Zifanti, reputedly the 
richest Greek colonist, had donated the money to buy the site 
on which the church was to be constructed, 
31 and Nicolao's 
Alexiano, a subsequent leader of the Greek community and 
Captain of the Port of Mahon 1769 -1782,32 is known to have 
made a personal contribution, in money and materials, of 
E775.33 At a"'later date, in 1782, Alexiano claimed to have 
'Estates and Property in Land, Houses, Warehouses, Ships and 
Merchandizel to the value of 'upwards of Ten thousand Pounds 
sterling'. 34 Although Hervey lists two French shopkeepers, 
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Mrs. Allion and Mr Flarde worth together some 70,000 
dollars(El5,167), no loan was expected of them, and the loan 
capability of other French and English shops (not enumerated) 
were 'not yet reckon1d' in Hervey's account, and no reference 
was -made to the possibility of a loan from the British 
merchant community which, to judge from the numbers who 
returned to Menorca in 1763, must have been in excess of 
thirty at that time. 35 
It is obvious that loan expectations from individuals was 
not directly related to their fortune - only 3,000 dollars 
was expected of Bernardo Ignacio olives y Quart, worth 80,000 
dollars, and yet a loan of 5,000 dollars was expected from 
Gabriel Saura y Vigo, worth only 45,000 dollars. This would 
suggest that more was expected of Menorcans of proven pro- 
British sympathies, like the Saura family, and would also 
account for the fact that the inhabitants of Mahon, where the 
economic benefits of the British presence in Menorca were 
most keenly appreciated, were expected to lend 23% of their 
estimated wealth, compared to 7% from Ciudadela. 
Although the wider aspects of the economic benefits to the 
island of corsair activity are considered in a later 
chapter, it is germane at this point to examine the 
opportunities this activity gave to individuals to enrich 
themselves and, at the same time, register the extent to 
which it breached traditional social barriers and involved a 
wide cross-section of society. 
Governor Murray's secretary remarked in 1778 that 'the 
Spirit these People have for Privateering is incrediblel, 36 
and this was borne out by results. Between September 1778 and 
August 1781, fifty-five Menorcan boats were armed and, 
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sailing as corsairs, captured 225 prizes, of which 179, 
together with their cargoes, were sold at public auction in 
Mahon at a gross value of 2m p9 (E400, OOO). 37 Corsair activity 
involved buying or leasing boats, arming them with light 
calibre carriage or swivel guns and provisioning them for a 
cruise in the Mediterranean lasting for up to six months. 38 
To finance corsair cruises, it was customary to set up a 
company for each voyage, involving an agent, shipowners, and 
investors. The agent's responsibility was to arrange the 
financial backing and the eventual sale of any prizes, for 
which he was entitled to 5% of the gross profits, as was the 
ship's captain, while the investors shared in the gross 
profits in direct proportion to their investment. The net 
profits of the voyage were shared between the shipowners and 
the crew, the latter being paid at the fixed rate agreed when 
they signed on for the voyage. 39 Agents were invariably Maho"n 
lawyers, and most shipowners were Menorcan merchants from 
Mahon, although there were some foreign owners - Adam Wilkie 
and George Forbes (British), Salomon Cohen(Jew) and Nicolas 
Alexiano (a Greek to whom reference has already been made). 40 
Investors included immigrant traders (British, Greek, Jewish 
and Italian), but the majority were Menorcan and included 
aristocracy (derogation notwithstanding), merchants, members 
of the legal and medica1 professions, craftsmen, tradesmen, 
farmers and some women. 41 Major investment - up to 70% of the 
capital - was usually provided by a small circle of foreign 
merchants, the aristocracy and the upper bourgeoisie in 
amounts ranging from 700p 
& (E140) to 1,200p 19 (E240), but for 
any voyage there could be as many as three dozen more 
investors pledging the remaining 30% in amounts ranging from 
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25 pS (E5) to 200 pS (E40). 42 Many investors spread their risks 
by pledging small amounts to a number of voyages, and Amador 
Puig cites the example of a nobleman, Miguel Geroni Rubi y 
Squella, who invested a total of 550 pS (E110) in six ventures 
between 1778 and 1780.43 Corsair activity was clearly an 
attractive and profitable venture for all involved, from the 
crews - as many as 3,000 sailors were estimated to be 
involved at the height of activity44 - to the shipowners, 
investors and agents, and the amount of money circulating in 
Menorca as a result of corsair activity permeated other 
spheres of the Menorcan economy, to týe benefit of many other 
individuals. As Lindemann recorded, there was no-one who 
derived no profit from it, 
the craftsmen earned money by equipping the 
privateer, the doctor and apothecary by 
providing medicine, the priest with consecration 
and intercession, the lawyers in recovering 
prize-money and in passing sentence. 45 
The third illustration of an increase in individual wealth 
in the eighteenth century is limited to the example -of the 
brothers Juan and Diego Vidal Seguf. It is representative of 
the practice described by Terron of the burgeoning middle 
classes of Mahon who, while devoting themselves largely to 
commerce, used some of their earnings to purchase first the 
usufruct of leased estates, then the estates themselves 
before entailing them for their own families. 46 The Vidal 
family, originally tenant farmers in the sixteenth century, 
came to be substantial landowners by the end of the second 
period of British rule. By that time, Juan Vidal owned f ive 
estates, the usufruct of another, two market-gardens, houses 
in Mahon, a warehouse and was earning interest on money 
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loaned to the Universitat of Mahon and to a number of 
individuals. He claimed to be worth E26,200.47 His brother, 
Diego, owned five estates, four vineyards, a market-garden, 
houses in Mahon and also earned interest on money loaned. He 
claimed to be worth E24,718.48 Both claims were made in 1782 
when the brothers petitioned the King of Spain to be granted 
noble status, and were required to prove that they possessed 
the means to support the status to which they aspired and, 
on the evidence they produced, their petition was granted in 
1783.49 They, like other successful members of the major 
estate in Mahon with a similar backgýound - the Mercadalp in 
the Plaza Conquista, and the Solers in the Calle Anuncivay, 
for example - sought to underline their improved financial 
and social standing by building imposing town houses, in the 
case of the Vidals, in the Calle San Roque in Mahon, -50 and 
Juan Vidal also built a substantial house in his principal 
country estate of Son Gall (Fig. 3-3). 
At the other end of the social scale, there were many who, 
in a variety of trades, benefited from the British presence 
in Menorca. In the early years of British rule when work on 
the defences of St. Philip's was at its height, Menorcan 
overseers, craftsmen and labourers were employed by the 
British in considerable numbers. In 1720 the Menorcan labour 
force at St. Philip's amounted to 1,500 men, 
51 with daily 
wages of ls. 1d for overseers and master craftsmen, 9d. for 
craftsmen (masons, carpenters and stone-cutters), 7d. for 
miners and 6d. for muleteers and labourers. 
52 When these 
wages are compared to the daily pay of 8d. for a private 
soldier in the garrison, 
53 they must have represented riches 
indeed to the islanders. By 1750 this labour force had been 
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reduced to a maintenance unit, one-tenth of the 1720 
figures54 but, in the second period of British rule, more 
workmen were recruited to build barracks in Mahon (1765) and 
the creation of Georgetown from 1771. The navy, also, had 
need of skilled and unskilled labour in the dockyard. In 
April 1747, there were more than 150 Menorcans employed - 52 
shipwrights and 32 caulkers on a daily wage of ls. 4d, 6 
masons and 5 ropemakers at ls. ld. and 62 labourers, boatmen 
and watchmen at a daily rate of 6d. 55 In the second period of 
British rule, additional workmen were recruited to rebuild 
the hospital, to create the new gockyard facilities on 
Saffron Island and to service the fleet of corsairs. 
Customs and Habits. 
Apart from the first English assessment of the Menorcans 
by Richard Gibson in 1672,56 and subsequent occasional and 
incidental observations in official correspondence and in 
letters from officers serving in the garrison, there are six 
appraisals of Menorcan customs and habits which survive from 
the eighteenth century - three British, one German, one 
Spanish and one Menorcan. The British commentaries were made 
by John Armstrong, Engineer in Ordinary in Menorca 1738- 
1742,57 George Cleghorn, Surgeon to the 22nd regiment in 
Menorca 1744-1749, -58 and by Major William Cunninghame, an 
officer in the Engineers writing in the late 1750s, but who 
had known Menorca since his first posting there in 1745.59 
The German assessment was by Christophe Lindemann, Lutheran 
Chaplain to Prince Ernst's regimentr one of the two 
Hanoverian regiments in the garrison 1775-1782.60 The Spanish 
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account was written, at the request of the Spanish Admiralty 
after the reincorporation of Menorca into the Spanish kingdom 
in 1782, by a serving naval officer, Jose de Vargas Ponce, 61 
and the Menorcan account in 1787 was by Dr. Juan Ramis y 
Ramis, 'appointed Assessor of Menorca by Spain in 1782.62 
Of the English accounts, Gibson's is the slightest and 
most superficial; Armstrong's is the most comprehensive, but 
it is also the most subjective and jingoistic; Cleghorn's 
observations are original, but they are incidental to the 
medical theme of his work. Cunninghame's comments reveal that 
he was aware of Armstrong's work, and much of what he had to 
say echoed Armstrong's findings, but there are some 
independent and informative observations. Ramis' account is 
disappointingly slight, although it confirms much of what was 
objectively observed by the British authors but, not 
suprisingly, some of his conclusions run counter to the 
religious prejudice and jingoism of Armstrong. The section 
devoted to Menorca in Vargas' work owed much to the 
collaboration he received from Ramis, but he was also aware 
of Armstrong's account (which had been translated into 
Spanish in 1781), and he went out of his way to rebut many of 
Armstrong's conclusions and to question the Englishman's 
competence as an historian. Of all the accounts, Lindemann's 
is the most perceptively objective and, despite his obvious 
familiarity with Armstrong's views, he amply justifies his 
own conclusions. 
Richard Gibson did not have a high opinion of the 
Menorcans. He described them as a 'Poore shuffling People' 
who were insolent and dishonest, but he was more critical of 
the 'Headsl(the Jurats and leading citizens) who Imutterld I 
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at him, than he was of the 'poore and middle sort! of 
Menorcans whom he found 'courteous enough'. 63 The accounts of 
the Menorcans dating f rom the eighteenth century were less 
censorious, and there was general agreement that the 
inhabitants were a clean-living, house-proud, demure, frugal 
and sober people who, despite the poverty of the majority, 
enjoyed a basically healthy, staple diet, although the 
foreigners found the food excessively flavoured with oil and 
garlic and disliked the manner in which, in all but the best 
houses, the meals were eaten in an atmosphere which reeked of 
home-grown tobacco. The nature of the, Menorcans was impetuous 
and contentious, and this gave rise to excessive, and often 
very petty civil litigation. However, criminal offences were 
rare, and the Menorcans submitted resignedly to the taxes 
imposed upon them by their own authorities. There was no 
dispute in the accounts about the high degree of influence 
exerted by the Catholic priests but, while the accounts in 
English took the strict observance of the many holy days as 
evidence of the islanders' indolence, Ramis considered it to 
be a praiseworthy testament to the steadfastness of their 
faith, and he went out of his way to emphasise their 
hardworking nature, a feature which was also supported by 
Lindemann. 64 All the commentators were agreed that, although 
the Menorcans were fond of music and dancing thoughout the 
year, Menorca in carnival time was at its most cheerful and 
unrestrained -a season of 'outrageous mirth and jollity, o65 
filled with processions, masks and feasts. There was no 
divergence of opinion about the physical appearance of the 
Menorcans (well-built, of middle stature and an olive 
complexion), 66 the fact that they tended to age before their 
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Education and Culture. 
At the start of the eighteenth century, Menorca was as 
culturally barren as any neglected outlying province of Spain, 
but, by 1782, when the island was reincorporated into the 
Spanish kingdom, the substantial improvements in the 
islanders' standard of living had been accompanied by 
significant cultural advances. The mass of the Menorcans wele 
still illiterate, but the small numbers of the literate 
aristocracy had been swollen by the burgeoning middle classes 
whose intellectual curiosity, ýreed from religious 
censorship, had been given every encouragement to develop by 
a culturally tolerant British government. 
What schooling there was in Menorca in the early 
eighteenth century was centred in the monasteries, where the 
curriculum was usually limited to reading, writing, Latin 
grammar and some basic. arithmetic. Some elements of theology 
and philosophy were sometimes included, but this never became 
a regularly established practice. 70 Armstrong, in mid- 
century, had a poor opinion of such schools7l and, together 
with Lindemann,. was scornful of the intellectual ability of I 
the teachers. 72 By 1782, 'grammar' schools had been in 
existence for some time in Maho"n73, Ciudadela74 and Alayor75, 
with the schoolmasters' salaries being paid by the 
universitats. In Alayor two additional schools were recorded 
in which music was taught - one devoted to singing and 
instrumental music and, in the other, pupils were taught-to 
play the organ76and, in Mah(5n in the 1770s when maritime 
activity was, at its height, ships' captains are known to have 
given tuition in mathematics and navigation. 
77 British policy 
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had always been to encourage Menorcans to send their children 
to British schools set up in the garrison towns to acquire a 
basic education and a knowledge of English, but this 
initiative was always strongly opposed by the Menorcan clergy 
who, despite being expressly forbidden to do so, used their 
considerable pastoral influence to dissuade their 
parishioners from exposing their children to the dangers of 
Protestant indoctrination. 78 
That not all Menorcans heeded this advice is illustrated 
by the fact that, during the second period of British rule, 
an Englishman, Ernest Cook, establis4ed an academy in Mahsn 
in which children of the prosperous middle classes were 
taught not only English, but also mathematics, experimental 
physics, logic and natural history. 79 One of the pupils, 
Mateo Orfila y Rotger, later to gain international fame in 
the field of medicine, became so proficient and fluent in 
English that it was said that he spoke it like a native. 80 
Lindemann reported that there were scholars to be found among 
the middle classes, well-read in French and Italian 
literature, but classical scholarship was a rare 
phenomenon. 81 In an island where much of the new prosperity 
was springing from trade and privateering, a knowledge of 
foreign languages was essential for lawyers and merchants. If 
few matched the ability of Pedro Ramis y Ramis, Doctor of 
Civil and Canon Law, who mastered Latin, Greek, Hebrew, 
Arabic, Spanish, French, English, Italian and German, 82 many 
merchants had a good knowledge of Spanish, French and 
English, and a working knowledge of Arabic and Italian. 
Nevertheless, if the tolerance of the British government 
encouraged intellectual development, most of the cultural 
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influences - British architecture and furniture apart - came 
from France. It was to France that most of the Menorcans who 
were in a position to do so went to finish their 
education, (there was no provision for secondary education and 
no seminary in Menorca, although both were to be f ound in 
Mallorca), and to the universities of Montpellier and Avignon 
in particular. 83 But such opportunities were open onlyýto the 
privileged and the affluent and, despite the assertion of 
Juan Ramis y Ramis that 'reading, writing and arithmetic were 
common accomplishments of the Menorcansl, 
84 the level of 
education of ýthe mass of the populat. ion remained low. In 
1782, Francisco Segul Sintes, a contemporary of Ramis, 
reported that, of the sixteen members of the Universitat of 
Ciudadela, half were illiterate; two-thirds of the 
universitats of Mahon and Alayor could neither read nor 
write, and it was rare for anyone serving in the Universitat 
of Mercadal to be literate. 85 Menorcan women had even less 
opportunity to learn, very few could read or write and, 
according to Lindemann, they took no interest in cultural 
pursuits. 86 Even a generation after Menorca's final 
reincorporation into the Spanish kingdom, a visitor staying 
in the home of one of the island's leading families (Squella) 
in Ciudadela, found the lady of the house unable to speak any 
language but Menorqul'. 87 
One indication of cultural advance was the installation 
of the first printing-press on the island in 1750. This was 
88 imported from London by Juan Fabregas y Sora, and was an 
acquisition which enabled a number of authors, notably Juan 
Ramis y Ramis, to play a significant part in maintaining 
Catalan/Menorqui as a living force in literature. Also, 
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painters and sculptors were listed in the 1782 census. Of the 
sculptors nothing is known, other than a reference by 
Armstrong praising the work of a Menorcan sculptor at work in 
Alayor in the 1740s, 89 but the leading painters are well 
documented and many of their paintings survive, mostly in 
Menorca, but there are some in Britain. 90 The doyen of the 
painters was Giuseppe Chiesa who settled in Mahon from 
Leghorn in 1728. He was renowned for his portraits, and as a 
pictorial chronicler of events on the island. Two of his sons 
were also painters and, like their father, set out to portray 
the society and countryside of Menorga. 91 The Chiesa family 
remained in Menorca, but Giuseppe Chiesa's protege, Pascual 
Calbo y Caldes, went to study in Italy in 1767 and then to 
work in Vienna as court painter and Director of the Imperial 
Gallery, before returning to Menorca in 1790. Like Chiesa, 
his forte was portrait painting, but he was also a remarkable 
depicter of customs. 92 
of all the indications of cultural advance, perhaps the 
two most telling were the opening of a public theatre in 
Mahon in 1776 with a performance of a French play, Le 
Sourcier et Le Sabatier, 93 and the foundation in 1778 of the 
Societat mahonesa de Cultura (Cultural Society of Mahon), the 
object of which was to further, by translations into Menorqui 
and by discussions, debates and lectures, cultural advances 
in Menorca in the linguistic, historical, literary and 
scientific fields. 94 As far as is known, the society had no 
contact with cultural societies outside the island, but 
relied upon its own members to read papers and lead 
discussions, and since this was all conducted in Menorquif, it 
is worthy of note that two of the society's founder members 
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were members of the garrison, and that two more officers were 
subsequently enrolled as members. 95 Its liberal outlook'at 
odds with the authorities after the Spanish reconquest, the 
society flourished for only seven years, and was disbanded in 
1785. 
Allegiance and Identity. I 
For all but a few Menorcans the pragmatic approach they 
adopted in most areas of the British government of the island 
never extended to consideration of. themselves as British 
subjects. The islanders never completely lost the resentment 
they had begun to feel during the period of British de facto 
administration of Menorca 1708-1713 when, after they had 
stirred themselves to remain subjects of a Catholic King of 
Spain who had pledged to respect their fueros, they found 
that they had to sustain an occupying force which was alien 
in every respect. For many the resentment was subsequently 
fuelled (as will be illustrated in succeeding chapters) by 
the fact that, in their opinion, Britain failed to honour her 
Utrecht obligations with regard to the civil and religious 
government of the island. The polarised positions of a 
Catholic people and a Protestant government which encouraged 
foreign settlers (the Jews and Greeks were particularly 
resented) restricted the full participation of the garrison 
in the life of the island, prevented all but ýa few mixed 
marriages, discouraged any substantial British civilian 
settlement and caused the Menorcans, hardly any of whom had 
been born Spanish subjects, passively to accept Menorca's 
reincorporation into the kingdom of Spain in 1782. 
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The British authorities put the political loyalty of the 
Menorcans to the test on four occasions. The first occurred 
in 1717, when it was thought that plans by Alberoni (Philip 
V's Chief Minister) to recoup some of Spain's former glory 
posed a threat to Menorca. Lord George Forbes (interim 
Commander-in-Chief in Menorca during Kane's absence in 
London) appealed to the Jurats of the island for support in 
the event of an attack, and this was promised in full. The 
Jurats, describing themselves as 'buenos y fieles vassallos' 
(good and faithful vassals), offered financial support and 
even pledged to die fighting (1has. ta sacrificar nuestras 
vidas') in defence of Inuestro Rey y nuestra Patrial (our 
King and country). 96 In the event, the Menorcans were not 
called upon to demonstrate their support. Spain mounted no 
attack in 1717, the garrison was relieved and strengthened in 
1718 and, with Byng's defeat of the Spanish navy off Cape 
Passero in Sicily in August 1718, the threat was removed. 
The second rallying call to the Menorcans was made in 
November 1741 by Brigadier Richard O'Farrell (once more an 
interim Commander- in -chief during Anstruther's absence in 
London) during the war with Spain (the so-called War of 
Jenkin! s Ear), which preceded the large-scale War of Austrian 
Succession (1744-1748). on this occasion, O'Farrell, advised 
that a Spanish expedition was being mounted in Mallorca to 
attack Menorca, wrote to the Jurats calling for volunteers to 
serve in the garrison in the event of an invasion. 
97 A list, 
containing seventy names was drawn up by the Jurats of Mah6n 
and sent to O'Farrell. 
98 Of the names, thirteen were priests 
who pledged moral support and prayers; six were noblemen, of 
whom two pledged active support; of the thirty-five leading 
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members of the 'brac mitjal, twenty-six volunteered their 
services and fourteen of the seventeen members listed from 
the 'brac menorl also answered the call positively. Age, 
indisposition and travel abroad on business accounted for the 
refusal of the remainder to rally to the cause. The response 
from the other terminos is not known, but it is unlikely to 
have been less disappointing than the paltry returns from 
Mahon. once again, the volunteers were not required to serve 
since Spain, in the wake of the death of the Austrian Emperor 
Charles V1, the former Hapsburg contender for the Spanish 
throne, turned its acquisitive inteptions to the Austrian 
territories in Italy. 
The next test of Menorcan support for the British crown 
occurred in February 1756 when all intelligence for months 
before had pointed to an imminent French attack upon the 
island. On this occasion, the Lt-Governor, Lt-General William 
Blakeney, appealed not only to the Jurats but also to the 
'Cabezas y Principales del Pueblo' (Heads and principal 
members of the community) to use their influence to persuade 
all the inhabitants to do all that was necessary for the 
service of the King. He reminded them of the benefits they 
had enjoyed under British rule and asked for their support in 
men and money. 99 Reference has already been made to the poor 
response to the appeal for money which produced only E2,519 
of the hoped-for total of E19,413, a sum which represented, 
according to Augustus Hervey, 'Indecent trifling 'with the 
Crown'. 100 The response to the call for volunteers to serve 
in the garrison was even more disappointing. only twenty-one 
names were forthcoming, a total which Hervey cynically 
claimed 'exceeded expectations'. 101 In the event, some eighty 
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Menorcans (masons, miners, labourers, millers and bakers) 
supported the garrison in St. Philip's during the siege of 
the fort, but the French must subsequently have accepted that 
their participation had been coerced and non-combative, since 
none suffered for their co-operation after Blakeney 
surrendered to the French in June 1756.102 
The final test of the Menorcans' political allegiance to 
Britain came in the late 1770s, when it became increasingly 
apparent that Spain intended to take advantage of Britain's 
preoccupation with the war of American Independence to 
attempt to recover her former Mediterranean possessions of 
Menorca and Gibraltar. In 1776, the Governor of Menorca, Lt- 
General the Hon James Murray, approached the noblemen of the 
island with a proposal to form a 'Corps of Militia' or 
Defence Corps, to be called into service in the event of an 
attack upon Menorca. 103 The proposal was welcomed in 
Londonl04, the more so since it was suggested that the cost 
would be covered from the patrimony of the island and at no 
cost to London, 105 and, after some modification, the 
proposals were considered by the 'Cavaliers' (noblemen) of 
Menorca. The suggestion envisaged a militia of battalion 
strength, with five hundred Menorcan rank-and-file commanded 
by officers drawn from 'Gentlemen of the first and second 
rank' in the island. 106 All were to be clothed, quartered and 
paid on the same basis as British soldiers, together with an 
entitlement to the benefits of Chelsea Hospital for those 
maimed in combat. The militia was to serve only in Menorca, 
and was to be allowed its own Catholic Chaplain and chapel in 
St. Philip's. The proposals were not rejected out of hand 
but serious objections were raised in some areas. 107 Murray 
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proposed to pay the militia only for an annual period of six 
weeks training and when they were called into service. The 
Menorcans wanted a retainer incentive amounting to one third 
of full annual pay; a disablement pension was thought to be 
more appropriate than Chelsea Hospital for the maimed; they 
were unhappy about being subject to British Articles of War 
which would expose them to the possibility of corporal 
punishment, a sentence explicitly forbidden by one of their 
fueros; they felt that no Catholic Chaplain would be willing 
to serve in the fort in the event of a siege, and there was 
great concern about the fate of the nýilitiamen if the island 
should be lost to a foreign power. Although further 
discussons took place, and some enlistments occurred, 108 no 
solution or compromise to these concerns satisfactory to both 
sides was found, and the militia was never officially 
constituted. 109 
Concurrently with his efforts to raise a militia, Murray 
also attempted to recruit a body of Menorcan artisans and 
labourers to be called upon to serve in St. Philip's in a 
siege. He proposed a labour force of five hundred (60 masons, 
120 carpenters, 50 smiths, 20 miners and 250 labourers), 
should be constituted in gangs of twenty working under 
twenty-five Menorcan supervisors. 110 Unlike the militiamen, 
they were not to be subject to the Articles of War but, like 
them, were to serve only in Menorca and be entitled, if 
maimed, to the benefits of Chelsea Hospital. The reward for 
those who emerged unscathed was to be a guarantee of work on 
a permanent basis in the garrison. Even though the financial 
incentive was attractive (a bounty of E2 on entering the fort 
and 9d. for every day spent in St. Philip's), 111 Menorcans 
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responded with even less enthusiasm to this initiative and, 
in Article 8 of the capitulation signed by Murray in 1782, he 
felt obliged to claim immunity for only four Menorcans who 
had rallied to the British garrison. 112 Another Spanish 
source names a further eleven Menorcans, mostly corsair 
captains, who had their goods and property confiscated by the 
Spanish because of their active support for the British. 113 
Nevertheless, some Menorcans are known to have enlisted 
and served with the British armed forces. Two, at least, 
served in the navy: Pedro Castillo from 1733 until at least 
1742,114 and another, unnamed, was se. ý-ving (unpressed) afloat 
at the end of the century. 115 Three young noblemen enlisted 
for service with the Menorcan militia, Rafael Carreras and 
the brothers Antonio and Jose Pasqueda Olives. When the 
militia project came to nothing, Carreras served for two 
years on attachment to the 51st regiment in the garrison, 116 
but the Pasqueda brothers applied for, and were granted, 
commissions in the 60th (Royal American) regiment. 117 The 
most distinguished Menorcan volunteer to the British army 
dates from the final period of British rule in the island. 
Lorenzo Arguimbau Mercadal, the son of Narcfs Arguimbau 
Panedas, 118 was commissioned into the lst regiment of Foot in 
1801, and ended his career as a Major General and Colonel of 
the 80th regiment before he died in 1854.119 Lorenzo 
Arguimbau's brothers, Juan-Narcls and Jose!, also served 
briefly in the British army, but not with any 
distinction. 120 
From a British standpoint, the Menorcans were found 
wanting when their political allegiance as British subjects 
came to be tested, and their attitude would appear to 
107 
reinforce the view expressed by one British Governor in 
Menorca that 'The Inhabitants of this Island are generally 
disaffected to the English'. 121 Among the British authorities 
in Menorca, Anstruther was not alone in his view, but it 
begged the question of what might have been if, in Menorcan 
eyes, Britain. had been seen to implement her Utrecht 
undertakings , not only in the most sensitive , area of 
ecclesiastical government, but also in the sphere of civil 
government. In 1713, Neal had sensed the Menorcans' 
resentment of being treated not as British subjects but as a 
conquered people. 122 In a letter to af riend . 
he was more 
explicit: 'As to the people in generall they are well 
inclined to the Queen, and are willing to submit to any Laws 
she shall think proper for them to live by, except a Military 
Power., 123 For, all Neal's optimism it is unlikely that 
Britain, given her history of colonial government in the 18th 
century, could have introduced reforms which would have won 
over the Menorcan aristocracy or clergy. As it was, on the 
two occasions when'Britain most needed Menorcan support, in 
1756 and 1781, the principal families gave no lead and, for 
the clergy, no amount of material benefit under British rule 
could offset the spiritual advantages of the government 
reverting to a Catholic power. 
Contacts with the garrison. 
A first examination of the few contemporary sources 
available suggest that, with both language and religion as 
barriers, there was little regular social contact between 
Menorcans and the garrison. Lindemann's observation that the 
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Menorcans 'do not have any parties, assemblies or coffee- 
visits,, 124 is supported by the absence of any mention of 
such occasions in the incidental references to the islanders 
and their customs contained in the correspondence, journals 
and papers of some officers who served in the Menorca 
garrison. 125 Of these, Captains Bond, Whitefoord and 
Congreve, Major Callander and Ensign Moore made no reference 
to any social intercourse with the Menorcans. Congreve 
lamented the fact that his association with the opposite sex 
was limited to 'a few officers' wives and daughters', 126 and 
Whitefoord's social activity was constrained to being 'an 
Assembly man and playing at Quadrille with the ladies[of the 
garrisonli. 127 Lieutenant Colborne, writing at the end of the 
century, was unequivocal, I[Menorcan] Female society we have 
none'. Consequently he wrote to his sister, 'I have no 
chance of marrying here'. 128 Lt-Colonel Pringle is the 
exception. He wrote of his Menorcan friends, Mr. Olivar, 129 
and the Soler family of Maho"n and, on his departure from 
Menorca in April 1782, he made a present of the 'remains of 
my Chateau and my ground at Georgetown' to [Juan] Soler. 130 
What is more, Pringle created an 'Apollo' (Pleasure garden) 
near the barracks in Mahon, which he allowed the inhabitants 
to frequent and enjoy-131 Although James Lind, the most 
celebrated of British naval physicians in the eighteenth 
century, writing in the late 1740s, criticised the British in 
Menorca for their unwillingness to socialise with the 
inhabitants, 132 Armstrong had earlier illustrated that 
individual social contacts were not taboo 'Cavaliers seldom 
make Entertainments and are no great Visitors, 133 yet, in 
Carnival time, 'it is common with us to join in their 
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Diversions, and we are treated with the utmost Courtesy and 
Distinction'. The British guests were 'seated in the Upper 
Part of the room', given refreshments, and 'the Woman of the 
House takes us out to dance'. 134 
We also know from the gatherings of the 'Societat de 
Cultura de Maho I of a meeting of minds between some of the 
garrison officers and the leading Menorcan intellectuals, and 
Cleghorn spoke of his admiration of the expertise of his 
medical friends Dr. Font of Ciudadela135 and Dr. Segul" of 
Mahon, 136 with whom he had discussions and consultations 
about island diseases and their tre. atment. Moreover it is 
equally clear that Cleghorn did not confine his medical 
practice to his regiment or even the garrison soldiers, since 
he also treated Menorcan civilians. 137 
Lindemann suggests that when Menorcans 'gave a luncheon' 
for the officers of the garrison, 'the ladies are kept 
prudently away,, 138 but there were obviously occasions when 
officers were able to meet Menorcan women, if only to judge 
by Anglo-Menorcan marriages which took place. These were few 
in number, and certainly not representative of the total, 
since Anglo-Catholic marriages were not sanctioned in 
Catholic churches and therefore no records are to be found in 
the diocesan registers. Moreover, regimental chaplains' 
records and the registers of the church of San Jose in Mahon, 
used for Anglican worship during the British periods of 
government, have not survived. Consequently, we know of only 
eight Anglo-Menorcan marriages, four of which caused a 
scandal. One because it was found to be bigamous, 139 and 
another three because the brides were professing nuns. 140 
However, the marriages of Rafaela Delgado Valls to Thomas 
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Morgan in 1776,141 and, after his death, to Captain William 
Boothby in 1781,142 and the marriages of Margarita Saura 
Carreras to Major Simon Fraser in . 
1800,143 and of Eulalia 
Briones Creus to Alexander Dickson Collingwood, an English 
naval officer in 1802,144 gave rise to no recorded 
protestations. 
Bearing in mind that Menorca had a British garrison for 
seventy years and that, in the first and longest period of 
British rule, four regiments were stationed Gn the island 
without relief for more than twenty years, 145 it is 
inconceivable that there were not m6re liaisons, licit and 
illicit, between officers and men of the garrison and the 
civilian population. While the total number of these 
relationships must now remain a matter of conjecture, a study 
by Vicent Ortells and Xavier Camps of eighteenth - century 
Menorcan parish baptismal records suggests that they were not 
as many as might have been suspected. 146 In cases where the 
mother was Catholic, registered the father as British, and 
had her children baptised in her faith, the records for the 
period 1708-1756 show that such marriages/liaisons produced 
only 14 children in Maho"n (0.1% of the total births), 42 in 
Ciudadela(0.4%), 8 in Alayor(O. 1%) and 34 children in St. 
Philipls(O. 5%). The disproportionately high number of 
registered births in Ciudadela, given the concentration of 
the garrison in Mah6n and St. Philip's, should be understood 
as more indicative of the strength, rather than a weakness. of 
Catholicism in its stronghold in the island. However, it must 
be a reasonable assumption that some children registered 
under another heading of 'father unknown', were fathered by 
men of the garrison. In this category, for the same period, a 
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further 39 births were recorded in Maho"n, 11 in. Alayor, 60 in 
St. Philip's and 125 in Ciudadela - but, of the Ciudadela 
total, Ortells and Campos do not reckon that Anglo-Menorcan 
unions made a major contribution. 147 It is worthy of note 
that Ortells and Campos also recorded two births issuing from 
unions between Menorcan men and English women. 148 Parish 
records also exist for the periods of British rule 1763-1782 
and 1798-1802, but, while no comparable statistics have been 
compiled, the drop in numbers of births registered from 
Anglo-Menorcan unions would suggest that fewer liaisons were 
formed during those years. I 
Freemasonry. 
The existence of a masonic lodge in Mahon, founded during 
the French occupation 1756-1763, lodge No. 158, 'Amigos de la 
Humanidad' (Friends of Humanity), and once claimed as the 
oldest masonic lodge in Spain149 (since disproved), 1-90 and 
the foundation of no fewer than eight British lodges in 
Menorca, 151 provided a further possibility of social contact 
between the garrison and the Menorcans, given the close 
relationships presumed to exist between lodges in 
Freemasonry. Unfortunately no evidence has survived of the 
activities of any of the lodges nor, in most cases of the 
membership. However, an entry in Augustus Hervey's Journal 
for 1753 suggests that membership of at least one of the four 
original British lodges was open to civilians as well as 
officers of the army and navy, and may well have been little 
more than a convivial dining club. 
152 A membership list of 
lodge No. 173 for 1781 included British military and civilian 
personnel, and also officers from the two Hanoverian 
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regiments in the garrison, but there is nowhere any mention 
of Menorcan masons. 
Menorcan society, for all the material benefits it enjoyed 
during the periods of British government, was consistently 
more conscious of the burdens it had to bear because of the 
garrison imposed upon it and, at best, the Menorcans 
tolerated rather than welcomed the British presence. There 
was clearly no established regular social intercourse between 
the garrison and the islanders, but this did not prevent 
individual initiatives in this respect. In general, the 
nobles remained aloof, the clergy disýrustful and the mass of 
the populace indifferent. Only the inhabitants of Mahon, the 
greatest beneficiaries under British rule, were appreciative, 
but even here, the superior attitude of the British 
authorities, their Protestant religion and their open 
encouragement of Jewish and Greek settlers, mitigated against 
unqualified acceptance of British rule in the island. 
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Chapter Four. 
Civil Government. 
The seventeenth and early eighteenth-century expansion of 
the British Empire, principally in North America and the West 
Indies, was achieved by settlement rather than by conquest. 
The colonists brought British laws 
ýand 
institutions 'to the 
territories they settled, and claimed the same fundamental 
civil rights enjoyed by their countrymen in the homeland. In 
the civil government of these colonies, the Governor, 
nominated councils and elected assemblies of colonists 
mirrored the King, Lords and Commons in Britain, but the 
British government looked upon colonial government 
institutions as local bodies levying local taxes, legislating 
by bye-laws and, in every respect, ultimately subservient to 
the Crown and the legislative powers of parliament. The 
circumstances and terms under which Britain acquired Menorca 
dictated that it could not be governed in like manner. 
Although Menorca had been acquired de facto by conquest in 
1708, the island was ceded de jure to Britain five years 
later by the Treaty of Utrecht in which the British crown 
gave an undertaking not only to allow the Menorcans the 
freedom to worship in the Catholic faith, but also to allow 
the inhabitants to 'enjoy safely - their rights and 
privileges. 11 The vague nature of the undertaking, left 
deliberately imprecise by the British negotiators, was not 
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clarified in the subsequent peace treaty signed between Spain 
and Britain three months later. In this, , notwithstanding 
Britain's earlier undertaking (which was reiterated in this 
separate treaty), Philip V ceded Menorca to the crown of 
Great Britain together with 'all rights and full dominion 
over the said island'. 2 Inevitably the ambivalent wording 
gave rise to differing interpretations of Britain's 
obligations to the Menorcans. The considerable difficulties 
encountered in the sphere of ecclesiastical government by a 
Protestant power governing a Catholic People are examined-in 
the following chapter, but British, reluctance clearly to 
define the parameters of authority of the Governor in 
Menorca in civil, as distinct from military, matters made the 
Civil government of the island under the British a no less 
constant source of friction. 
The acquisition of Menorca in 1713 presented Britain with 
an unprecedented situation. The island was a European and not 
a New World territory; unlike Gibraltar, where a mass exodus 
of the Spanish population after the British took the Rock 
reduced the civilian population to little more than thirty 
families, 3 all but a few Menorcans remained on the island; 
Menorca had a well-developed, superficially representative 
form-of local government and a tried legal system, and the 
Menorcans enjoyed some long-established fueros. There were 
also differences in language and social customs, but these, 
in themselves, were to pose few problems. It could be argued 
that Britain's reluctance to redefine and clarify the areas 
Of responsibility in the civil government of Menorca was 
induced by a wish to abide by the spirit, as well as the 
120 
letter', of her Utrecht undertaking, but such an argument would 
be superficial and would discount more influential factors. 
Initially, hopes had been. entertained in Britain that 
Menorca would become an entrepot of Mediterranean trade. 
These hopes were boosted by the early decision of the Oxford 
ministry to grant Mahon free port status in 1712,4 but 
subsequent ministries did little to further this aim, or to 
protect merchants in Menorca from unfair competition from 
France, 5 and the fact that all the British Governors of 
Menorca were army officers(Fig. 4.1), supports the view that 
the British government looked upon t4e island primarily as a 
military outpost and naval base, and not as a commercially 
attractive or rewarding possession. Secondly, unlike the 
British New World territories, Menorca never attracted 
British immigrants. Some British merchants resided On the 
island to carry out their business, but none bought land or 
settled in the conventional sense. Consequently there was no 
pressure upon the British government to introduce reforms to 
the island's institutions to cater for such an eventuality. 
Finally, the Menorcans themselves posed no threat to the 
British government On the island. The islanders tolerated 
British rule, although the Jurats were zealous in their 
protests in Menorca (and in London through their Syndichs) 
against the affronts, the injustices, the unwarranted 
interference in their affairs and the acts of despotism which 
they persistently claimed to have suffered at the hands of 
the Governors in Menorca. Some of the allegations were petty, 
others were serious and justified, but the Jurats' protests 
tended to be critical of individual actions of particular 
Governors, rather than a criticism of Britain's failure to 
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make known its interpretation of the extent of the Governor's 
authority in civil matters, not only to the Jurats, but also 
to the military commanders appointed to govern in Menorca, to 
whom no guidance was given in their royal commissions as 
Governor other than to expect obedience from 'all our 
Ministers, officers and loving Subjects, 6. The Menorcan 
Jurats, however, considered that Britain's pledge in the 
Treaty of Utrecht gave the Governor no more authority to 
interfere in the island's local government and administration 
of justice than had been the case before the island became 
British, and that his role was part of the following pre-1713 
pattern of civil government and administration of justice in 
Menorca which Britain had undertaken to respect. 
The role of the Governor. 
Under Spanish rule, the Governor had military, civil and 
judicial responsibilities. Invariably a military man, and 
never a Menorcan, he was responsible for the security of the 
island, its defences and the conduct of the garrison. In the 
civil and judicial spheres, his role was largely supervisory. 
In civil matters he was required to hold a watching brief 
over weights and measures and the supply and prices charged 
for foodstuffs . He presided over 
(but could not influence) 
the annual selection of the Jurats in Menorca, and, although 
he was informed of the decisions of the universitat general, 
he had no authority to summon, nor to be present at a meeting 
of that body, and he had no control over local government 
finances. In judicial matters he was required to rubber stamp 
the decisions reached by Menorca's two principal judges, but 
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he had a casting vote in the verdict if the judges disagreed. 
The Governor had a salary of E(M)600 (E90), plus expenses of 
E(M)300 (E45), paid out of the royal patrimony of the 
island. 7 (It is not surprising to learn that Spanish 
Governors were frustrated to have their authority so 
circumscribed, and that their interventions in -the 
seventeenth-century politics of Menorca were probably as 
frequent, and certainly as much resented by the Jurats, as 
the actions of the British Governors in the eighteenth 
century). 8 
Local government. 9 
Menorca was divided into four administrative districts - 
the terminos of Ciudadela, Mahon, Alayor and 
Mercadal(including the district of Ferrerias). Each was 
governed by its own Universitat, a council composed of Jurats 
and- Consellers who served in office for a year, and were 
representative of the four estates in the island. The 
Universitat of Ciudadela was composed of four Jurats (one 
representative from each of the estates), and twelve 
Consellers (two from the nobility, four each from the major 
and middle and two from the minor estates); the Universitats 
of Mahon and Alayor consisted of three Jurats (one 
representative from the major, middle and minor estates) and 
twelve Consellers, (four representatives from each of the 
three lesser estates), and the Universitat of Mercadal had 
two Jurats (middle estate) and twelve Consellers (minor 
estate). In each instance, the Jurats formed the executive of 
the Universitat. 
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There was also a Universitat General (council for the 
whole island of Menorca), which was made up of the entire 
Universitat of Ciudadela, plus five delegates from the 
Universitat of Mahon and three delegates each from Alayor and 
from Mercadal. 
To be eligible to serve on any of the Universitats, 
candidates had to be natives of Menorca, male, Catholic, 
married or a widower, a houseowner and to be at least twenty- 
five years of age. Candidates were not eligible if their 
father, son or brother was to hold office in the same council 
in the same year. Also disqualified were those who were 
considered too old or infirm, those serving in the armed 
forces, criminals and council debtors or those involved in 
civil litigation with their Universitat. 
The selection of the Jurats and Consellers which took 
place annually in the week preceding Whitsunday, was by 
insaculacion (ballot), a haphazard method which operated in 
Menorca with no variation for four centuries until 1814. The 
names of those considered eligible to serve as 
representatives of their estate were submitted to the 
Governor, as the King's representative, some six months 
before the date of the ballot. The Governor had the power, at 
this stage, to make additions or deletions, and the names, 
when finalised, were written on slips of paper and sealed in 
boxes. On the appointed day, the boxes were opened in the 
presence of the Governor and the candidates, and a boy of not 
more than seven years of age drew out the names for the posts 
which were to be filled. 
The function of the Universitat General, founded in 1301, 
was to oversee the well-being of the island as a whole, and 
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to consider matters of government and economy on an island as 
opposed to a district level. To this end it met annually in 
October to decide upon lafforationsl- the assizes or prices 
at which wheat, oats, cheese and wool were to be sold in the 
ensuing year. It had no tax-raising capacity in itself, but 
it was responsible for allocating money or labour raised by 
the districts to improve the defences. It was also the body 
which convened whenever necessary to consider governmental 
malpractices in the island, and it represented the 
islanders' grievances to the Governor. However, the 
preponderance of Ciudadelan members ip this body led to that 
termino being favoured , often at the expense of the other 
terminos, and certainly to their increasing dissatisfaction, 
in the seventeenth century. 
The Universitat in each t4rmino, (Ciudadela established in 
1301, Maho**n in 1398, Alayor and Mercadal both in 1439), 
effectively regulated the internal economic government, for 
they calculated the level of tax necessary to balance the 
Universitat's annual budget. They made their own afforations 
to fix the prices for wine, meat, fish and vegetables in 
their termino, and were responsible for ensuring that local 
markets were supplied with provisions and at fair prices. 
This was the responsibility of the lalmotacenlor Imustasafl, 
the annually elected superintendent of markets and of weights 
and measures. Each Universitat allocated specific areas of 
responsibility to its members (council finance, tax 
assessment, auditing of accounts, public health and 
quarantine), others assumed responsibility for the hospital, 
the guilds, alms-collection, care of the mentally-handicapped 
and the foundlings, and there were, in addition, a number of 
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salaried posts from secretary/archivist to town-crier. 10 Each 
University had the right to bypass the Universitat General to 
represent local grievances to the Governor. 
Taxation. 
No taxes were levied on an island basis, and the district 
Universitats sought to balance their annual expenditure - 
the salaries of council officials, municipal expenditure on 
hospitals, foundlings, the destitute, and on entertainment 
expenses incurred on major local festivities - by income 
derived from the talla and the nitxol. The nitxol was a flat- 
rate tax levied on each household, but it raised an 
insignificant sum, since it was levied at only an annual 
rate of ls. 2d in 1713,11 and was still described as Imuy 
modical (very moderate) in 1781.12 The talla (land tax) was 
paid only by property owners, and was based on a catastro, a 
quinquennial assessment of the rental value of land in both 
money and crops, on which a percentage was levied calculated 
at a level to balance the books. The five-yearly review and 
the inaccuracy of the landowners' returns made an inequitable 
tax quite unsatisfactory and so ineffective that, by the end 
of the seventeenth century, a sizeable amount of the annual 
expenditure of each universitat was taken up by payment of 
interest on loans taken out to balance the books in earlier 
years. 
The Administration of Justice. 
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Before Menorca was ceded to Britain there were ten courts 
which dispensed justice an the island. Two were 
ecclesiastical tribunals based on canon law and will be 
examined in chapter five, but in the remainder justice was 
based on Roman law and the common law of Aragon. This meant 
that there was no trial by jury, torture was employed when 
evidence was lacking in capital offences, and accused, 
accusers and witnesses never faced each other in court (all 
judgements were made on the basis of written statements). 13 
However, particular attention was paid to the fueros enjoyed 
by the Menorcans, and where these were at variance with Roman 
or Aragonese law, the fueros took precedence. The fueros were 
royal privileges or concessions granted to the Menorcans over 
the years since the island's conquest from the Moors.. There 
were many fueros, mostly protecting human rights and, of 
these, the right of the Universitats to send Syndichs 
(Agents/Representatives) to represent their grievances to the 
King with or without the approval of the Governor (granted in 
1392), Jurats' exemption from prosecution during their year 
of office (1390), prohibition of any sentence of corporal 
punishment(1403) and the fuero forbidding trespass(1356) were 
to be contentious issues under British rule. But the bed-rock 
of the Menorcans rights was the first fuero granted in 1287, 
which stated that 'No order to be admissible or obeyed in 
Menorca which flouts any of the fueros of the island'. 
Figure 4.2. Principal Law officers. 
Asesor. The Governor's principal legal adviser, senior 
judge and qualified in both civil and canon 
law. In civil cases, his verdict was binding 
but, in criminal cases, the Abogado Fiscal had 
an equal say in the verdict. A crown 
appointment. 
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Abogado Fiscal. (Advocate Fiscal). Qualified in civil 
and canon law, he represented the interests of 
the crown, and also acted as a judge in 
criminal proceedings. A crown appointment. 
Procurador-Fiscal. ([Scottishl Procurator Fiscal). A 
qualified civil lawyer, he was responsible for 
the investigation of charges, and for pressing 
prosecution. He had to be present to see the 
sentences of the criminal court were carried 
out, and that all payments owed to the crown 
were made. A Governor's appointment. 
Bayle General. ([Scottish] Baillie of Menorca). The 
senior lay magistrate, elected annually from 
the ranks of the brac militar who took 
precedence as the first citizen of Menorca 
(after the Governor), during his year in 
office. He was advised in his judgements 
by an Asesor(a qualified civil lawyer elected 
biannually). 
All the above officials were native Menorcans and were paid a 
salary from the royal patrimony of Menorca; Asesor(E74.15s. ), 
Abogado Fiscal(E47.5s. ), Procurador Fiscal(ES), the Bayle 
General. and his Asesor (ES. 12s. ) each. 
Tiq. 4'5. 'APPOi7ntmentS of Asesor and Abogado Fiscal. 
1715.22 Sep. Francisco Sanxo. 
1734.4 June. Juan Ebnt y Ll&nbias. 
1763.25 Aug. Juan Fbnt y Llawbfas. 
Asesor (Criminal. Asesor (Civil). 
1771.16 May. Juan Seguf y Sanxo. 
48 Nov. Mateo mercadal. 
10 Dec. Mateo Mercadal. 
6 10 Dec. Francisco sequf Sintes. 
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Courts of Justice (Fig. 4. +). 
Tribunal de Real Gobernacion. (Court of Royal Government). 
This was the principal court of justice in Menorca. In 
civil cases, it acted as a court of appeal against judgements 
in lower civil courts (those of the Bayle General and the 
district Bayles) and it heard, in the first instance, all 
inter-Universitat disputes, and disputes between officials of 
the Universitats. In criminal matters, it heard all cases in 
the first instance. It was also týe court for coroners' 
inquests. 
The President of the court in both civil and criminal 
cases was the Governor, but he' had limited power. In civil 
cases he was obliged to endorse the verdict of the Asesor, 
and, in criminal cases, he had no say in the judgement unless 
the Asesor and the Abogado Fiscal disagreed, in which 
eventuality he had the casting vote. 
In civil cases, if judgements led to fines in excess of 
E160, further appeal could be made to the Tribunal de Real 
Audiencia (Appeal court) in Mallorca, but for judgements 
involving sums of less than that amount, its verdict was 
final. In most criminal cases the judgement of the court was 
final, but appeal could be made to Mallorca if the sentence 
involved a fine in excess of E80, or decreed the death 
penalty, mutilation of limbs or a sentence to the galleys. 
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Fig. 4.4. Civil and Criminal Courts (pre 1713). 
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(1). Civil cases involving less than EMS. 
(2). All maritime and external trade disputes. 
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(5). Inter-urtiversitat disputes; Coroner inquestss appeals frcxa inferior Bayle oourts. 
(6). Ali crm*nal cases. 
(7). Appeal Tribunal for courts of the Bayles Consules. 
(8). Appeal Tribunal for: Court of Patrimony. 
Court of Royal Ckweownent (Civil) for Judgemnts involving 
acre than E(M)1072. 
Court of Royal Governtnent (CrLvinal) for sentences of 
death. uutilation or a galley sentence. 
Tribunal del Real Patrimonio-(Royal Patrimony/Crown Revenue). 
This court was independent of the Tribunal de Real 
. le Gobernacion, and held exclusive jurisdiction in all matters 
relating to the finances of the crown - taxes, ground rents, 
tithes, transfer of property and entails. 
The President of the court was the Procurador Real 
(Receiver General), appointed by the Receiver General of 
Mallorca and he was paid a salary of E21. Like the Governor 
in the Tribunal de Real Gobernacion, he had no say in the 
verdicts unless there was a disagree(nent between the Asesor 
and the Abogado Fiscal who also officiated in this court. 
In judgements involving less than E160, the decision of 
the court was binding, but after judgements involving sums 
greater than this amount, an appeal could be made to 
Mallorca. 
Tribunales de los Bayles Consules. (Admiralty courts in 
Ciudadela and Mahon). 
These courts heard all disputes concerning the sea and 
maritime trade which were judged according to the maritime 
laws of Aragon. 
The Presidents were the Bayles of Ciudadela and Mahon, 
assisted by two honorary lay councillors. The Presidents were 
in receipt of salaries of E3.15s. and 15s. respectively from 
the royal patrimony for this office (in addition to their 
salary from their Universitat in their capacity of district 
Bayles). 
130 
Appeal against judgements was possible to the Consulat de 
Mar (Marine Consulate) of Aragon, in Barcelona. 
Tribunal del Bayle General. (Chief Magistrate's court). 
This court normally sat in Ciudadela, but it could sit 
elsewhere on the island and take precedence over the local 
Bayle's court in other terminos. 
It heard all civil cases when the monies involved exceeded 
E(M)5, all cases involving minors and others who, because of 
inf irmity, could not manage their af f airs, and it had the 
power to appoint guardians and grant powers of. attorney 
where necessary. 
The Bayle General was elected annually from nominees from 
the nobility. He was required to attend all the hearings in 
his court, but was obliged to accept the verdict of his 
Asesor. 
The Asesor to the Bayle General was a qualified civil 
lawyer elected biannually from the ranks of the brac major. 
Both Bayle and Asesor enjoyed a salary of E5.15s. each, paid 
from the revenue of the royal patrimony. 
Tribunales de los Bayles. (District, Magistrates courts). 
There was a magistrate's court in each of the island 
terminos, and it dealt with civil cases in which the monies 
involved did not exceed E(M)5 (15s. ). However, if both 
parties were in agreement, the court was allowed to hear 
cases involving greater sums. 
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Bayles were stipendiary lay magistrates and were elected 
annually. from nominees from the major estate. They had to 
be literate (except in the termino of Mercadal), married and 
be more than twenty-eight years old. Their salaries were paid 
by their respective Universitats as follows: Ciudadela, 
Alayor and Mercadal, E2.5s., and Mahon E7.10s. 
The Bayles presided in court with the assistance of two 
'prohombres' (upright citizens), non-stipendiary lay 
colleagues who were selected from a panel of eight and sat in 
court on a rota of two per week. The prohombres pronounced 
judgement, the Bayle having only a cýLsting vote in the event 
of a disagreement between the prohombres. 
Appeals against judgements were allowed to the Tribunal de 
Real Gobernacion. * 
Such were the institutions and practices of the civil 
government of Menorca when Britain assumed the sovereignty of 
the island in 1713. Some changes thereafter were inevitable. 
For example, it was -inconceivable that appeals from the 
island's courts should continue to be heard in Mallorca, and 
neither the competence of the Bayles Consules nor the 
maritime laws of Aragon were equal to the volume and 
complexity of actions arising from the increase in merchant 
and naval activity -a matter brought to a head by the 
capture of Spanish prizes in the war against Spain (1718- 
1720). Consequently, the high court of appeal for the 
Menorcans came to be the Privy Council, and a vice-admiralty 
court was established in Mahon by Kane in 1720, in which the 
judgements were made according to British maritime law, 
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although the Judge commissary appointed to preside was a 
Menorcan lawyer. 14 
There were, of course, other anomalies between the laws 
and constitution of Great Britain and the 'Privileges, 
Immunities, municipal Laws and the ancient, established, 
unalterable Custom and Practice of the Island', 15 which 
needed to be resolved. The Menorcans were apprehensive of any 
change, and campaigned to preserve the pre-1713 status quo, 
but Westminster was urged by successive Governors, and by 
other interested Britons, to resolve the situation and 'frame 
some new model of Government... where0y the Governor may know 
how to act'. 16 Unfortunately, on too many occasions when the 
Privy Council appeared to be about to address the problem of 
the government of Menorca, it was at a time when the British 
government became preoccupied with other matters and 'the 
affairs of Great Brittain did not permit that work to go 
forward. '17 
Proposed reforms (1713-1752). 
In his survey of Menorca in 1713 Henry Neal reported the 
the British military government was treating the Menorcans 
not as 'Subjects of our Lady the Queen, but as a Conquered 
People', 18 as a result, he confided to a friend, matters 
would improve only 'once a Civil Magistracy is settled'. 19 It 
appeared that the ministry in London, in the light of Neal's 
report presented in April 1714,20 was also keen to resolve 
the situation, and Bolingbroke, the Secretary of State, wrote 
to Neal, 21 Kane22, Brigadier Durand23 and Admiral Sir James 
Wishart24 in the same month to say that it was intended to 
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'settle the Military, Civil and Ecclesiastical Government of 
Minorca this summer, I and seeking their expert advice in 
their respective spheres of responsibility. In a further 
letter to Kane, Bolingbroke conveyed the Queen's command that 
two representatives 'of the best skill and knowledge in the 
Laws and Customs of the Country' be sent to London from the 
island to be lodged in London at the crown's expense to be 
'upon the spot' for consultation. 
25 But it was not to be. The 
Syndichs chosen by the Universitat General, and approved by 
Kane, Dr. Manuel Mercader (Paborde and Vicar-General), and 
Dr. Francisco Sanxo (a leading lawyqr soon to be appointed 
Asesor), did not reach London until August 1714, shortly 
after the death of Queen Anne, at a time when the resolution 
of Menorcals problems by the home government (for all that it 
was now a Whig ministry with Stanhope as Secretary of State), 
paled before the problems associated with the Hanoverian 
succession and the Jacobite rebellion of 1715, and was 
consequently not then considered. 
Without the benefit of political-guidelines, Kane resorted 
to a pragmatic approach to government in Menorca, but this 
led to protests about his autocratic rule, and to allegations 
of a variety of abuses perpetrated by the soldiers of the 
garrison. The bulk of the twenty-eight articles of complaint, 
contained in a memorial presented to the Court of St. James 
by the Spanish Ambassador in April 1717, related to the 
restrictions Kane had introduced to limit the liber usus of 
the Catholic religion, and to the lack of discipline in the 
soldiers under Kane's command, and are examined elsewhere in 
the relevant chapters of this thesis. 
26 But Kane was also 
accused of infringing the Menorcans' fueros by seizing the 
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official papers of the Universitat General, and by denying a 
passport to travel to London to its elected Syndich, Juan de 
Bayarte Ametller. 27 Kane attempted to justify his actions to 
George Bubb, British Ambassador to Spain, claiming that the 
papers were 'a parcel of notorious Falcities', and that 
Bayarte (the son of the Governor who had blown hot and cold 
in his dealings with the English in Menorca 1670-1672) was an 
'Incinuating Gentleman ... in the Interest of Spain, ' who had 
formerly held a Captain's commission in Philip V's army. 28 
Superficially, Kane's actions may appear intrusive and 
autocratic, but it should be borne in mind that, in 1716, 
Spain's attitude towards Menorca was seen to be threatening, 
and that Kane genuinely believed that: 
the most minute action here [in Menorcal will 
reach the court of Madrid, and keep up the spirit 
in the people that they may still 2 expect 
to be 
restored to the Crown [of Spain). 9 
Mercader and Sanxo, Menorcals first Syndichs to the court 
of St. James, did succeed in gaining an audience with the 
King in 1715, when they presented a memorial of seventeen 
articles concerning the government of Menorca. All but one 
dealt with ecclesiastical matters, but no decisions were 
reached. 30 Sanxo was allowed to return to Menorca on 
appointment as the island's Asesor, 
31 but Mercader remained 
in London as Menorcals accredited representative, and was 
granted a royal pension of E300 per annum. 
32 
The election of Bayarte by the Universitat General to 
supercede Mercader as Menorcals 'Lawful Deputy to the Crown 
of England' in April 1716, complicated matters. His election 
was disputed in Menorca, 33 not officially recognised by the 
British government34 but, when he reached London in 1718 
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(having secured a passport from Col. Gervase Parker, interim 
Commander-in-Chief during Kane Is absence in May 1718), he 
nevertheless succeeded in putting his case to the British 
public in print35, and in gaining a hearing in the House of 
Commons. 36 Despite the fact that Bayarte was informed as 
early as December 1718, that the King attached no blame to 
Kane for his conduct in Menorca, and that Bayarte's presence 
in England was not required, 37 he remained in London for a 
number of years. He was in London to submit a further 
petition Ides Griefs des Habitants' in 1723,38 and he 
prolonged his stay even after the UniVersitats of Menorca had 
ceased to pay his expenses in February 1728.39 According to 
one account, Bayarte did not return to Menorca until 1748.40 
The charges of maladministration and abuse of power 
brought against Kane by the Spanish Ambassador, and 
subsequently by Bayarte, were considered by the Privy Council 
in 1717 and 1718, and by the House of Commons in 1720. They 
were dismissed as 'frivolous and ill-grounded, ' and Kane was 
'honorably cleared' of all the allegations. 41 Nevertheless, 
the complaints had revealed grey areas in the government of 
Menorca and, at the suggestion of Lord Carpenter, the 
Governor42, these were examined by seven committees set up by 
the King's command in June 1718.43 The Archbishop of 
Canterbury, the Lord Chancellor, the Secretary at War and the 
Master General of ordnance were charged respectively with 
reports on ecclesiastical government, civil government and 
laws, military government and the island's fortifications, 
while matters relating to Menorcals revenues, naval affairs 
and trade and commerce were to be examined by the Lords 
Commissioners of the Treasury, Admiralty and Trade. Kane 
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received orders to lay before the committees 'papers proper 
for their purpose', and was directed to attend the committees 
as required to give 'what further lights and explanations 
shall be thought requisite'. 44 of the reports subsequently 
produced, only the recommendations for the ecclesiastical 
government can now be traced, 45 but a draft of Kane's 
submissions to the committees survives. 46 
Kane's submissions were contained in a memorandum of 
thirty sections, some of which gave an account of existing 
practices in Menorca, and the remainder suggested alterations 
and innovations. All indicate his girasp of island affairs,, 
and a desire to put the government of the island on a more 
manageable footing more in keeping with British civil 
administration, and he challenged the view that Britain was 
bound to preserve the laws and customs of Menorca as firmly 
and unalterably as the Menorcans maintained. 
47 Incorporated 
into the draft memorandum were considerations of Kane's 
proposals by an (anonymous) 'Gentleman who has read Civil Law 
in Spain, and is well acquainted with the Constitution and 
Temper of the People of Minorcal. 
48 The anonymous comments 
served to temper some of Kane's more extravagant suggestions; 
the extent to which they may have been incorporated into 
Kane Is-f inal submissions is not known, but it is of little 
consequence since, once again, the affairs of Menorca were 
relegated to obscurity in the face of the delicate political 
situation in the Mediterranean 1718-1720, and of the Squth 
Sea Bubble scandal at home. No reforms other than the 
establishment of the vice-admiralty court were implemented. 
In the light of the Bayarte episode, Kane was unhappy that 
meetings of the Universitat General were outside the 
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Governor's control or influence, and he proposed that the 
Governor, or his representative, should be present at all 
meetings, and that all members of the Universitats be 
required to swear an unqualified oath of allegiance to the 
crown. 49 He proposed no changes to the constitution of the 
district Universitats, except that their exclusive right to 
make afforations should be limited, 50 but he did raise (but 
not answer) the question of British non-military residents 
being allowed to play a role in local government, and whether 
they should be subject to British, Menorcan or military law 
(Kane favoured military law) .,, 
51 He proposed the 
establishment of a Supreme Council to consist of nine members 
- Governor, Lt-Governor, Lt-Governor-of St. Philip's, Asesor, 
Abogado Fiscal, together with 'one gentleman of the best 
fortune and learning' from each termino - with powers to 
alter old laws, privileges and customs, to create new sources 
of revenue, to hear all grievances from the Universitats and 
be the only body in the island to raise money for 
extraordinary reasons-52 In the sphere of justice, Kane 
suggested that a court of appeal should be set up in-Menorca 
(with a final right of appeal to the Privy Council); 
53 some 
elements of English common law should be introduced, 
punishments reviewed and brought more in line with sentences 
meted out -in British courts. However, such was his lack of 
faith in the sanctity of an oath taken by a Catholic subject, 
he made an exception in the case of perjury where he 
advocated that anyone found guilty of that crime should 
suffer the loss of his ears. 
54 In the civil courts he sought 
to introduce an element of arbitration to cut down the number 
of cases which reached the courts and to speed up settlement 
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of those which did55, and he urged that agreement be reached 
with Spain and the Viceroy of Mallorca to bring to an end the 
age-old practice whereby criminals from one island sought 
sanctuary in the other. 56 Kane was also opposed to religious 
discrimination which discouraged settlement in Menorca (here 
he had Jews particularly in mind), provided that all settlers 
swore an oath of allegiance to the British crown. 57. Finally, 
(among his proposals relevant to this chapter), to encourage 
settlement and to increase prosperity in Menorca, Kane 
proposed changes to the custom of land tenure. 58 He believed 
that the system in force by which thpre were no fixed terms 
for leases, and the land was farmed on the basis of 
sharecropping, offered the tenant no security and little 
incentive to develop the land to its full potential. 
Moreover, Menorcan landowners would sell only to native-born 
islanders. Kane advocated the introduction of fixed term, 
renewable leases, and that proprietors should be compelled to 
sell land which they had no intention of cultivating or 
farming. 
Before he left Menorca for London in April 1717, Kane had 
shown that, in the absence of specific guidelines and 
authority, he was prepared to use his initiative and act if 
he considered there was good reason. He had compelled the 
Universitats to provide unpaid labour for the construction of 
the new road from St. Philip's to Ciudadela; 
59 he infringed 
the civil liberties of the Menorcans when he reimposed the 
ban on the carrying or possession of arms, and compounded 
this action by making the penalty for this offence, and for 
any act of stoning the troops, a public whipping, a 
punishment from which the Menorcans were specifically exempt 
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according to one of their fueros; 60 Kane banned gaming 
houses, made the Universitats provide a House of Correction 
for the vagabonds in each termino, 61 and ordered the 
Universitat of Mahon to confine known prostitutes to one 
outlying district of the town. 62 He had also usurped the 
resposibilities of the Jurats in 1716 by imposing regulations 
for the import of cattle and sheep; by fixing sale prices for 
all meat, poultry, game and fish; by laying down arbitrarily 
the rates for hire of beasts of burden, and by imposing 
standardised weights and measures throughout the island. 63 
Richard Kane returned to Menor. ca in December 1719, 
exonerated from the charges which had been levelled against 
him, but with no more clearly defined authority as Civil 
Governor of the island than he had had when he left for 
London, but, for the remaining sixteen years of his 
4governorship, he continued to govern by decree, undeterred by 
the opposition he encountered from the Jurats in the island 
and the complaints which they sent to London about his 
autocratic behaviour. 
He had authority from the Admiralty to establish a vice- 
admiralty court, 64 which he set up in 1720 with himself 
appointed Vice-Admiral but, without authority, he transferred 
the principal law courts from Ciudadela to Mahon in 1722,, 65 
summoned the Universitat General to meet in Mah(5n and not 
Ciudadela in October of the same year'66 and in 1728 he 
decreed that the annual linsaculacion' would take place in 
Maho'n67 - all acts which effectively lessened the importance 
of Ciudadela, diminished the influence of the Universitat 
General (no meetings were held after 1730), and effectively 
made Mahon the capital of Menorca - and in 1734 Kane took it 
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upon himself to resolve disputes of precedence between the 
Jurats. 68 
Other decrees by Kane which bypassed the authority of the 
Jurats were those issued to reinforce the standardisation of 
weights and measures, 69 to eliminate counterfeit money in 
circulation, 70 and to establish a firm rate of exchange in 
the various currencies in circulation; 71 he also legislated 
on the afforations of wheat, oats, cheese and wool, 72 the 
cutting of wood73 and the sale of wine, 74 and in 1733 he 
decreed that all civil disputes involving sums of less than 
E(M)20 (E3) were to be settled by arbitration, and that cases 
unresolved after three months were to be referred to the 
Governor for adjudication. 75 
In 1724 Kane introduced two important fiscal measures by 
re-imposing the lestanquel(tax on the sale of brandy), 76 and 
an anchorage duty to be paid by all foreign trading vessels 
entering Mahon harbour. 77 The revenues of the estanque were 
designed-to produce a fund from which the Jurats could pay 
for the cost of maintaining and repairing public buildings 
and roads, and the anchorage duty was destined for a fund to 
pay for the construction of a lazaretto in the harbour of 
Mahon. 
All Kane's legislation in the sphere of civil government 
was carried out without a Governor's authority to act in 
these matters ever being defined, and it was consistently 
challenged by the Jurats on these grounds. But, for all the 
accusations of despotism levelled at him, it was never Kane's 
wish that his civil powers should remain undefined. He 
repeatedly urged Westminster to draft regulations for Menorca 
in which the various areas and the extent of the Governor's 
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authority would be clarified. He made a final attempt to 
achieve this objective while he was on leave in London for 
the last time 1728-1730. Kane, together with Lord Carpenter, 
one of the few Governors to carry out his responsibilities in 
Menorca(May 1726-December 1727), raised the issue with the 
King and Privy Council in 1730,78 but once again, with an 
advantageous peace treaty having just been concluded with 
Spain (November 1729), the moment was not right. Walpole's 
ministry, fearful of Spanish and foreign Catholic opposition, 
fought shy of introducing reforms in Menorca which it was 
certain would be interpreted as a violation of Britain's 
Utrecht undertakings, and it was not until 1752, after a 
determined prosecution by the Menorcan Universitats of the 
malpractices of Kane's successor, Phlip Anstruther, that 
Westminster eventually drew up some regulations for the 
government of Menorca. 
After Kane's death-in 1736, the remaining twenty years of 
the first period of British rule in Menorca saw no 
improvement in the relations between the Governor in the 
island and the Jurats. The principal difficulty continued to 
be the contrast between the Jurats' belief that Britain's 
Utrecht undertakings did not give the Governor any authority 
to interfere in matters of civil government, and the stance 
of the Governors or interim Commanders -in-Chie f, who saw it 
as their duty to intervene if they considered it to be in the 
interest of 'His Majesty's service'. 
79 
As in Kane's governorship, some of the disputes - 
quarters, supplies, garrison indiscipline - arose from 
alleged misuse of the Governors' military authority as 
Commander-in-Chief, and are dealt with elsewhere, as are the 
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numerous complaints about interference in ecclesiastical 
matters. But, in addition to grievances about isolated 
actions of particular Governors, there were recurrent heads 
of complaint about Kane's successors meddling, and acting 
without due authority in matters of civil government in 
Menorca, and these formed the basis of a series of petitions 
to the Privy Council seeking redress from actions of Lt-Col. 
Pinfold, 80 Maj-Gen. Anstruther8l and Lt-Gen. Blakeney. 82 The 
recurrent heads of complaint can be grouped as follows: 
Harassment and prosecution of law officers, officials and 
Syndichs. 
Pinfold was accused of condoning, in November 1737, the 
malicious prosecution of Antonio Rubi, the farmer of the 
royal tithes of corn, for selling wheat at above the 
afforation price (which he was, by tradition, allowed to do), 
and for approvng an excessively severe sentence of two years' 
exile and a fine of 200 dollars. 83 He was further accused of 
summarily dismissing from office the Asesor (Dr. Font), the 
Abogado Fiscal (Dr. Pons) and the Secretary of the Court of 
Patrimony (Rafael Febrer) on charges that they had usurped 
his authority by ordering a house to house search for hoarded 
grain, of exacting exorbitant fees from litigants and 
imposing unjust sentences, and for spreading false and 
alarming rumours. 84 All three officials dismissed by Pinfold 
were replaced with his own placemen, but on appeal to the 
Privy Council, the officials were exonerated, reinstated and 
recompensed. 85 
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Anstruther also dismissed from office and imprisoned five 
Jurats/Syndichs - Dr. Juan Company (Pinfold's choice as 
Asesor to replace Dr. Font), Dr. Olivar y Cardona(Ciudadela), 
Dr. Francisco Caules(Mahon), Bartolom4 Mascaro(Alayor) and 
Tomas Castel (Mercadal). They appealed to the Privy Counci, 86 
and, as a result, all were liberated, but although Company 
and Caules came to London personally to press for damages 
against Anstruther, they were ultimately (after more than ten 
years of lobbying and waiting) unsuccessful. 87 
Blakeney imprisoned Dr. Raymundo Ballester, Syndich of the 
Universitat of Mah6n, and prosecuteql him for conducting a 
campaign of civil rights, 88 and he dismissed from office both 
Dr. Andreu, -the Abogado Fiscal, on a charge of fomenting 
dissension" and Juan Pons y Andreu, the Secretary of the 
Universitat of Mahon(later to become the Syndich in London 
1765-1771), on a charge of dishonesty. 90 
Treatment of Jurats, and abuse of the insaculacio*n. 
The Jurats resented Pinfold's allegation that they were 
all 'codiciosos y falsos'(greedy and perfidious), 91 and that 
the three Jurats from Ciudadela who had written to the Earl 
of Hertford (the absentee Governor) criticising his conduct 
were Itraidores sediciosos' (seditious traitors). 92 Although 
Pinfold started criminal proceedings against the latter, they 
were dropped when Pinfold was superceded by Anstruther. 93 
The Jurats complained that Anstruther had substituted his 
own placemen (including a non-native Menorcan) for properly 
nominated candidates in the insaculacion; 94 he had compelled 
Jurats to sign and approve documents against their will and 
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better judgement; 95 he had prosecuted and imprisoned Jurats 
who had opposed him, 96 and he had resolutely refused to reply 
to any memorials from the Jurats which were critical of his 
administration. 97 
Blakeney was also accused of interfering in the 
insaculacion, and of uttering threats and menaces to the 
Jurats. 98 
Peculation, Trade, Estanque and Anchorage dues. 
Pinfold introduced new taxes, imposed fines and forbade 
trade with Mallorca for his own personal gain, 99 but these 
were all measures which were condemned by Anstruther and were 
rescinded by him after he assumed command in Menorca. 100 
Ironically, in the light of his reaction to Pinfold's 
activities, some of the most bitter criticisms of Anstruther 
were related to his ill-concealed ambition for personal 
financial gain. He stood accused of trading with Spain at a 
time when that country was an enemy, 101 of confiscating 
estates of suspected Spanish sympathisers and pocketing the 
proceeds, 102 and of retaining the entire proceeds of the 
estanquel03 and anchorage dues-104 He also had to answer 
charges that he had monopolised the wine trade by buying, 
through his agents, as much wine as he could, to re-sell it 
at a higher price, 105 and that he stockpiled wine, wood, oil 
and tobacco to sell at inflated prices in times of 
shortage. 106 
Individual liberties. 
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The Jurats accused Anstruther of intercepting private 
correspondence, 107 of refusing to grant passports to 
Menorcans who had shown themselves in any way critical of his 
administration, 108 and of causing his troops to trespass to 
cut an excessive amount of wood. 109 
Although General Wynyard, during his period in command as 
interim Commander-in-Chief from April 1745 until Blakeney's 
arrival in June 1748, escaped many of the criticisms levelled 
at other British commanders, he was guilty of lack of 
judgement and displayed an ignorance of the islanders' fueros 
when, in 1745, he authorised Admir. al Medley to send out 
sailors to press Menorcans into service on board the fleet. 
Wynyard foresaw that it might cause 'some little Noysel in 
the island, but he underestimated the furore and the 
opposition. 110 In what became known to the Menorcans as 
'slany de ses pedradasl(the year of the stonings), the 
islanders (men and women) resisted the press gang with sticks 
and stones and with such vigour that few Menorcans were 
pressed on land, and only a few at sea. 
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Among the accusations levelled at Blakeney were that he, 
too, sanctioned trespass, and that he unlawfully detained and 
imprisoned individuals. 112 
There were, of course, more individual allegations of 
abuse of power. Pinfold was accused of victimising seafarers 
with additional taxes, and of hounding Menorcans who had 
found favour with Kane; 113 Anstruther's hypocrisy in banning 
hunting for others while he himself continued to hunt was 
criticised, 114 as was Wynyard's encouragement of Greek 
settlers, 115 and Blakeney's determination to 'clear the 
J* streets of Mahon of Hogs' and to 'extirpate almost the whole 
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species of Dogs' in Menorca (without compensation), was 
bitterly resented. 116 
The petition against Anstruther which contained the most 
telling allegations of mismanagement and abuse of-power, was 
assiduously promoted by the Syndich, Juan Mir y Espineta. He 
first presented the petition to the Privy Council in August 
1743 but, because of the delay in obtaining depositions from 
witnesses in Menorca and the labour of translating statements 
from Menorqui into English, it was not considered by the 
Council until March 1748. Even then, daunted by the work-load 
of examining all the twenty-five allegations, the Council 
limited consideration to eight complaints which they asked 
Mir to select. Mir was astute in his choice. He did not 
select necessarily the charges which had caused most outrage 
in Menorca, but concentrated on those which, if proven, would 
confirm Anstruther's abuse of his civil powers, and the 
personal pecuniary advantages he had gained from his 
arbitrary actions. 117 The council's verdict was damning: 
General Anstruther ... hath, in many Instances, 
acted in an Arbitrary and unwarrantable Manner, to 
the great injury and oppression of many of 
Your Majesty's Subjects[in Menorcal, in breach of 
his Duty ... and contrary to the Constitution of the Island. 118 
The Council was resolved that Anstruther's conduct was such 
as to have merited his removal from office in Menorca (he 
had, in fact, been replaced by Blakeney in August 1747), and 
it recommended that Anstruther should be required not only to 
make reparation to all ipjured parties in Menorca, but that 
he should also bear the entire costs of the inquiry - the sum 
was never clearly stated, but was thought to be in the region 
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of E4,000.119 Moreover the Council recommended, in the light 
of the complaints against Anstruther and of 'other petitions 
of Complaint pending', 120 that to forestall any such 
proceedings in the future it would be advisable to draw up 
some 'Regulations for the better Guidance and Conduct' for 
the Governors of Menorca. 121 
Mir's petition on behalf of the Universitats of Menorca 
was remarkable, not only because of its successful 
prosecution of Anstruther, but also because it ended with 
some three dozen recommendations about the future government 
of Menorca under British rule, some of which indicated a more 
moderate and pragmatic approach to problems of government by 
the Universitats. Some constants, of course, remained; 
recognition and respect for the island's fueros, 
122 no 
interference with the responsibilities of the Jurats, 
123 no 
restriction on the islanders' rights to represent grievances 
to the King in Council, 124 nor on the freedom of the 
Menorcans to trade and come and go as they pleased, 
125 but 
there were also recommendations that the Governor (and not 
his Lieutenant) should be required to reside in Menorca, 
126 
that a Civil Governor be appointed and required to answer all 
memorials from the Jurats, 
127 there should be no censorship 
of private correspondence, 
128 the income from the estanque 
and anchorage dues should be administered by the 
Universtitats, 129 and that an Appeal Court should be 
established in the island-130 
The Privy council had taken four years to hear the 
petition of complaints against Anstruther, it took a further 
four years before it produced the Regulations it had 
undertaken to draw up. These were approved in May 1752131 
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but, in so far as' they -addressed civil government, they 
served only to create greater conflict between the Governor 
and the Jurats. 
The Regulations of 1752. 
In the 'Civil Branch' of the Regulations, the Universitats 
were to be free to make afforations for all the island's 
producel32 and to be responsible for the provision of meat 
for the garrison, 133 the Governor was to have no power to 
prevent Menorcans leaving the island for some 'lawful 
cause"? 134 the Universitat of Mahon was to be responsible for 
devoting the proceeds of anchorage dues to the building of a 
'Pratique Haven', 135 all the revenue of the estanque was to 
go to the Universitats to be used for the upkeep and repair 
of public* buildings and services, 136 and the Governor and 
British officers and officials were forbidden to engage in 
trade. 137 
The Regulations, the first attempt in forty years of 
British rule to allocate responsibilities in the civil 
government of Menorca, were inadequate and unsatisfactory. 
Too many contentious areas remained undefined and, while the 
Jurats rejoiced in the official recognition of some of their 
customary rights, for Blakeney the restrictions imposed upon 
his authority made an already taxing situation even more 
fraught after the Regulations came into force in Menorca in 
August 1752. 
In a series of letters to the Secretary of State, 138 
Blakeney complained that the measures taken by the Jurats to 
regulate the prices of provisions on the island, to control 
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the imports, and to enforce longer (and therefore more 
costly) periods of quarantine, had resulted in shortages, 
increased prices., and had discriminated against British and 
foreign merchants trading from Menorca. 139 Blakeney drew 
attention to the fact that the Regulations superceded a 
decree of the Court of Spain in 1666, whereby the Governor 
was charged with the ultimate responsibility to ensure that 
in the area of afforations and provisions 'everything that 
was for the common benefit was duly executed'. 140 Blakeney 
accused the Jurats of monopolising the sale of brandy, of 
refusing to introduce licensing hcturs for the sale and 
consumption of brandy and wine (thereby causing an increase 
in the, incidence of drunkenness in the garrison), 141 and of 
using the revenues of the estanque, the anchorage dues and 
the land tax for purposes for which they were not 
intended. 142 He warned that the new Powers granted to the 
Jurats of Maho'n had 'so intoxicated' them that inter- 
Universitat rivalry had been created in Menorca - 
particularly between Maho'n and Ciudadela -a dispute which 
Blakeney considered could become 'very troublesome'. 143 
Blakeney further complained of the 'arrogance and insolence' 
of the people of Mahon, 144 the 'great partiality', shown by 
native judges to their countrymen in disputes with the 
British, 145 and he sought approval for his dismissal from 
office of one of the judges, Dr. Jaime Andreu y Costabella, 
the Abogado Fiscal, whom he considered guilty of 'fomenting 
all Broils and encouraging a Spirit of Opposition to the 
Government'. 146 
After the introduction of the Regulations, the attitude of 
the Jurats to the Governor became more confrontational. In 
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addition to specific complaints to which reference has 
already been made, they alleged that Blakeney's 'arbitrary 
and usurped authority' had resulted in many instances of 
oppression'; 147 he had acted unlawfully in dismissing the 
Abogado Fiscal for doing no less than his duty in defending 
the Menorcans' fueros, 148 and, his decision to increase the 
guard in Maho'n and mount two cannons to protect the 
warehouses against any action that might have arisen out of 
the 'arrogance and insubordination of the natives,, 149 led to 
an accusation of resorting to 'terror as the main engine of 
government'. 150 
The position of the Governor in Menorca had not been easy 
before the 1752 Regulations came into force, and their 
introduction undoubtedly made it more difficult. Although 
there was no suggestion by the Jurats that any of Blakeney's 
actions were venal, there was clearly some personal animosity 
which arose from Blakeney's lack of tact and discretion, and 
as a result of his short temper - on one occasion he gave way 
to a public display of fury at the Abogado fiscal, 'putting 
his fist to his face and calling him a Villain and a 
Traytor'. 151 But not only was Blakeney inexperienced as a 
Colonial Governor, it was his 'misfortune to have no British 
subordinate, naval or military, with any knowledge of the 
island to whom he could turn for advice. Within a year of 
Blakeney's arrival in Menorca, the end of the War of Austrian 
Succession led to a reduction of the naval presence, and all 
the regiments in the garrison had been relieved by troops new 
to the island. 
The government in London misinterpreted Blakeney's 
incessant complaints as an implicit request to be relieved of 
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his command in Menorca, and he was informed in may 1753 of 
his appointment as Governor of Gibraltar, to be assumed as 
soon as Lord Tyrawley, the Governor, arrived in Menorca. 152 
Although the appointment to Gibraltar would have constituted 
a promotion, Blakeney protested that a mistake had been made, 
and insisted that 'no Feuds or Animosities, no Dangers or 
Difficulties' would ever induce him to wish to be removed 
from any command with which he had been honoured. 153 
The Regulations of 1753. 
Blakeney's reports, together with the representations of 
the Jurats, led the Lords Justices, in May 1753, to consider 
a further report from the Privy Council proposing 
clarification of the 1752 Regulations, because of the 
'confusion which has arisen in the island'. 154 A copy of the 
Privy Council recommendations was sent for comment to the 
Governor of Menorca, James O'Hara, Lord Tyrawley. of all the 
British Governors, Tyrawley was unique in that he had had 
direct contact with the island'before his appointment for, as 
Colonel of the 7th Foot, he had served in Menorca f rom 1713 
until 1715. His reaction to the proposed revised Regulations 
were recorded in a letter to the Secretary at War in May 
1753: 
As to these new Regulations in general as far as my 
memory serves me, they seem to be very different 
from those when Brigadier Kane commanded there, 
whose conduct I have always understood was approved 
of, and I heard no complaint either on the part of 
the garrison or the inhabitants duriyg5the two years 
that I was there under his command. 
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Tyrawley's consideration of the proposals was coloured by his 
recollection that the Menorcans were little more than a 
'rabble of beggars and banditti', 156 and he stressed that, if 
he was to govern in the island, he would expect to be 
invested with 'absolute power'. 157 
Tyrawley's suggestions for the powers to be vested in the 
Governor of Menorca were sent to the Privy Council in July 
1753.158 In the sphere of civil government, he recommended 
that the Governor be nominated the supreme judge in the 
island, 1,59 to allow such laws of the land to stand 'where 
Britain's service is not obstructed by them;, 160 to ensure 
that there was no partiality in judgements and that 
punishments fitted the crime and, while not admitting to any 
British obligation under the Treaty of Utrecht to preserve 
Menorcan fueros, yet to govern the island with justicep 
equity and lenity. 161 The Governor was to take the Jurats to 
task for their 'malevolent disposition' to the British 
authorities, and disqualify them from holding office if they 
were obstructive. 162 The Governor should institute an inquiry 
into the improper and illegal use of the revenues of the 
estanque, the anchorage dues and the land tax, and the 
Governor must be empowered to control supplies of provisions 
and to make afforations. 163 
The revised Regulations which were approved in August 1753 
were less conciliatory towards the jurats and did much to 
strengthen the Governor's authority. 
164 The Governor was now 
authorised to make afforations if the Jurats proved 
unreasonable in this respect, and he was empowered to make 
the afforations 'equal and general', but any future dispute 
on this issue was to be referred directly to the Privy 
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Council. The Jurats were no longer to manage the revenues 
from the estanque and anchorage dues. In future these were to 
be collected by a Receiver appointed by the Governor and 
charged with the responsibility of ensuring that they were 
devoted to the purposes for which they were originally 
intended - the revenue of the former to go towards the 
provision and upkeep of public buildings and works, and the 
anchorage dues towards the building of a Lazaretto in Mah6n 
harbour. But, in addition to the revised Regulations, 
measures even more unpalatable to the Jurats were contained 
in a new set of instructions issued to the Governor and Lt- 
Governor in August 1753.165 In these, the Governor in Menorca 
was granted 'divers Powers of Civil and Military Government, 
adapted to the Situation and Circumstances of Our Island'. 
The Jurats were to be reminded of the benefits the island had 
enjoyed under British rule (free trade, greater economic 
wellbeing, removal of the threat of attack from Barbary), 166 
and admonished for their recent 'contemptuous attitude'. 167 
Appeals to the Crown were to be permitted only when the sum 
involved exceeded 800 dollars in civil cases in the Court of 
Royal government, and 400 dollars in cases of 
misdemeanour; 168 exemplary punishments were to be inflicted 
on those found guilty of assaults on members of the 
garrisonl69 and, to avoid 'frivolous and vexatious 
representations', grievances could be carried to London only 
by Menorcans who were 'persons of reputation in the 
island., 170 Allegations concerning the misapplication of the 
land tax were to be investigated, 
171 the inter-Universitat 
disputes were to be examined, 172 and the Governor was given 
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the authority to disarm the Menorcans if he 'judged it 
necessary'. 173 
The 1753 Regulations and, particularly, the additional 
Instructions, embodied virtually all the powers which 
Tyrawley had demanded to be invested in the Governor of 
Menorca. But, while he had been granted what amounted to a 
free hand in the civil government of the island, he showed no 
urgency about taking up his command in Menorca, and he had 
not even set out for the island before it was lost to the 
French in 1756. Consequently it was left to Blakeney to carry 
out the Instructions and implement thp- Regulations. It proved 
a thankless and frustrating task. On 30 November 1753, 
Blakeney convened a meeting of the Jurats of Menorca to make 
them aware of the new Regulations, and to read them his 
Instructions. Not surprisingly, the Jurats were dismayed by 
the revised Regulations and resented the accompanying 
Instructions, and Blakeney found that they persisted 
regardless in 'wicked designs to oppose His Majesty's orders 
and harass the Commander -in Chief '. 174 The Jurats were 
radically opposed to the new pattern of governmentt which 
they considered to be a contravention of Britain's Utrecht 
undertakings, and they sought, at least, a return to the 1752 
Regulations. They suggested that the source of the inter- 
UniVersitat disputes lay in the pre-eminence which the 
British had given to the Universitat and town of Mahon, and 
they pressed for the return to Ciudadela of the principal 
courts of justice and for the revival of the Universitat 
General. They conceded that Mah&, because of the port and 
the fortress would continue to enjoy disproportionate 
benefits from the British presence in Menorca, but pleaded 
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that the termino of Mahon should make a correspondingly 
greater contribution to the island's internal economy. They 
pressed for the appointment of a Civil Governor in Menorca 
with authority independent of the Military Governor, and they 
objected to Blakeney's choice of Charles Williams as Receiver 
of the estanque revenue and anchorage dues, maintaining that 
the appointment, if it had to be made, should have been given 
to a Menorcan and 0 175 -not to an Irishman trading out of Mah'n. 
Blakeney dismissed the Jurats' objections and turned down 
all their proposals except one, which requested the 
appointment of an additional Asesor. to deal with criminal 
cases in the Court of Royal Government. To press their case 
the Jurats sent two Syndichs to London in the summer of 1754. 
The Syndichs, Bernardo olives y Olives and Dr. Mateo Mercadal 
y Sanxo, presented a comprehensive petition to the Privy 
Council in September 1754,176 but did not obtain a hearing 
before the Council, and had to be content with a meeting in 
October with the -Secretary of State. Sir Thomas Robinson 
dismissed the Syndichs' arguments, and bluntly told them that 
Menorca was British by conquest, consequently the Menorcans 
should 'felicitate themselves that the [1753) Orders had gone 
no further', and they should not 'entertain any false hopes 
of obtaining either by clamour or importunity either a 
suspension or a variation of the Regulations'. 177 
Although olives and Mercadal remained in London for a 
further six months attempting to obtain a hearing before the 
Privy Council, they were unsuccessful and they returned, 
frustrated and disillusioned to inform the Jurats that 
Britain regarded the Menorcans not as free subjects, but as a 
conquered people. In the circumstances, and bearing in mind 
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that the 1753 Regulations also contained measures relating to 
the military and ecclesiastical government of the island to 
which the Menorcans strongly objected, 178 it is hardly 
surprising that when Blakeney, faced with with an impending 
attack from France, appealed to the loyalty of the Menorcans 
to the British crown for support, the response was minimal. 
The French Government of Menorca, 1756-1763. 
- The French were proved correct in their assessment that 
Menorca would be an easy conquest but, even before the Duc de 
Richelieu's expedition had set sail, it was clear that they 
entertained no expectations that the island would become a 
permanent French territorial acquisition. The French Minister 
for War was advised in March 1756: 'Soit que nous le gardions 
[Port Mahon] actuellement, soit que nous le remettions "a 
VEspagne, il retournera bient*Ot aux Anglais'. 179 
Nevertheless, it emerged from the very f irst days of the 
French occupation that, while Menorca remained in French 
hands , it was to be governed 
in the same manner as all other 
provinces of mainland France. If the Jurats expected the 
'joye inexprimable', 180 with which they claimed to have 
welcomed the prospect of French rule to be confirmed by a 
more benign and less intrusive regime of civil government, 
they were to be disappointed. 
Like the British before and after them, the French found 
Menorca a 
singulier pays ou on ne pouvait faire un pas sans 
se heurter a un privil4ge, remuer une pierre 
sans troubler une coutume i ouvrir un chemin I sans attenter a un droit. 
81 
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However, the Menorcans welcomed the French without 'ill- 
will,, 182 and although Louis XV confirmed the jois, 
coutumes, stile et usages' of the island as readily as Queen 
Anne had done in 1712,183 the French authorities' disregard 
for the island's fueros was more blatant than their British 
predecessors. The functions and status of the Jurats were 
undermined from the outset by the appointment of a- French 
Intendant (Civil Governor), subordinate to the Military 
Governor, whose responsibilities included the regulation and 
collection of taxes, the supply and afforations of provisions 
and the auditing of the balance sheeps of the Universitats. 
Meetings of the Universitats were permitted only with the 
prior permission of the Governor, and the French authorities 
appropriated the profit of the estanque and the anchorage 
dues. 184 Moreover, France expected the island to support 
garrison numbers vastly in excess of those which had caused 
the island such hardship during the first period of British 
rule. 185 
Not surprisingly, the remonstrances of the Jurats to the 
French authorities became as frequent and as plaintive as 
they had been to the British. Quite apart from the regular 
flow of complaints to Antoine de Causan, the Intendant# in 
the first four years of French rule there were nine petitions 
to the Governor, and a further eight petitions to Ministers 
in Paris. 186 For the most part, the petitions elicited as 
little sympathy and as little response as earlier complaints 
to British Governors and to London. A typically dismissive 
reply from the Comte de Lannion, the Governor, suggested that 
the Jurats ought to be grateful, and not resentful of the 
control exercised by the French in the island's civil 
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government in view of the chaotic way in which the 
Universitats had long managed their affairs. 187 
The period of French rule brought about some changes in 
the island: legal processes were speeded up by the 
appointment of two Asesors, one to deal with criminal 
Offences, the other with civil cases; appeals were heard by 
the Council of Roussillon in Perpignan, a more readily 
accessible venue, and therefore a less expensive process; 
communications within the island were improved by the 
construction of some ninety kilometres of new roads radial to 
Kane's east-west arterial road, and q new road, the Cami des 
Cavalls (horse road), was constructed around the island's 
coastline-188 Trade links were established with France to 
compensate for the Joss of markets in the Levant and in 
Barbary, and the town of San Luis sprang up to the South of 
Mahon. Most importantly for the islanders, the spiritual 
authority of the Bishop of Mallorca was restored in Menorca, 
but there can be little doubt that the French authorities 
relied heavily upon the islanders' gratitude for their return 
to an unfettered profession of their Catholic faith to offset 
the -discontent aroused by the increased burdens the island 
had to bear during their period of government in Menorca. 189 
The restoration of British rule, 1763. 
- For all the Menorcans, affinity with the religion and 
culture of the French, there were some, laffectiones aux 
Anglais', 190 who welcomed the return of the British to the 
island in 1763, if only for commercial reasons. For the 
Jurats, however, the second period of British rule gave them 
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no less cause to complain of the British 43overnors , and for 
much the same reasons as before - arbitrary gubernatorial 
decisions and actions; lack of respect for the Jurats and 
usurpation of their responsibilities; infringements of 
personal liberties and misappropriation of funds. But it was 
also a period in which some leading Menorcans, notably the 
principal law officers, recognised that improvements could be 
made in the civil government and in the economic well-being 
of the island. Their proposals for reform were largely 
supported by the British Governors (not necessarily for 
altruistic reasons), who also put forVard some ideas of their 
Own. However, very little was accomplished, partly because 
the Jurats, suspicious of change, did not back the 
-initiativest but primarily because the British government, 
with an insouciance characteristic of its eighteenth-century 
handling of colonial affairs, failed to live up to its 
responsibilities, and did little or nothing to resolve the 
problems in the island, although it was repeatedly alerted to 
them. 
In the circumstances, it was ironic that the British 
government should have looked to Menorca for guidance to 
govern Canada when that province was ceded by France to 
Britain in 1763 - an irony heightened by the fact that when 
the relevant papers were sought, 191 such was the neglect of 
Menorcan affairs in Westminster, that it was revealed that 
the ' Minorca correspondence for a number of years is not to 
be found in the Secretary of State's office, the Paper Office 
or the [Privy] Councill. 192 The common ground for comparison 
was that both Canada (native Indians excepted) and Menorca 
were populated by non-English-speaking Catholics, accustomed 
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to a legal system and an established form of government 
radically different from the British, but there was a 
fundamental difference. Part of Canada (Acadia/Nova Scotia) 
had already been settled by Britons, and it was the clear 
intention of the home government to encourage British 
settlers to colonise the newly-acquired territory in 
substantial numbers, 193 whereas no initiative was ever taken 
to encourage British settlement in Menorca. 
,A 'Plan for settling the Island of Minorca with a Sett of 
Substantial and Industrious Inhabitants, 194 had been proposed 
in the early years of the f irst peripd of British rule by a 
Colonel Daubuis, who had -served under. Stanhope, but it had 
not been pursued 'for fear of disoblidging some of our 
Foreign Friends'. 195 The plan was revived at the start of the 
second period of British rule by Colonel Daubuis I son-in- 
law, 196 who proposed that a 'numerous Colony of Substantial 
and Industrious Protestants [British and Foreign) be 
encouraged to settle in Menorca (which will cost but a 
Trifle), #197 to make the most of the island's largely 
untapped agricultural potential and, in due course, fill 'all 
the Places and offices' in the island. 
198 Another scheme for 
encouraging settlers in Menorca was put forward by Thomas 
Hope who visited the island in 1764/65, who considered that 
Menorca, the population of which he estimated to be 18,000P 
could support more than ten times that number. He advocated 
that 'All encouragement be given to New Settlers by a 
Naturalizaton Bill, Immunities, Privileges (unspecified) 
etc. 1199 Westminster remained unc onvinced and did nothing to 
further any of the schemes. 
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,,. Consequently, whereas British Policy in Menorca was 
persistently indeterminate, in Canada it was conciliatory 
and, with the passing of the Quebec Act in 1774, purposeful 
and decisive. From the outset of British government in 
Canada, an attempt was made to influence the French Canadian 
settlers to become willing subjects, loyal to the British 
crown. Compromise government was sought whereby the French 
Canadians could retain some of their former institutions and 
be persuaded to accept some constitutional changes more in 
line with the British traditions. The vexed problem of 
ecclesiastical government was solve4 by the British tacit 
recognition of the authority of 'Superintendent' (Bishop in 
all but name) Briand in 1766; 200 Canadian Catholics were 
granted civil liberties which were not extended to their 
British counterparts for a further thirty years, 201 and a 
compromise was reached in establishing the laws by which the 
new colony was to be governed. 202 None of these achievements 
was mirrored in Menorca, and nothing was done to win the 
support of the islanders - indeed a judgement by the Chief 
Justice of the Court of common Pleas in an action brought by 
the Menorcan secretary of the vice-admiralty court against 
the Lieutenant-Governor and the Abogado Fiscal in 1765, ruled 
that the Menorcans' decision in 1712 not to be governed by 
the British constitution, excluded them from seeking redress 
for grievances in the British courts, except in criminal 
cases. 203 This judgement was reversed by the Lord Chief 
Justice ten years later in another action brought by a 
Menorcan (to which reference is made later in this chapter) 
but, by then, the feeling among many Menorcans that they were 
162 
unequal and insignificant British subjects had become 
entrenched. 
In 1713, Britain's negotiators in the Treaty of Utrecht 
had failed clearly to establish the parameters of British and 
Menorcan authority in all aspects of the government of the 
island, and the failure was compounded in the Treaty of Paris 
which concluded the Seven Years' War. 204 Article Two of the 
Treaty restored Menorca to Britain, and Britain promised to 
confirm all the Menorcans' rights and privileges as they had 
stood in 1756. To Britain, this meant government by the 1753 
Regulations, but these had never been accepted by the 
Menorcans, who considered them to be a violation of Britain's 
Utrecht undertakings, and their opposition to the Regulations 
had been registered, but not considered by the Privy Council., 
before the island was lost to the French. A chasm existed 
between the Menorcans' interpretation of Britain's 
obligations as one of total non-interference in the island's 
internal government, and the British standpoint that they 
were bound to interfere if the measures taken by the Menorcan 
authorities were at a variance with the civil government and 
the laws of Great Britain'. 205 It was a chasm which was not 
to be bridged while menorca was British, and the inevitable 
irreconcilable differences ensured that the second period of 
British rule was quite as contentious as the first. 
Of the Britons appointed to command in Menorca from 1763- 
1782, Sir Richard Lyttelton (Governor 1763-1766) and 
Lieutenant-General George Howard (Governor 1766-1768) never 
visited the island, and Lieutenant-General John Mostyn 
(Governor 1768-1779) exercised his command in Menorca for 
only eighteen months (January 1771-July 1772). For most of 
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the period, the government of Menorca was the responsibility 
of two men - Colonel (later Major-General) James Johnston 
(Lieutenant-Governor 1763-1774) and Lieutenant-General the 
Hon James Murray (Lieutenant-Governor 1774-1779, and Governor 
1779-1782). Johnston, Murray and# to a lesser extent. Mostyn. 
all faced challenges to their authority in Menorca. Some 
confrontations undoubtedly arose as a result of their own 
dispositions, but more stemmed from a lack of understanding, 
support and guidance from Westminster. 
The government of James Johnston (1763-1770,1772-1774). 
The choice of Johnston to command in Menorca was not idealý 
for, while he was a good soldier and came to be regarded as a 
conscientious if , at times, over-zealous administrator by 
his masters in London, 206 the Menorcans resented his blunt, 
autocratic approach, devoid as it was of any tact or 
subtlety. He was an unpopular Governor dn the island, and his 
wife, Lady Cecily, the first lady to reside in Government 
House, was also disliked because of her haughty demeanour, 
her anti-Catholic prejudice and the strong influence she was. 
alleged to have over her husband (one commentator has gone as 
far as to describe her as 'the real GOvernorl)207. But 
Johnston's reputation has suffered unfairly at the hands of 
many Menorcan historians, notably Oleo, Riudavets, 
Hernandez, Verdaguer and Mata. In their assessment they have 
dwelt upon the faults in Johnston's character, and have 
chosen to overlook facts which indicate that the initiatives 
which he proposed were quite as radical and forward-looking 
as those which had been suggested by Kane (uniformly in 
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favour with the same historians). It is true that not all the 
reforms he suggested were devoid of an element of self- 
interest, but most would have improved the economic well- 
being of the island as well as increasing the royal 
patrimony. 
Much of the Menorcan antipathy to Johnston resulted from 
his first official communication to the island's Jurats soon 
after his arrival in October 1763. He wrote to them stating 
that all the 1753 Regulations were to be implemented, but he 
overstepped his instructions (identical to those issued to 
Tyrawley and Blakeney ten years , earlier), 
by adding, 
injudiciously, that in future Britain's guarantee of the 
island's fueros would be dependent upon the good behaviour 
and co-operation of the Menorcans. 
208 The Jurats immediately 
protested, and although Johnston attempted to justify his 
point to the Secretary of State by stressing how 
'troublesome' the Jurats were, and that 'some severities will 
not be improper', 209 he was instructed by Halifax to inform 
the Jurats that Britain's undertaking to respect the Menorcan 
fueros remained unchanged. 
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Johnston's relations with the Jurats never recovered from 
this initial faux pas. However genuine his subsequent 
motives, his actions were disputed and their altruism 
questioned. Consequently when he urged that the wild olive 
trees 'which abounded on the island should be grafted and made 
fruit-bearing, that goats (which damaged the trees) should be 
banned and replaced with sheep, and that the quality of meat 
would be improved by the castration of lambs not needed for 
breeding211 - suggestions at least worthy of consideration - 
he was accused of exceeding his authority, and was opposed by 
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the Jurats on principle, rather than for any practical 
reason. Johnston incensed the Jurats by his appropriation of 
the estanque profit and the anchorage dues; his increase in 
the fees charged for Mediterranean passes; his appointment of 
a Greek and not a Menorcan to the lucrative post of receiver 
of weights and measures; 212 his attempt to commandeer the 
hospital in Mahon (a Catholic foundation) as a garrison 
hospital; 213 his use of one of the Catholic churches in Mahon 
for Protestant worship, and by depriving the Jurats of their 
responsibility for administering Public Health and Quarantine 
regulations. 214 on only one issue were Johnston and the 
Jurats of one mind; that was in criticism of the conduct of 
the judge of the vice-admiralty court, James Sutherland. Both 
parties sought greater control over the judge's independence, 
but Johnston's solution - to seek to be appointed Vice- 
Admiral (a position traditionally held by the Governor) - 
was misinterpreted by the Jurats as further evidence of 
ambition and cupidity, even though the perquisites of the 
post in times of peace were negligible. 
The result of Johnston's actions in the first few months 
of his command was a decision by the Jurats to send Juan Pons 
y Andreu as their Syndich to London to lay their complaints 
before the Privy Council. 215 In June 1764, after less than a 
year in Menorca, Johnston was recalled to London to answer 
charges brought against him that he had misappropriated the 
estanque profits and anchorage dues, and that he had profited 
personally from the sale of corn at a time of shortage in the 
island. 216 
As in the case of the Anstruther inquiry in the 1740s, the 
investigation of the charges against Johnston took time. 
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Depositions had to be taken in Menorca and in London, 
translations made and then further depositions in answer to 
Johnston's refutation of the charges, and it was not until 
1770 that the Privy Council judgement was delivered. In the 
meantime, pending the outcome of the inquiry, Johnston was 
authorised to return to his command in December 1765. 
Johnston returned to Menorca to find that, in his absence, 
Lt-Colonel Thomas Townshend, the interim Governor for the 
previous year, had used the entire profits of the estanque to 
finance the start of the building of a barracks in Mahc5n, and 
was proposing to mortgage future profits to see the project 
finished by the spring of 1765.217 The Jurats of Mahon 
considered Townshend's initiative 'the most useful work for 
the relief of the Universitat', 218 but Johnston's immediate 
reaction was to suspend building work (by then the barracks 
were more than a third complete), and to refuse to pay for 
the site which had been requisitioned for the building. 
219 
Johnston's actions arose partly out of pique at Townshend's 
initiative, partly because Townshend had no authority to 
build the barracks (he was censured by the Secretary of State 
for his actions), 220 but also because a share of the profits 
of the estanque had become part of the perquisites of the 
Governor in Menorca, and he felt cheated. This element of the 
Governor's emoluments had always been disputed by the Jurats, 
and although Johnston was to propose that he should forego it 
and be paid an annual supplement of E365 to his salary in 
lieu, 221 the situation was never satisfactorily resolved even 
though Murray, Johnston's successor, again made an issue in 
1774 of the Governor's pay and perquisites (Fig. 4.5). 
Johnston's refusal to continue with the building of the 
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fig. 4.5. 
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Surgeon's Kite 63.17.6. 
In addition. from 1712 until at least 1742, the following salaries 
uvro paid for posts in the rm-existent Fort St. Nine: 
roct Kajor 91. S. 0. 
Fort Adjutant 54.15.0. 
Suctjeon 91.5.0. 
Surgeon's Pate 45.11.6. 
1 3% 31% 
Table compiled from BL Add Mss4. P. 105. 'State of 
Employment in Minorca with the Incomes and Emoluments of 
Each as they stood in 1756'. and from Army Lists. 
2 
Payable in Menorca to whoever was in command in the 
island. The sum was made up of savings from the 
Governor's contingency fund, fees charged on trading 
licences. Mediterranean passes and passports, half the 
profit on the estanque, a third of the profit on the 
bread contract for the garrison, sales and fines in 
St. Philip's/Georgetown and (when appropriate) in the 
Vice-Admiralty court, and from other minor sources. By 
1774, Murray estimated that the perquistites had risen in 
value to E1,970. (PRO CO 174/17, P. 51. Murray to R. Rigby 
(Paymaster General), 25 November 1774). 
3 
According to BL Add Mss 38332, p. 105, the salary was 
never published, and was disclosed only to the Treasury 
and the Auditors. However. a 'Memorandum Touching the 
island of Minorca*, (D/M/4314, unsigned but dated 15 July 
1730). in the Mostyn mss In the Clwyd Record Office, 
reveals that Joseph Gascoigne was appointed the first 
Receiver in December 1712, at a salary of Jos. per diem. 
An additional allowance of, 10s. per them was granted in 
1722, and a 'farther(sic) additional Allowance' of Jos. 
per them was paid from 1725. The salary and allowances 
would therefore have amounted to an annual payment to the 
Receiver of E547. Jos. 
4 
Salary not disclosed, but in 1743, when Sir Francis 
Poole was required under the Place Act to vacate this 
post, he was awarded an annual pension of E200*, 
subsequently increased to E300, until his death in 1763. 
His son, Henry Poqle, held the post from 1747 until 
Menorca was lost in 1756 and, between December 1758 and 
March 1761, he received compensation of E1,325 for the 
loss of his post. (J. Brent, 'The Pooles of Chailey and 
. Lewes' in Sussex Archaeological Collections Vol. 114. 1976, p. 72. 
barracks infuriated the Jurats, and they sent another 
petition of grievance to the King. 222 
Meanwhile, in response to an earlier petition, the Jurats 
had obtained an order in council returning to their control 
the management of health and quarantine, and Johnston had 
been instructed not to interfere in the annual election of 
the Jurats. 223 The Jurats also provided material highly 
critical of Johnston's conduct which was published in the 
f orm of a pamphlet in London in 1766.224 The pamphlet was 
published anonymously, but the author was almost certainly 
Juan Pons y Andreu, the Menorcan pyndich in London. The 
pamphlet listed Johnston's alleged public crimes and personal 
spites. The author was particularly bitter that the posts of 
Receiver of Weights and Measures and Captain of the Port of 
Mahon should have been given to a Greek, and that the 
services of the island's Asesor were to be summarily 
dispensed with after more than thirty years' loyal service. 
He allowed that Johnston may have been a good army 
commander, but maintained that he was the worst of the 
British governors of Menorca. This attack provoked a vigorous 
defence of Johnston in a pamphlet published by his Chaplain 
and Secretary, the Revd Edward Clarke, who, in addition to 
refuting the charges, went out of his way to decry the mean 
status of the jurats, and to pour scorn on their incompetence 
to manage the island's internal affairs. Clarke also took the 
opportunity to undermine the standing and authority of Pons, 
suggesting that a proven perjurer was not a fit person to 
represent Menorca225 and. that he had been chosen Syndich only 
after two Menorcans 'of worth and credit' had both refused to 
undertake 'so dirty a job., 226 
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Fit person or not, Pons represented his own interest (he 
was still seeking compensation for wrongful dismissal by 
Blakeney in 1753), and presented in London a series of 
grievances from the Jurats from 1764 until 1770, and from 
1768 until 1770, he also represented in London the interests 
of the Menorcan clergy. In his final petition to the King in 
1770, Pons claimed to have pressed his employers' grievances 
with 'unremitting activity, diligence, circumspection and 
fidelity, o227 but added that he was so badly out of pocket, 
and had been kept so short of funds from Menorca that he had 
even been arrested for debt as a conspquence. He had received 
E4,797.8s. 2d. from the Jurats and E210 from the clergy 
towards his expenses and costs, but he petitioned the King to 
order further payment of E5,056.5s. 8d. by the Jurats, 
228 and 
E826.1s. 3d. by the clergy, 229 so that their obligation to 
him could be discharged. These were exorbitant sums which 
were never paid, and which, considering the lack of censure 
in the Privy -Council's findings in the inquiry into 
Johnston's conduct in February 1770, were totally 
disproportionate to any success Pons' activities had 
achieved. 
During the years in which Pons, in London, had been 
persistently presenting complaints about the Lt-Governor's 
conduct, Johnston, in Menorca, had not been idle. Despite his 
initial opposition, the building of the barracks was 
restarted and completed in 1772; 
230 estanque accounts 
submitted to the Secretary of State showed that the profits 
had been legitimately shared and the correct portion spent on 
public works, 231 also E800 had accrued in the anchorage fund 
and was earmarked for the construction of a lazaretto. 
232 
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Johnston had also sent the Secretary of State a series of 
proposals for reforms in Menorca which were fundamental, 
forward-looking and far-reaching. 233 The extent to which the 
reforms proposed represented Johnston's own ideas or largely 
reflected the opinions of Juan Segul y Sanxo, the Abogado 
Fiscal, 234 is not always clear, but it is evident that both 
men were of much the same mind in respect of reforms in the 
civil government and administration of justice in Menorca. 
Johnston proposed a restructuring of the constitution of the 
Universitats; all members should be literate and numerate and 
serve for a period of three years; representatives of the 
middle and minor estates should no longer be eligible for 
office: 
the one being brought up to labour the ground, the 
other to mechanical arts and the greater part of 
them very poor and consequently the less interested 
in contributing to the public burdens. 
The existing offices of Jurat and Conseller should be 
replaced by Regidores (Aldermen) - six in Mahon and 
Ciudadela, four in Alayor and three in Mercadal; the 
Regidores should be salaried officials with annual earnings 
of approximately E20 in Mahon and Ciudadela, E16 in Alayor 
and E10 in Mercadal, but candidates for office could be 
considered only if they possessed a personal fortune in 
excess of E800 in Mahon and Ciudadela, E400 in Alayor and 
E200 in Mercadal; the method of election by ballot should be 
abolished and replaced by a system of nomination by the 
Regidores themselves, and the Governor or his representative 
should have the right of attendance at meetings of the 
Universitats, if he so wished. Johnston also advocated the 
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creation of a Chamber of Health with authority independent of 
the Universitats. Both Johnston and Segul argued for the 
appointment of an Asesor in the criminal court to speed up 
the process of justice, and Segui proposed the appointment 
of an Asesor in the court of Royal Patrimony for the same 
reasons. Segul also suggested that a sovereign court of 
appeal be created in Menorca and the the court of the Bayle 
General in Ciudadela should be abolished and replaced by a 
court in Maho"n presided over by a Judge ordinary. 
Both Johnston and Segul put forward proposals to improve 
the economic state of the island 4Lnd thereby the King's 
revenue and the well-being of the inhabitants, and Johnston 
had some very firm views about changes in the ecclesiastical 
government of Menorca, but neither advocated the diminution 
or clear delineation of the Governor's civil powers. In 
contrast, Thomas Hope who represented the views of the 
British merchants in Menorca to the British government in 
1765, and gave incidentally his own assessment of the 
situation on the island, 235 and the author of the 'Plan for 
Settling the Island of Minorca..., 236 (probably produced at 
about the same time), were in no doubt that the establishment 
of a civil government in the island was a priority. It is the 
first measure proposed by the former, and for the latter it 
was a 'conditio sine qua non I that a civil government be 
established forthwith, maintaining that: 
a Military Government is inconsistent with the 
Libertys of the Subjects, it is in its nature 
despotick and when the Civil Power is joined to 
it, it soon becomes tyrannical. 237 
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All these proposals and opinions, together with the 
Menorcan Syndich's repeated pleas for the 1752 Regulations to 
be reinstated, were submitted to the Privy Council, which 
considered them under three headings: 'Points that seem to 
require dispatch; Points that do not seem to require delay, 
and Points which do not seem to press. 238 For all the 
priorities given, in the sphere of civil government only one 
decision resulted - the appointment of an Asesor (Criminal), 
and even then, a warrant for the appointment was not issued 
until three years later in 1771. 
In the meantime, any hope that thp Privy Council inquiry 
into Johnston's conduct in Menorca would result in a clearer 
definition of the Governor's civil powers had been dashed. in 
its judgement issued in February 1770, the Council accepted 
that Johnston had unjustifiably raised anchorage dues and 
fees for Mediterranean passes, and it was ordered that these 
should be revised in their original amounts. Johnston was 
instructed not to intefere with the Jurats' management of the 
health and quarantine regulations, and he was to adhere 
strictly to the 1753 Regulations dividing the profit of the 
estanque equally between the Governor and the Jurats. In this 
respect, Johnston was ordered to refund any balance 
outstanding to the jurats since 1763. Charges that Johnston 
had abused the right of the Jurats to make afforations, and 
that he had discriminated unfairly in the issue of 
Mediterranean passes were dismissed. The overall conclusion 
of the Council was that the bulk of the charges against the 
Lt-Governor were 'not made out in proof', and that his 
conduct had not proceeded from any corrupt motive, and it 
concluded that there was no cause for 'recall or censuret. 239 
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After the Privy Council had concluded its inquiry, 
Johnston continued in command in Menorca until Mostyn's 
arrival in the island in January 1771, and then, after 
Mostyn's departure, for a further eighteen months from 
December 1772 until November 1774. During these periods he 
seems to have heeded the advice he was given by the Secretary 
of State not to be: 
provoked by the impertinent and vexatious but 
contemptible opposition you meet within the discharge 
of your duty into any hasty and mistaken exercise of 
power. 240 
It was not that the Jurats ceased to complain, but the 
grievances were now largely concerned with alleged abuses by 
Johnston of his powers as Military and not Civil Governor 
(although the apportionment of the profits of the estanque 
remained a contentious issue), 241 and they made no impression 
on Johnston and provoked no reaction in London. Johnston 
continued to suggest reforms and economic improvements in 
Menorca, but the home government, preoccupied with affairs 
elsewhere, gave them no consideration and Johnston's last 
proposals were not even acknowledged. 
242 
The government of John Mostyn in Menorca, 1771 -1772. 
But for the Falklands Islands dispute with Spain, it is 
probable that Mostyn, like his immediate predecessors Howard 
and Lyttelton, would have chosen to remain in England and 
allowed the command in Menorca to devolve upon his 
Lieutenant. The prospect of war induced the home government 
to strengthen its overseas bases which were likely targets 
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for Spanish attacks and, with this in mind, Mostyn was 
informed in November 1770 that it was the 'King's pleasure 
that you do repair to your Government of Minorca without loss 
of time'. 243 Mostyn immediately complied with the royal 
command, arriving in Menorca in January 1771, and he 
remained on the island for eighteen months until July 1772. 
of the three British Governors in the island with whom the 
Menorcans had to deal during the second period of British 
rule, Mostyn attracted the least criticism. He avoided any 
major contretemps with the Jurats in the sphere of civil 
government and, indeed, earned their. approval as a military 
governor by the way in which he set out to correct abuses in 
the quartering of troops, and in the sympathetic mannner in 
which he tackled the problems arising out of the decision to 
demolish the arrabal of St. Philip's and construct a new 
town, Georgetown, a few miles away at Cala Font. 
Mostyn might well have returned to England with a happier 
memory of Menorca, had it not been for one incident which was 
to cost him dearly, and led him to say that he would never 
return - not even if he were offered the fee simple of the 
island. 244 In September 1771, Mostyn ordered the arrest, 
imprisonment and then banishment of Antonio Fabrigas on a 
charge of seditious behaviour. It was not a decision which 
Mostyn took hastily or lightly - he consulted the island's 
law officers and was supported in his action by the opinions 
of his field officers - but it as a decision which Mostyn was 
called upon to justify when Fabrigas was encouraged to bring 
a civil action in the English courts, 245 seeking damages for 
false imprisonment and banishment. 246 
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r Fabrigas, variously described in court as a 'gentleman of 
the island of Minorca of as good condition as any 
inhabitant'247 by counsel for the plaintiff, and as 'Red 
Toney, a troublesome, drunken, shuffling fellow, 248 by 
Colonel Mackellar, the Chief Engineer in Menorca, had applied 
to the Almotace"n of St. Philip's to sell wine in the arrabal, 
but his request had been rejected on the grounds that 
licences were issued in order, and he was told that he would 
have to wait his turn on the roster. FSbrigas appealed to 
Mostyn, alleging bias on the part of the Almotacen, who was 
also a wineseller. Mostyn rejected. the appeal, whereupon 
Of Fabrigas presented a petition to the Governor accusing the 
Almotacen on twelve counts of misconduct and prejudice. 
Mostyn took legal advice, which was that the accusations 
could not be substantiated, but that it was open to Fabrigas 
to pursue his case in the court of Royal Government, and 
Fabrigas was so advised. Fabrigas' reaction was to write 
again to Mostyn, stating that he intended to return in 
twenty-four hours, together with a band of supporters at 
which time he expected his petition to be granted. 
249 Faced 
with this challenge to his authority as Sovernor, Mostyn 
decided to I lay hold of the man and send him out of the 
island' . 
250 It emerged at the trial that this was done in a 
rather brutal manner and that Fabrigas, during his five days 
of imprisonment in the island, was held under maximum 
security and was refused permission even to see his family. 
The essential f acts in the case were not in dispute in 
court, although precise dates and times, the number of 
supporters intended to bring with him for his confrontation 
with Mostyn, and the reliability of the Menorcan interpreters 
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were, at various times, called into question. The plaintiff's 
case was that Mostyn had exceeded his authority by 
imprisoning him and banishing him without trial. Mostyn's 
defence was that the arrabal of St. Philip's was a 'royalty' 
-a district outside the jurisdiction of the island's courts 
in which he, by virtue of his Letters Patent as Governor, had 
'absolute government, 251 - and that the seditious nature of 
the plaintiff's conduct and its mutinous implications 
justified his actions. In November 1773, the jury found for 
Fabrigas, exonerating him of sedition and mutiny, and awarded 
him damages of E3,000 and ordered Mostyn to pay all the costs 
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of the action. 
The verdict was remarkable and surprising in that it ran 
contrary to the judgement of the Chief Justice of the Court 
of Common Pleas in 1765, in which he had ruled that a civil 
action for damages brought by a Menorcan was inadmissable in 
an English court. Mostyn appealed against the sentence of the 
court, partly on these grounds, but he was again 
unsuccessful. In January 1775, Lord Chief Justice Mansfield 
and his fellow judges upheld the verdict, and ruled that 
Fabrigas, as a subject of King George III, had as good a 
right as any British-born subject to apply for justice in 
England, and that the offence was committed in Menorca was no 
bar to the case being heard in England. 
253 In the 
circumstances, it is not surprising that Mostyn did not 
return to his command in Menorca. 
The goverriment of the Hon James Murray, 1774-1782. 
Could they [French Canadians] be indulged with a few 
privileges which the laws of England deny Roman 
Catholics at home, they would soon get the better 
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of every natural antipathy to their conquerors 
and become the most faithful and useful set 
of men. 254 
Such was the philosophy with which Lt-General the Hon 
James Murray, Johnston's successor as Lt-Governor in Menorca 
in 1774, had approached his task as Governor of Quebec, and 
in the short period of his government there he did his best 
to implement it. He persuaded the home government to sanction 
the appointment of a Bishop (in all but name) to minister to 
the spiritual needs of the Catholic population; 
255 he 
substituted English for French criminal law, and he allowed 
Catholics to practise as lawyers and to sit on juries. But 
his conciliatory approach had progressed too quickly for some 
politicians at home, and certainly for the small but 
disproportionately influential group of British settlers in 
Canada (they were initially outnumbered by some three hundred 
and fifty to one), 256 and Murray was recalled to England in 
1766 to face an inquiry into his administration. In April 
1767, an Order in Council dismissed the charges against him 
as 'groundlessl, 
257 but he did not return to Canada, and his 
next active command was in Menorca. 
It was a command which Murray, uniquely among the British 
commanders in Menorca, deliberately sought. His regiment 
(13th Foot). had been one of the regiments sent to Menorca to 
strengthen the garrison at the time of the Falklands crisis, 
and in 1774, he requested permission to join it there and 
exchange the post of Governor of Quebec (a post he still held 
as an absentee), for the Lieutenant-Governorship of Menorca. 
The offer proved attractive to Johnston, particularly since 
Murray undertook to compensate Johnston for the rest of his 
life with the difference in salary between the two posts. 258 
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The exchange received royal approval, and Murray and Johnston 
received their respective warrants in November 1774.259 
It might have been expected that the appointment of 
Murray, the first British governor in Menorca to have had the 
experience of civil government of a predominantly Catholic 
British colony, who took pride, even after his recall from 
Quebec, in having been accused of: 
warmth and firmness in protecting the King's French 
Canadian subjects, and of doing the utmost in my 
power to gain my royal master the affections of that 
brave, hardy people, 260 
would have been well-suited to command in Menorca, but it was 
not to be. Whether it was that Murray's appointment came too 
late for the Jurats to overcome their long-standing mistrust 
of British rule, or whether Murray's sympathies and 
admiration for the Canadians did not immediately extend 
towards the Menorcans he was, in time, to consider them a 
'turbulent people, 261 the civil government of Menorca 
under Murray was no less fraught with disputes than it had 
been in the past. Furthermore, Murray had, by his own 
admission, a 'temper as quick as lightning and combustible 
like gunpowders', 262 and it was a temper which was sorely 
tried by the tenacious manner in which the Jurats clung to 
traditional ways, and were accustomed to I pout at the King's 
orders and harass his Ministers and Governors upon every 
263 trifling occasion'. 
Murray assumed command in Menorca shortly before the 
outbreak of the American War of Independence, and at a time 
when Britain's other overseas Possessions were potentially 
under threat from her traditional 18th century adversaries, 
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France and Spain. Murray's prime responsibilty was to ensure 
the security of the island and his efforts to achieve this 
military objective occasioned most of the petitions of 
grievance which he received from the Jurats. Nevertheless, 
protests about Murray's actions in the strictly civil sphere 
of his administration were not lacking. The Jurats strongly 
resented his ban on any assembly of the universities which he 
had not sanctioned, and his insistence that his 
representatives must be present at any such meeting; 264 he 
was accused of interfering in the elections and of exceeding 
his authority in dismissing the Secrqtary of the Universitat 
of Mahon. 265 There were accusations that he had censored 
letters leaving Menorca, that he had interfered in the 
afforations, ignored the laws of trespass and individual 
liberty, and had instituted new criminal laws and caused 
illegal punishments to be inflicted. 266 
Although Murray, at an early stage of his command, 
unsuccessfully recommended that knighthoods be conferred upon 
two prominent Menorcan anglophiles, Mateo Mercadal and Diego 
Vidal y Segui, 267 whatever inclination he may have had 
initially to conciliate the Menorcans did not persist for 
long, and he became convinced that Britain's retention of 
Menorca (and, incidentally, Gibraltar) was 'a prodigious 
expensel, 268 and economically unjustifiable. Nevertheless, 
this did not prevent him from urging upon the home government 
reforms in the government of the island. By the second year 
of his command, he had become convinced that fundamental 
changes were necessary. He wrote to the Secretary of State in 
April 1776, urging a thorough revision of the Menorcan 
constitution, drawing attention to the fact that some of the 
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laws and fueros dated, unchanged, from the early fourteenth 
century, when the population was insignificant, the people 
ignorant and the economy geared to day-to-day survival. 269 
Under British rule, the population had increased 
substantially, the people were more knowledgeable and less 
insular in their outlook and the economic well-being of the 
island had improved immeasurably. But, he contended, the 
affairs of the Universitats, particularly their finances, 
would continue to be lamentably unsatisfactory until control 
of them was vested in the 'opulent and instructed' classes of 
the community, and not entrusted to Imechanicks, farmers and 
a very small proportion of citizens', 270 and Murray urged 
stricter control of the finances of the Universitats by 
subjecting their accounts to annual scrutiny by the court of 
Royal Government. There was little novelty in Murray's 
proposed constitutional reforms - Johnston had argued along 
the same lines ten years earlier, and they embodied many of 
Kane's suggestions - but their timing was unfortunate. As on 
other occasions, the recommendations reached the home 
government at a time when it was preoccupied with other 
matters (on this occasion, the war in America), and no 
serious consideration was given to them. Murray was left to 
govern in the same pragmatic manner as his predecessors, and 
this, inevitably, led to yet another Syndich, Francisco 
Ximenes, being sent to London by the Jurats in 1780 to 
present the accumulation of grievances against Murray to 
which reference has already been made. Ximenes presented the 
petition (which Murray sarcastically described as a 
'panegyrick' on his administration, 271 to the Privy Council 
in the Spring of 1781, but before any inquiry was instituted, 
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it was overtaken by events. Spain invaded Menorca in August 
1781, and with the island's loss to Spain in February 1782, 
the inquiry became pointless. 
The Spanish acquisition of Menorca pre-empted the need for 
Murray to answer the Jurats' complaintsbut, on his return to 
England, it did not prevent him from having to face a court 
martial and a civil action for damages, both relating to his 
conduct in Menorca, and arising from 'those tempestuous 
passions for which he is too frequently remarkable'. 272 The 
court martial took place as a result of twenty-nine charges 
of misconduct made against Murray by. his deputy in Menorca, 
Lt-General Sir William Draper. Some of the charges echoed 
complaints listed by the Jurats in their petition, others 
were of a military nature, relating to Murray's conduct of 
the siege of St. Philip's. 273 In January 1783, he was 
acquitted of all but two charges - undue interference with 
auction fees, and of issuing an order derogatory to the 
standing of his Lt-Governor. 
274 Murray was sentenced to be 
reprimanded on the two charges of which he had been found 
guilty, but George III overruled the verdict. Draper was 
ordered to apologise to Murray, and a month, after the trial 
Murray was promoted to the rank of General. 
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The civil action against Murray was brought in 1783 by 
James Sutherland, whom Murray had suspended from his post as 
judge of the - vice-admiralty court for alleged seditious 
behaviour. Here again there is evidence of a clash of 
personalities and of vigorous reactions by Murray to some of 
Sutherland's decisions. George III, to whom the matter had 
been referred in 1780, had confirmed Murray's action, but 
Sutherland pursued his case in court where, notwithstanding 
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the King's known views, the jury found for Sutherland, and 
awarded him damages of E5,000 (plus costs) for unfair 
dismissal. However, such was the public standing of 'Old 
Minorca' as Murray was popularly known, the House of Commons 
voted on 6 May 1785 that Murray's fine and legal costs should 
be paid out of public funds. 276 
Britain's failure to establish a civil government in 
Menorca, even to the extent of defining the Governor's 
jurisdiction, created confusion. In the circumstances, it is 
understandable that the Jurats chose to interpret Britain's 
repeated undertaking to respect thqir fueros in the most 
literal manner. The Jurats saw a clear distinction between 
civil and military government, and between their authority 
and the limits of the Governors' civil jurisdiction, and they 
were frustrated when what they considered to be unwarranted 
gubernatorial intervention in their affairs was justified by 
the Governors on the grounds of the exigencies of His 
Majesty's service. But the Jurats protested too much, and too 
often about comparatively trivial matters. They must also 
stand accused of intransigence. By the second period of 
British rule, some Menorcans, principally the emerging 
business class and those in permanent administrative 
government posts, were aware that the age-old system of 
election to the Universitats by ballot from the four estates, 
was out of date. Whatever the democratic virtues of the 
system, it placed the running of the island's internal 
affairs in the hands of too many who were inexperienced in 
financial management, and who were intellectually ill- 
equipped to cope with all the problems of government. The 
annual election of Jurats militated against the introduction 
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of any innovative measures, and the objectives of the Jurats 
during their year in office were limited to a persistent 
determination to retain their authority independent of the 
Governor, and to an exercise in financial damage limitation. 
The British Governors must also bear their share of blame 
for their consistently confrontational approach to the issues 
of civil government. Without exception the Governors were 
senior army officers who were accustomed to having their 
orders carried out without delay or question and, lacking any 
clear directives, the Governors failed either dependably or 
consistently to distinguish between their civil and military 
authority. This resulted in what the Jurats considered to be 
ill-disguised, autocratic military rule, under which the 
Menorcans were not respected as British subjects, and were 
treated as natives of an occupied territory, whose rights and 
privileges were disregarded at will. All the British 
Governors in Menorca were criticised by the Jurats for their 
conduct in this context, and most were accused of extortion. 
This was most clearly illustrated in the long-running 
disputes about the apportionment of the profits of the 
estanque and the anchorage dues, but accusations were also 
periodically levelled that the Governors abused their 
authority by charging excessive licensing fees, and were 
guilty of profiteering at the expense of the Menorcans. 
Mostyn was excluded from criticism on this count (although it 
will be shown that he was not above accepting a bribe), 
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and so, curiously, was Kane who undoubtedly used his position 
to increase his emoluments. Although nothing seems to have 
come of the venture, Kane sought, and together with 
Carpenter, was granted in 1718 a royal patent for the 
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manufacture of salt in Menorca, 278 and, in 1724, when the 
estanque was established, Kane reached an agreement with the 
Jurats that half the profit should be 'a Perquisite to the 
Governor for his concurrence in laying on that Duty'. 279 It 
was also Kane who negotiated the first contracts for the 
supply of bread to the garrison (in 1714,280 1728,281 and 
1735282), by which one third of the profits accrued to the 
Governor. But it was ironic and unjust that Murray should 
have been accused of cupidity (not only by the Jurats but 
also by Menorcan historians), for he had long considered the 
emoluments attached to a Sovernorship to be distasteful. In 
his governorship in Quebec, he had deliberately chosen to 
forego E4,000 of fees which could legitimately have been 
considered part of his perquisites, 283 and on his appointment 
to Menorca, he suggested to the Paymaster General, with the 
support of the Secretary at War, that all the money which the 
governor received from perquisites should be made over to the 
Pay Office, and the governor should be paid a fixed salary of 
E3,000 p. a. (equivalent to the total of pay plus perquisites), 
in order that: 
the Governor or Lt-Governor on the spot may preserve 
his dignity and authority, which is impossible for 
him to do if his income is made up of perquisites 
to be taken and demanded on his authority. 
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